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Abstract
The Proscriptive Principle and Logics of Analytic Implication
by
Thomas Macaulay Ferguson
Adviser: Professor Graham Priest
The analogy between inference and mereological containment goes at least back to Aristotle,
whose discussion in the Prior Analytics motivates the validity of the syllogism by way of
talk of parts and wholes. On this picture, the application of syllogistic is merely the anal-
ysis of concepts, a term that presupposes—through the root ἀνά + λύω —a mereological
background.
In the 1930s, such considerations led William T. Parry to attempt to codify this notion
of logical containment in his system of analytic implication AI. Parry’s system AI was later
expanded to the system PAI. The hallmark of Parry’s systems—and of what may be thought
of as containment logics or Parry systems in general—is a strong relevance property called
the ‘Proscriptive Principle’ (PP) described by Parry as the thesis that:
No formula with analytic implication as main relation holds universally if it has
a free variable occurring in the consequent but not the antecedent.
This type of proscription is on its face justified, as the presence of a novel parameter in the
consequent corresponds to the introduction of new subject matter. The plausibility of the
thesis that the content of a statement is related to its subject matter thus appears also to
support the validity of the formal principle.
Primarily due to the perception that Parry’s formal systems were intended to accurately
model Kant’s notion of an analytic judgment, Parry’s deductive systems—and the suitability
v
of the Proscriptive Principle in general—were met with severe criticism. While Anderson and
Belnap argued that Parry’s criterion failed to account for a number of prima facie analytic
judgments, others—such as Sylvan and Brady—argued that the utility of the criterion was
impeded by its reliance on a ‘syntactical’ device.
But these arguments are restricted to Parry’s work qua exegesis of Kant and fail to take
into account the breadth of applications in which the Proscriptive Principle emerges. It is the
goal of the present work to explore themes related to deductive systems satisfying one form
of the Proscriptive Principle or other, with a special emphasis placed on the rehabilitation
of their study to some degree. The structure of the dissertation is as follows:
∗ In Chapter 2 we identify and develop the relationship between Parry-type deductive sys-
tems and the field of ‘logics of nonsense.’ Of particular importance is Dmitri Bochvar’s
‘internal’ nonsense logic Σ0, and we observe that two ⊢-Parry subsystems of Σ0—Harry
Deutsch’s Sfde and Frederick Johnson’s RC—can be considered to be the products of partic-
ular ‘strategies’ of eliminating problematic inferences from Bochvar’s system.
∗ The material of Chapter 3 considers Kit Fine’s program of state space semantics in the
context of Parry logics. Fine—who had already provided the first intuitive semantics for
Parry’s PAI—has offered a formal model of truthmaking (and falsemaking) that provides
one of the first natural semantics for Richard B. Angell’s logic of analytic containment AC,
itself a ⊢-Parry system. After discussing the relationship between state space semantics and
nonsense, we observe that Fabrice Correia’s weaker framework—introduced as a semantics
for a containment logic weaker than AC—tacitly endorses an implausible feature of allowing
hypernonsensical statements. By modelling Correia’s containment logic within the stronger
setting of Fine’s semantics, we are able to retain Correia’s intuitions about factual equivalence
without such a commitment. As a further application, we observe that Fine’s setting can
resolve some ambiguities in Greg Restall’s own truthmaker semantics.
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∗ Chapter 4 we consider interpretations of disjunction that accord with the characteristic
failure of Addition in which the evaluation of a disjunction A ∨̇ B requires not only the
truth of one disjunct, but also that both disjuncts satisfy some further property. In the
setting of computation, such an analysis requires the existence of some procedure tasked
with ensuring the satisfaction of this property by both disjuncts. This observation leads to
a computational analysis of the relationship between Parry logics and logics of nonsense in
which the semantic category of ‘nonsense’ is associated with catastrophic faults in computer
programs. In this spirit, we examine semantics for several ⊢-Parry logics in terms of the
successful execution of certain types of programs and the consequences of extending this
analysis to dynamic logic and constructive logic.
∗ Chapter 5 considers these faults in the particular case in which Nuel Belnap’s ‘artificial
reasoner’ is unable to retrieve the value assigned to a variable. This leads not only to a natural
interpretation of Graham Priest’s semantics for the ⊢-Parry system S⋆
fde
but also a novel,
many-valued semantics for Angell’s AC, completeness of which is proven by establishing a
correspondence with Correia’s semantics for AC. These many-valued semantics have the
additional benefit of allowing us to apply the material in Chapter 2 to the case of AC to
define intensional extensions of AC in the spirit of Parry’s PAI.
∗ One particular instance of the type of disjunction central to Chapter 4 is Melvin Fitting’s
cut-down disjunction. Chapter 6 examines cut-down operations in more detail and provides
bilattice and trilattice semantics for the ⊢-Parry systems Sfde and AC in the style of Ofer
Arieli and Arnon Avron’s logical bilattices. The elegant connection between these systems
and logical multilattices supports the fundamentality and naturalness of these logics and,
additionally, allows us to extend epistemic interpretation of bilattices in the tradition of
artificial intelligence to these systems.
∗ Finally, the correspondence between the present many-valued semantics for AC and those
vii
of Correia is revisited in Chapter 7. The technique that plays an essential role in Chapter 4 is
used to characterize a wide class of first-degree calculi intermediate between AC and classical
logic in Correia’s setting. This correspondence allows the correction of an incorrect charac-
terization of classical logic made by Correia and leads to the question of how to characterize
hybrid systems extending Angell’s AC∗. Finally, we consider whether this correspondence
aids in providing an interpretation to Correia’s first semantics for AC.
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5.4.1 The Gödel-Fine Analysis of AC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.4.2 Extending to Higher Degree Formulae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6 Cut-Down Operations on Multilattices 177
6.1 Introduction: Bilattices and Cut-Downs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.2 Cut-Down Operations on Bilattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
CONTENTS xvi
6.2.1 Logical Bilattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.2.2 Sfde on Bilattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.3 NINE2 and AC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.4 Cut-Down Operations on Trilattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.4.1 Generalizations of Cut-Down Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.4.2 Some Properties of Trifilters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
6.5 Analytic Logic on Trilattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.5.1 Sfde on Trilattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.5.2 Interlude: Analytic Containment and Sfde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
6.5.3 AC on Trilattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
6.6 Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
7 Correia Semantics Revisited 217
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
7.2 Analytic Containment and Correia Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
7.2.1 Semantical Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
7.2.2 Correlating the Two Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.2.3 A General Characterization Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
7.3 Correia Models and Other Propositional Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
7.3.1 First-Degree Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
7.3.2 ‘Analytic’ Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
7.3.3 Non-‘Analytic’ Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
7.3.4 Correia’s Characterization of Classical Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
7.4 Conclusions and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
7.4.1 Extensions of AC∗ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
7.4.2 Clauses and Clutters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
CONTENTS xvii
8 Concluding Remarks 245
8.1 Refining the Notion of Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
8.1.1 The Content of Entailments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
8.1.2 Quantification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
8.2 Related Deductive Calculi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
8.2.1 Dual Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
8.2.2 Other Parry Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
8.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Bibliography 258
List of Figures
3.1 T ⊒ U and U ′ ⊑ T ′ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1 Relationships Between →-Parry Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.2 Relationships Between ⊢-Parry Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3 McCarthy-style Algorithm Interpreting Disjunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4 Algorithm with Undeclared Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.1 Systems Intermediate Between PAC and DAI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.1 The Bilattice FOUR2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.2 The Bilattice NINE2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.1 First-Degree Systems Intermediate Between AC and CL . . . . . . . . . . . . 234





1.1 The Proscriptive Principle and Its Rivals
The analogy between inference and mereological containment goes at least back to Aristotle,
whose discussion in the Prior Analytics motivates the validity of the syllogism by way of
talk of parts and wholes.
When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained
in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the
extremes must admit of perfect syllogism. By ‘middle term’ I mean that which
both is contained in another and contains another in itself... and by ‘extremes’ (a)
that which is contained in another and (b) that in which another is contained.(15,
p. 209)
On this picture, the application of syllogistic is merely the analysis of concepts, a term that
presupposes—through the root ἀνά + λύω —a mereological background.
1
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Considering the backdrop of class logic that figures so heavily in extensional syllogistic,
such an analogy is perhaps inevitable. But the more general mereological analogy that logical
inference in general is a process that breaks up a statement into its constituent parts finds
expression in many discussions of inferences between propositions. For example, as reported
by William and Martha Kneale, one of the four competing interpretations of the conditional
described by Sextus Empiricus is a relation of containment:
And those who judge by implication say that a true conditional is one whose
consequent is contained potentially in its antecedent.(123, p. 129)
One of the most explicit articulations of this analogy is found in Immanuel Kant’s character-
ization of an ‘analytic’ judgment. Certainly—as will be reflected in the sequel—Kant’s name
is uniformly the first to be invoked when this subject is taken up. Kant, recall, determines
that a judgment ‘A is B’ is analytic precisely in those cases in which:
the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained
in this concept A.(118, p. 130)
In more dynamic—and colorful—terms, Kant goes on to characterize the analyticity of a
judgment in terms of an activity, or an operation carried out on concepts:
One could also call [analytic judgments] judgments of clarification... since through
the predicate the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but
only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were
already thought in it (though confusedly).(118, p. 130)
In its identification of a particular species of inference with the containment of concepts,
Kant’s criterion is essentially the assertion that there exists a correspondence between the
behavior of logical inference and background assumptions concerning not only an underlying
class theory but also a mereology of concepts or meanings.
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To investigate this analogy with further rigor, of course, demands that the nature of
relata of this containment relation—concepts, semantic content, meanings—be made more
precise. Considering the sheer diversity of competing interpretations of Kant’s project, it is
hardly surprising that analyses of this relationship between inference and content are just as
diverse.
The relationship between inference and the content or meaning of a sentence was taken
up frequently during the early development of modern analytic philosophy. As Ken Gemes
identifies in (93), Rudolph Carnap considers the class of logical consequences of a sentence A
(modulo classical logic) to be the essential ingredient in determining its content. He writes:
the class of non-valid consequences of a given sentence is called the content of
this sentence.(40, p. 42)
In other words, the content of a sentence A is given by the the statements that follow from
it in a non-vacuous manner.
Like Carnap, Karl Popper’s characterization of a statement’s content—also related by
Gemes in (93)—places an emphasis on the role of classical inference and is similar in its
character.
By logical content (or the consequence class of [A]) we mean the class of all
statements that follow from [A].(153, p. 385)
Although both recognize a relationship between some notion of content and logical inference,
the nature of Carnap and Popper’s analyses diverge from Kant in an important way. Because
Kant characterizes analyticity of an inference in terms of the structure and relationships
between the concepts involved, the semantic notion is clearly taken as the primitive notion.
In contrast, both Carnap and Popper’s analyses (considered by Gemes in (93) to be the
‘traditional’ notion) treat content as a class of statements whose extension is determined—
at least, in part—by the more fundamental notion of classical logic.
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After Gemes himself outlined a novel theory of content in (93) and (94), Gemes argued
that the earlier theories of Carnap and Popper were too generous with respect to their
respective notions of content for their endorsement of the following property:
where content is identified with consequence class, for any A and B, as long as
¬A does not entail B, there will always be a content part of A that ‘includes’ B,
namely, [the content of] A ∨̇ B.(93, p. 600)
Gemes cites as an unfortunate consequence of this ‘traditional view’ that
not only do Relativity theory and Newtonian mechanics share common con-
tent but also so do Relativity theory and your favorite crackpot theory, say,
Dianetics.(93, p. 597)
Gemes outlines a number of further pathologies that result from this type of definition. For
example, on both Carnap and Popper’s accounts any satisfiable statement A contains both
A ∨̇ B and A ∨̇ ¬B for an arbitrary B and—since B is either true or false—will thereby
contain a true statement as part of its content. Hence, if the ‘partial truth’ of a statement
is understood as the property that some content part of that statement is true, then every
contingently false statement is partially true, contrary to our natural expectations.
While not motivated as analyses of meaning containment per se, each of these theories
of content is rich enough to indirectly support a corresponding characterization of infer-
ences that are analytic in a Kantian sense, that is, those inferences valid in virtue of the
consequent’s content being part of the antecedent’s content. Although somewhat circular,
Popper’s account entails that classical consequence is a logic of meaning containment.
Ross Brady more directly attacks the problem in his description of weak relevant logics
that can be thought of as logics of containment of meaning. Brady’s ‘containment logic’ DJ—
described in (36)—builds off of considerations articulated in his (35) and, most recently, has
borne fruit in his analysis of relevant arithmetic in (37).
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Brady’s work argues that meaning containment is part of the correct analysis of logical
entailment, defining the content of a statement A as:
the set of all sentences which can be analytically established from [A], using the
properties of relations and terms of [A]... taken in [its] proper context... Thus,
the content [c(A)] is an analytic closure.(36, p. 161)
We may note that Brady’s definition is, like Carnap and Popper’s before it, a class of formulae
and shares with them the property that any two contingent statements will share a content
part.
We won’t go into these particular accounts in any further detail, motivating our leaving
them aside due to a common feature. All of the foregoing notions of content are indifferent
with respect to the notion of subject matter. Where p and q are atomic formulae, each of these
definitions demand that the content of the formula p contains the content of the complex
formula p ∧̇ (p ∨̇ q). If we consider interpretations in which p and q are heterogeneous in
their subject matter—say that one is a statement about arithmetic while the other a line
from The Wind in the Willows—it might seem far-fetched to suggest that the analysis of
the one should include any mention of the other.
In the present case, we will restrict our attention to formalizations of the contain-
ment/entailment analogy in which attention is given to subject matter, and will take as
the archetypal case the systems in the family of analytic implication described by William
T. Parry.
1.1.1 Parry’s Proscriptive Principle
In the 1930s, such considerations led William T. Parry to attempt to codify this notion of
logical containment in his system of analytic implication AI. Parry was a product of the
logical school at Harvard led by C. I. Lewis, Henry Sheffer, and Alfred North Whitehead.
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Along with Parry, this group that produced many other logicians during the tumultuous
early years of non-classical logic, such as Everett Nelson (known for early work on connexive
logic) and Arnold Emch (who produced early work on modal logic). Parry had a profound
influence on the development of modal logic proper, with many of the proofs and material
in Lewis and Langford’s (127) attributed to him.
Parry’s system AI was introduced in (143) and expanded to the system PAI in (144).
The matter of the axiomatization of Parry’s intuitions is somewhat complicated. Although
Parry’s dissertation (142) included a primitive rule of adjunction, the rule was omitted in the
first published axiomatization in (143). For a number of reasons, we will prefer to consider
the expanded system. Although semantics for PAI were provided by Kit Fine in (81), there is
no known semantics with respect to which the first system is complete. Furthermore, Parry’s
(147) states that the expanded system PAI was always his intent, and was first formalized in
an unpublished paper from 1957.
The hallmark of Parry’s systems—and of what may be thought of as containment logics
or Parry systems in general—is a strong relevance property called the ‘Proscriptive Principle’
(PP) described in (144, p. 151) as the thesis that:
No formula with analytic implication as main relation holds universally if it has
a free variable occurring in the consequent but not the antecedent.
This type of proscription is on its face justified, as the presence of a novel variable in the
consequent corresponds to the introduction of new subject matter. The plausibility of the
thesis that the content of a statement is related to its subject matter thus appears also to
support the validity of the formal principle.
A colorful example of the sort of entailment that Parry intends to rule out as valid is
explained as follows:
If a system contains the assertion that two points determine a straight line, does
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the theorem necessarily follow that either two points determine a straight line
or the moon is made of green cheese? No, for the system may contain no terms
from which ‘moon,’ etc., can be defined. (144, p. 151)
To the layperson, the deduction of facts nominally about green cheese—at least in part—from
the axioms of geometry seems unusual.
Despite its a priori plausibility, it should be clear that the Proscriptive Principle is
not universally accepted as a constraint on the containment relation between meanings or
semantic content. Such a criterion is obviously not respected by Carnap and Popper’s
proposals; because any classical consequence of p ∨̇ q is a fortiori a classical consequence of
p, under both definitions, the content of p ∨̇ q is contained in the content of p yet flagrantly
violates the PP.
Despite Gemes’ rejection of the ‘traditional’ definitions, the picture of content inclusion
outlined in his (93) and (94) itself contradicts Parry’s Proscriptive Principle. His own theory
entails that whenever B is a part of the content of A, then B must also be a part of the content
of any A′ logically equivalent to A. Formally, the divergence between Parry’s assumptions
and those of Gemes is easy to identify. For example, despite the logical equivalence (modulo
classical logic) between the complex formula A ∧̇ (A ∨̇ B) and A, Parry asserts that the
classes of formulae that are analytically entailed by the two are distinct in general (that
is, some atom appearing in B does not appear in A). According to Parry, the formula
A ∧̇ (A ∨̇ B) → analytically entails the formula A ∧̇ (A ∨̇ B) although (the classically
equivalent) formula A fails to analytically entail A ∨̇ B.
Gemes argues that a notion of content with respect to which classically equivalent state-
ments may differ in content cannot be reconciled with his aims:
[E]mbracing a notion of content that entails an abandonment of classical equiv-
alence would make that notion of content difficult to use for many projects in
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the philosophy of science which carry a commitment to classical equivalence.(93,
p. 600)
Furthermore, this property immediately reveals the incompatibility between Parry’s project
and Brady’s formal analysis of entailment as containment of meaning. The axiomatization
in (36) of Brady’s preferred containment logic DJ—a system designed as a characterization
of entailments induced by meaning containment—includes axioms such as A→ A ∨̇ B. The
validity of such entailments immediately conflicts with Parry’s formal property.
In Parry’s own system, the PP is a property of theorems of AI; this property may be
called the PP→—Proscriptive Principle for theorems. Now, consider a language L+ that
defined with a negation, conjunction, and disjunction connectives, as well as an intensional
implication connective →, i.e., an implication connective distinct from the material condi-
tional:
Definition 1.1.1. Let At = {p0, p1, ...} be a denumerable set of atomic formulae. Then the
propositional language L+ is defined in Backus-Naur form with p ∈ At:
A ::= p| ¬̇A|A ∧̇ A|A ∨̇ A|A→ A
Note that the languages in which we will be working are propositional, lacking predicates,
quantifiers, and so forth. The matter of interpreting such notions in logics of analytic impli-
cation is interesting, but one that will be set aside for future work.
We will in the sequel also refer to a set of literals Lit, defined as At∪{¬̇ p | p ∈ At}. For
an arbitrary formula A, let ‘At(A)’ represent the set of atoms in At that appear in A. Then
for a language such as L+, the PP
→ may be succinctly described as the following constraint
on a deductive system:
PP→ If ⊢ A→ B, then At(B) ⊆ At(A)
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However, we will frequently describe deductive systems within a zeroth degree language that
includes negation, conjunction, and disjunction as its sole logical constants, such as Lzdf:
Definition 1.1.2. Where At is a denumerable set of atomic formulae, Lzdf is defined in
Backus-Naur form with p ∈ At:
A ::= p| ¬̇A|A ∧̇ A|A ∨̇ A
Because deductive systems defined over Lzdf lack an intensional implication connective (al-
though they admit a definable material conditional connective ⊃), the PP→ will not be
well-defined in these cases. Let the notation f [X ] represent the image of a set X under a
function f ; in particular, for a collection of formulae Γ, At[Γ] will be the collection of all
atoms appearing in some formula in Γ. Then to carry over Parry’s intuitions to a first-
degree logic, a system will be taken to be a containment logic or a Parry logic if it obeys the
condition:
PP⊢ If Γ ⊢ B, then At(B) ⊆ At[Γ]
Note that Parry’s own system fails to obey the PP⊢.1
An immediate consequence of PP→ and PP⊢ is that each is incompatible with the
respective form of the principle of Addition. This principle may be characterized either
as ranging over formulae of the form A → (A ∨̇ B) or ranging over inferences A ⊢ A ∨̇ B,
depending on the type of system considered. For example:
Addition1 ⊢ A→ (A ∨̇ B)
Addition2 If Γ ⊢ A then Γ ⊢ A ∨̇ B.
1The criticism leveled against Parry by Charles Kielkopf in (120) hinged on this fact; Kielkopf suggested
that the inference A AI B ∨̇ ¬̇B reveals a fatal flaw in AI as B ∨̇ ¬̇B is not ‘analytically contained’ in A
in Parry’s sense. Kielkopf failed to notice, however, that in Parry’s system, the double turnstile is read as
a truth-theoretic relation, whereas analytic implication—the meaning-theoretic relation—is represented by
the connective →.
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While either species of Addition is classically acceptable—indeed, each is acceptable by
the lights of almost any deductive system in the literature—Parry justifies the proscription
against the validity of Addition by claiming that B may ‘introduce new content.’
As some languages contain a conditional connective and others do not, if the spirit of the
Proscriptive Principle is to be preserved in the systems in language L , the property must
be made more precise in such contexts. Indeed, the Proscriptive Principle appears in two
different forms in the literature; Parry’s principle can be formulated with respect to logical
consequence or with respect to the implication connective. With respect to a set of formulae
Γ, recall that At[Γ] denotes the set of all atoms appearing in some B ∈ Γ. Then we can
distinguish these systems formally by writing:
Definition 1.1.3. A formal logical system L is →-Parry if it enjoys the property that
⊢L A→ B only if At(B) ⊆ At(A)
Definition 1.1.4. A formal logical system L is ⊢-Parry if it enjoys the property that
Γ ⊢L A only if At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]
It should be observed that no system can non-vacuously enjoy both these properties. If a
system L is ⊢-Parry, that every formula in L + contains atoms ensures that for no formula
A→ B ∈ L + does L A→ B. 2
A further consequence of this view, of course, is that the scope of deduction theorems
must be very constrained in their scope with respect to Parry-type systems. For example,
if a system L is ⊢-Parry, one cannot infer that ⊢L A → B from A L B, as theoremhood
of A → B (i.e., consequence from an empty set of premises) will violate the Proscriptive
2Richard Epstein’s system PD of paraconsistent dependence logic introduced in (72) nearly exhibits both
properties in that Γ PD A behaves as a ⊢-Parry system when Γ is nonempty and as a→-Parry system when
Γ = ∅. The price for this, however, is that PD’s consequence relation violates the familiar Tarskian axioms
for such relations.
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Principle with respect to the consequence relation. Likewise, if a formula A is logically false
in a →-Parry system L, although A L B for an arbitrary formula B, it cannot thereby be
inferred that L A→ B, as B may contain propositional variables not found in A.
The two versions of the Proscriptive Principle entail can be identified as special cases of
more general conditions corresponding to the selection and placement of atoms in formulae.
In particular, whenever a formula A → B is a theorem of a →-Parry logic, it follows that
the antecedent A and consequent B share some variable p, i.e., theoremhood of A → B
entails that At(A)∩At(B). This condition can be recognized as the famous variable-sharing
property that is characteristic of propositional relevant logics. This weaker property is that
it is a necessary condition on valid inferences that the hypothesis and conclusion have some
propositional variable in common.
VSP If ⊢ A→ B, then At(A) ∩At(B) 6= ∅
Consequently, Parry-type systems can be thought of as a subspecies of relevant logics. In-
deed, many such systems have been introduced with an emphasis placed on their exhibiting
the variable-sharing property rather than the Proscriptive Principle. Harry Deutsch’s work
in (58) and (60) squarely identifies his own systems as relevant, as does the work of Frederick
Johnson in (116) and (117).
Just as Parry’s Proscriptive Principle admits two formulations, satisfaction of the variable-
sharing property can be similarly formulated in two ways.3
Definition 1.1.5. A formal logical system L is ⊢-relevant if
Γ ⊢L A only if At(A) ∩At[Γ] 6= ∅
Definition 1.1.6. A formal logical system L is →-relevant if
3Note that this is sometimes known as ‘weak relevance’ due to a stronger property of ‘depth relevance’
described by Ross Brady in (34).
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⊢L A→ B only if At(A) ∩At(B) 6= ∅
Clearly, systems that are ⊢-Parry or →-Parry enjoy their respective version of the variable-
sharing property.
Observation 1.1.1. If a system L is →-Parry then L is →-relevant.
Observation 1.1.2. If a system L is ⊢-Parry then L is ⊢-relevant.
Some authors, like Deutsch or Johnson, suggest that Parry-type systems, from a semantical
viewpoint, more naturally capture matters of relevance than the standard relevant logics
like R or E. (In some contexts—such as the matter of the frame problem mentioned in
Richard Sylvan’s paper published in various configurations as (186), (184), and (183)—the
conjunction of these two characterizations of ‘relevance’ is viewed as attractive.4)
Deductive systems that are ⊢-Parry are also instances of a more general class of propo-
sitional logics: paraconsistent logics. In Section 1.1.2, it was noted that both relevant and
Parry-style logics can be thought of as arising from distinct strategies against Lewis’ proof of
ECQ. In general, paraconsistent logics are defined as deductive systems whose consequence
relations fail to obey ECQ.
Definition 1.1.7. A logical system L is paraconsistent if there exist formulae A and B such
that
A, ¬̇A 2L B
Both the relevant and Parry-type strategies are successful in this regard.
In particular, it is clear that a system’s being ⊢-Parry entails that it is paraconsistent as
well. For any ⊢-Parry system L and distinct propositional variables p and q, the Proscriptive
Principle entails that p, ¬̇ p 2L q because q /∈ At[{p, ¬̇ p}].
4Explicitly, Sylvan writes: ‘Evidently the best of both, relevant and containment logics without the de-
fects, can be had by combining the two, essentially product-wise. So result relevant containment logics.’(184,
p. 170)
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Being able to introduce versions of the Proscriptive Principle and variable-sharing prop-
erty formulated with respect to both consequence and the conditional connective is useful
in that it enables us to study the first-degree fragments of systems with intensional condi-
tional connectives in isolation. For our purposes, we can define a first-degree fragment of a
deductive system as follows:
Definition 1.1.8. With respect to systems L in language L + and L′ in L , L′ is the first-
degree fragment of L—symbolized by L′ = Lfde—if for all A,B ∈ L :
A L′ B iff L A→ B
This carries the consequence that L is →-Parry only if Lfde is ⊢-Parry.
This distinction is especially useful in analyzing the intensional Parry systems, as in many
cases their first-degree fragments have appeared independently in the literature.
1.1.2 Proscription as ‘Conceptivism’
Conceptivism—a name originated by Richard Sylvan—is a name for a loose confederation
of deductive systems, joined in common resistance to the Principle of Explosion or Ex Con-
tradictione Quodlibet (ECQ), i.e., that from a contradiction A ∧̇ ¬̇A, one may infer an
arbitrary formula B. (166) provides a taxonomy of such renegade logics, distinguished by
the manner in which they resist C. I. Lewis’ demonstration of ECQ in (127). Parry himself
considers the distinctions between analytic implication and its rivals through this lens in
(147) and (146).
For example, relevant logics—the most widely known family of such systems—reject the
inference of Disjunctive Syllogism, i.e., that from A and ¬̇A ∨̇ B one may infer B. Sylvan
identifies the position preempting the Lewis proof by rejecting the Principle of Addition,
i.e., A entails A ∨̇ B, as conceptivism.
Conceptivism is described at (166, p. 96) in the following terms.
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[William] Parry’s position—for which we have coined the ugly term conceptivism—
is that no implication A→ B is correct where B contains concepts which do not
occur in A. Plainly this makes A→ A ∨̇ B [the principle of Addition] incorrect
since B may well, in an obvious sense, ‘contain concepts’ not in A.
The hallmark, according to Sylvan, of conceptivist logics is the rejection of the Principle of
Addition.
Relevant logics and other members of this confederation have received the lion’s share of
attention in the literature. Apart, however, from a handful of technical papers, conceptivism
has been severely neglected in the wake of some particularly sharp criticism of the notion of
‘analytic implication.’ The semantics for PAI and related systems which eventually emerged
made it easy to dismiss conceptivist systems as merely imposing a syntactic filter atop
other, independently motivated systems, without any independent and robust interpretation
of their own.
What we wish to show is that there are clear means of motivating a conceptivist logic
that are not subject to the criticism leveled against the field by Sylvan. We will examine a
number of trends in logic and linguistics that are suggestive of these systems before providing
a robust interpretation supporting the failure of Addition. First, let us survey several of the
objections raised against conceptivism.
Much of the criticism of conceptivism stems from questioning whether Parry’s system
and others in its neighborhood employ a robust notion of ‘concept’ and, in turn, correctly
characterize Kant’s notion of analytic judgment. J. Michael Dunn, for example, introduces
Parry’s work by writing that
Parry’s system is intended to be in step with Kant’s notion of analyticity. (65,
p. 195)
Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel Belnap, Jr. legitimately question whether PAI is successful
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with respect to this goal, suggesting at (7, p. 432) that Addition is required for many
entailments that should be thought of as analytic in the Kantian sense, i.e., true by definition.
E.g., the classic example of ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ is commonly thought to be analytic
due to the validity of Conjunctive Simplification. The story goes that the predicate ‘x is a
bachelor’ is identical to ‘x is a male and x is unmarried’ and so by Conjunctive Simplification,
we may infer that
If x is a male and x is unmarried, then x is unmarried.
Anderson and Belnap suggest that it is just as natural to maintain that the predicate ‘x is
a sibling’ is defined as ‘either x is a sister or x is a brother.’ At (6, p. 23), they write that
there is surely a sense in which A ∨̇ B is ‘contained’ in A; viz., the sense in
which the concept Sibling (which is most naturally defined as Brother-or-Sister)
is contained in the concept Brother. Certainly ‘All brothers are siblings’ would
have been regarded as analytic by Kant.
Essentially, Anderson and Belnap attack the ‘analyticity’ of Parry’s system by describing an
example of a Kantian analytic judgment whose validity is not reflected in PAI. The argument
requires both that we identify the logical form of the judgment ‘All brothers are siblings’
with that of an entailment A→ A ∨̇ B, and that we consider the judgment ‘A brother is a
sibling’ to be a textbook instance of an analytic judgment in the Kantian sense. Given these
assumptions, Anderson and Belnap suggest that PAI—and, indeed, any →-Parry logic—is
inadequately ‘analytic.’
We will not take up the question of whether these two cases really stand or fall together
but merely note that Anderson and Belnaps’s example serves, at best, as a critique of PAI
qua exegesis of Kant.
A further critique of PAI and its neighbors has its origins in a conjecture of Kurt Gödel.
In (143), Parry quotes Gödel as remarking that
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perhaps ‘p analytically implies q’ can be interpreted as ‘q is derivable from p and
the logical axioms and does not include any other concepts than p’
This falls under the heading of what Sylvan calls a ‘double-barrelled’ analysis in (185, p. 166),
where double-barrelled analyses of implicational relations are those that may be reduced to
imposing ‘sieves or strainers, which capture a tighter connection through controlled cases
(“sieving”) of a slacker one.’ Gödel’s conjecture that theoremhood in Parry’s system amounts
to the conjunction of two theses—that A → B is a theorem of some other, independently
motivated system L and that At(B) is a subset of At(A)—‘strains out’ certain cases of
implication in L and is thus such a sieve.
In the 1970s, Dunn and Alasdair Urquhart gave semantical analyses of systems related
to PAI in the papers (65) and (188), respectively, but the Gödel conjecture was ultimately
confirmed by Kit Fine in the paper (81).5 Fine’s semantics amounts to an S4 Kripke model
equipped with additional machinery that essentially tracks when, for any two formula A,B,
At(B) ⊆ At(A). The truth conditions for analytic implication are clearly double-barrelled
in Sylvan’s sense; letting γu denote a map from At to a set C of ‘concepts,’ the account is:








if u  A then u  B, and
γu[At(B)] ⊆ γu[At(A)]
This reveals the analytic implication of Parry as essentially S4 strict implication with an
additional filter.
Part of why this conclusion came across as destructive to conceptivism seems to be that
whereas (supposing L to be sound and complete) a conditional A→ B can in general receive
a semantical characterization, the condition that At(B) ⊆ At(A) is frequently described
as irreducibly syntactical in nature. In general, providing a semantical interpretation for
some feature of a system is essential for showing the intuitions underlying that system to be
5Although note that Dunn, too, proves in (65) that a similar property holds for his demodalized DAI
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natural. Compare, for example, this to Grzegorczyk’s formal interpretation of intuitionistic
logic in (102): his reading of intuitionistic logic as a logic of ‘scientific investigation’ against
classical logic as ‘the logic of ontological thought’ is reinforced by the semantical picture of
(102) and (124) in a way that the axioms alone cannot provide.
Although Fine’s device to track when At(B) ⊆ At(A) is, strictly speaking, semantical,
some have argued that its appeal to syntax fails to provide any deep semantical insight into
the notions of ‘concept’ or ‘analysis.’ Brady, for example, appeals to precisely this feature
in dismissing such a characterization:
[B]eing essentially a syntactic containment, [Fine’s ‘constitutive content’] is not
meaning containment in the sense that we are arguing for.(36, p. 160)
Whether or not Fine’s semantics provides any profound insight into psychology or phe-
nomenology, Sylvan and other critics have suggested that the interpretation of the term
‘concept’ presupposes an isomorphism with that of a propositional variable.
The problem for the larger field of conceptivist logics is that nearly every system intro-
duced in the literature admits such an analysis. Hence, this type of critique against Parry’s
system as ill-motivated extends to virtually all Parry-type systems introduced in the litera-
ture to date. Absent an independent and robust semantical picture, Sylvan argues that the
insights provided by Parry-type systems come across as merely parasitic.
On this basis, Sylvan rather vociferously dismisses conceptivist logics, complaining in
(166, p. 100) that philosophical worries concerning entailment ‘are not repaired simply by
throwing on a variable-inclusion filter.’ That the semantics for PAI ensures the Proscriptive
Principle by such a device leads Sylvan to condemn conceptivism because ‘the conceptivist
objections do not rest on a solid base, but on a narrow and arbitrary assumption as to
what counts as a concept or term.’ (166, p. 101) Hence, offered merely as a formalization of
Kantian analytic judgments, Parry’s system seems to fail.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 18
An intriguing observation is that while Sylvan reads Fine’s result as sounding a dirge
for conceptivism, Parry himself in (148) greets Fine’s results with great enthusiasm; indeed,
he suggests that Fine’s approach confirms his intuitions concerning PAI. Part of Parry’s
reaction seems to stem from the fact that the interpretation of PAI as a Kantian exegesis is an
assumption on the part not of Parry himself, but of his critics. Insight into Parry’s preferred
interpretation can be found in his PhD dissertation (142). Parry considers Proposition 5.123
of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which reads:
If a god creates a world in which certain propositions are true, he creates thereby
also a world in which all propositions consequent on them are true. And similarly
he could not create a world in which the proposition ‘p’ is true without creating
all its objects.
Parry’s reply is:
But one might say: ‘Could not a god create a world in which the proposition p is
true, without thereby creating all the objects contained in any other proposition
q? Then there would be no proposition q, or q ∨̇ ¬̇ q...’
There is certainly room for debate over whether Parry’s reply suffices to show that q ∨̇ ¬̇ q
does not follow from p. But it is clear that Parry is not committed to the equivalence of his
analytic implication with analytic judgments.
Admittedly, Parry’s use of the term ‘analytic implication’ certainly appears to suggest
a Kantian motivation. Yet in (144), Parry explicitly cites his primary inspiration as not
Kant, but H. M. Sheffer, to whom Parry attributes the original case against Addition. This
is reflected well in the discussion of (146):
Our conception of deducibility may be clarified thus: [B] is deducible from [A]
if, in any system in which [A] is asserted, the assertion of [B] is justifiable,
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assuming a reasonably complete logic. Now, we ask, if a system of Euclidean
geometry contains the assertion that two points determine a straight line, are
we justified in asserting in this system: ‘Either two points determine a straight
line or some mice like cheese’? No,. this strange disjunction is not a legitimate
assertion in a system of Eucliddean geometry, for the simple reason that no such
system contains the terms ‘mice’ or ‘cheese’, nor can one define by geometric
concepts a type of cheese any self-respecting mouse would nibble at.(146, p. 24)
But this position does not sound Kantian; it speaks of terms—syntactical objects—rather
than of meaning or content. Yet the dismissal of Parry’s intuition essentially stems from
the supposed conflation of the notions of concept and syntax. As the system is presented by
Parry, the charges of Anderson, Belnap, and Sylvan seem much less compelling. In a sense,
the collapse of the Parry program was illusory; rather than show that Parry’s own intuitions
were off the mark, his critics set up a ‘straw program’ and knocked it down.
It is the goal of the present work to explore some themes related to deductive systems
satisfying one form of the Proscriptive Principle or other, with a special emphasis placed on
the rehabilitation of their study to some degree.
1.2 Overview of the Material
The dissertation is roughly divided into two sections. The first is primarily concerned with
interpreting the Proscriptive Principle through the lens of the semantic category of nonsense,
with Chapters 2, 3, and 4 considering the relationship between the two in the contexts
of linguistics/semantics, metaphysics, and computation, respectively. The second section
emphasizes formal and algebraic analysis the family of first-degree Parry logics intermediate
between Parry’s PAIfde and Richard B. Angell’s AC, with Chapters 5, 6, and 7 treating this
family in the settings of many-valued semantics, Arieli/Avron-style logical bilattices, and
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Correia’s 2004 semantics for AC.
In Chapter 2—much of which has appeared in the paper (77)—we identify and develop
the relationship between Parry-type deductive systems and the field of ‘logics of nonsense.’
Of particular importance is Dmitri Bochvar’s ‘internal’ nonsense logic Σ0, and we observe
that two ⊢-Parry subsystems of Σ0—Harry Deutsch’s Sfde and Frederick Johnson’s RC—
can be considered to be the products of particular ‘strategies’ of eliminating problematic
inferences from Bochvar’s system.
The material of Chapter 3 considers Kit Fine’s program of state space semantics in the
context of Parry logics. In (87), Fine—who had already provided the first intuitive semantics
for Parry’s PAI in (81)—offers a formal model of truthmaking (and falsemaking) that provides
one of the first natural semantics for Richard B. Angell’s logic of analytic containment AC,
itself a ⊢-Parry system. After discussing the relationship between state space semantics
and nonsense, we observe that Fabrice Correia’s weaker framework—introduced in (51) as a
semantics for a containment logic weaker than AC—tacitly endorses an implausible feature of
allowing hypernonsensical statements. By modelling Correia’s containment logic within the
stronger setting of Fine’s semantics, we are able to retain Correia’s intuitions about factual
equivalence without such a commitment. As a further application, we observe that Fine’s
setting can resolve some ambiguities in Greg Restall’s own truthmaker semantics of (159).
Chapter 4—which includes material appearing in (73)—we consider interpretations of
disjunction that accord with the characteristic failure of Addition in which the evaluation
of a disjunction A ∨̇ B requires not only the truth of one disjunct, but also that both disjuncts
satisfy some further property. In the setting of computation, such an analysis requires the
existence of some procedure tasked with ensuring the satisfaction of this property by both
disjuncts. This observation leads to a computational analysis of the relationship between
Parry logics and logics of nonsense in which the semantic category of ‘nonsense’ is associated
with catastrophic faults in computer programs. In this spirit, we examine semantics for
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 21
several ⊢-Parry logics in terms of the successful execution of certain types of programs and
the consequences of extending this analysis to dynamic logic and constructive logic.
Chapter 5—which incorporates material that has appeared in (79)—considers these faults
in the particular case in which Nuel Belnap’s ‘artificial reasoner’ of (23) and (24) is unable
to retrieve the value assigned to a variable. This leads not only to a natural interpretation of
Graham Priest’s semantics of (156) for the ⊢-Parry system S⋆
fde
but also a novel, many-valued
semantics for Angell’s AC, completeness of which is proven by establishing a correspondence
with Correia’s semantics for AC of (49). These many-valued semantics have the additional
benefit of allowing us to apply the material in Chapter 2 to the case of AC to define intensional
extensions of AC in the spirit of Parry’s PAI.
One particular instance of the type of disjunction central to Chapter 4 is Mel Fitting’s
cut-down disjunction, outlined in (91). Chapter 6—incorporating material appearing in (76)
and (80)—examines cut-down operations in more detail and provides bilattice and trilattice
semantics for the ⊢-Parry systems Sfde and AC in the style of Ofer Arieli and Arnon Avron’s
logical bilattices of (12) or (13). The elegant connection between these systems and logical
multilattices supports the fundamentality and naturalness of these logics and, additionally,
allows us to extend the epistemic interpretation of bilattices in the tradition of artificial
intelligence to these systems.
Finally, the correspondence between the present many-valued semantics for AC and those
of Correia is revisited in Chapter 7, which has appeared as the paper (78). The technique
that plays an essential role in Chapter 5 is used to characterize a wide class of first-degree
calculi intermediate between AC and classical logic in Correia’s setting. This correspondence
allows the correction of an incorrect characterization of classical logic in (49) and leads to the
question of how to characterize hybrid systems extending Angell’s AC∗. Finally, we consider




In this chapter, we examine the relationship between the logics of nonsense of Bochvar and
Halldén and the containment logics in the neighborhood of William Parry’s PAI. We de-
tail two strategies for manufacturing containment logics from nonsense logics—taking either
connexive and paraconsistent fragments of such systems—and show how systems determined
by these techniques have appeared as Frederick Johnson’s RC and the system Sfde indepen-
dently discovered by Harry Deutsch and Carlos Oller. In particular, we prove that Johnson’s
system is precisely the intersection of Bochvar’s Σ0 and Graham Priest’s non-symmetrized
connexive logic and that the Deutsch-Oller system lies just beneath the intersection of Σ0
and Priest’s paraconsistent LP. We conclude by examining the Deutsch-Oller system in more
depth, giving it a characterization in terms of LP and showing that it plays the same role to
Harry Deutsch’s paraconsistent containment logic S that Aleksandr Zinov'ev’s S1 plays with
respect to PAI.
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2.1 Introduction and Semantical Preliminaries
A close cousin to containment logics—although the shared genetics may not be immediately
clear—is the class of so-called ‘logics of nonsense,’ such as the systems described by Åqvist
(1), Bochvar (32), and Halldén (104). The general motivation for such systems is the thesis
that formal systems must have something to say about statements that are taken to be ‘non-
sense’ or ‘meaningless.’ Bochvar and Halldén each proposed solutions to the semantical para-
doxes by calling the problematic sentences—e.g., the Liar or Curry sentences—‘meaningless’
and offered their systems as means to proceed in formal logic while still allowing for such
a semantical category. Granted that some syntactic objects are indeed meaningless in this
way, these types of systems provide an additional semantic value beyond truth and falsity
and formalize logics flexible enough to account for meaningless formulae.
2.2 Nonsense Logics
Logics of nonsense are logical systems which aim to reconcile a theory of deduction with the
thesis that some statements are meaningless or nonsense, many of which are summarized
in Krystyna Piróg-Rzepecka’s (150). If there are indeed meaningless statements—and such
statements cannot be said to be true or false—then the classical, bivalent logic championed
by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell is inadequate to give an account of the inferential
status of such statements.
The possibility of grammatical yet meaningless statements neither true nor false arises
frequently in philosophical contexts. For example, one type of a purportedly meaningless
statement is a so-called category mistake, e.g., a statement such as ‘the square root of Socrates
is irrational’ in which a predicate (‘the square root of x is irrational’) is applied to an object
(Socrates) in an apparently nonsensical fashion. The statement is apparently grammatical;
whether it is meaningful is less clear. It is arguably plausible to suggest that such statements
CHAPTER 2. NONSENSE AND PROSCRIPTION 24
are indeed nonsense—grammatical yet non-significant—and thus demand that a correct the-
ory of deduction be flexible enough to give accounts of meaningless statements. Logics of
nonsense profess to give such a correct theory.
Unlike relevant or constructive logics, there is no unifying formal property delimiting the
class of logics of nonsense; what determines this family of deductive systems is the common
goal of giving an account of deduction in light of meaningless statements. Even supposing
that such an account is necessary, the progenitors of nonsense logic had differing positions on
many technical questions, such as the proper ontological category of meaningless statements
or whether a nonsensical semantic value ought to be designated.
The proponents of logics of nonsense, chief among them being Dmitri Bochvar and Sören
Halldén, agree that the classical propositional calculus is ill-equipped to deal with statements
that are meaningless or nonsense and fail to take a value of either true or false. Yet a
theory of meaninglessness presupposes a theory of meaning and meaning is an extraordinarily
opaque concept. As the theories we will survey in this chapter were developed against the
backdrop of problems of analytic philosophy, we will focus on appearances of the notion of
meaninglessness since the publication of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica.
Of those, we restrict our attention to three cases that may be thought to necessitate a theory
of deduction capable of handling meaningless statements.
To be clear, arriving at a theory of deduction accounting for the category of meaningless
statements is not some esoteric task. Hans Reichenbach wrote of Russell’s suggestion that
such a category be considered in the following terms:
It is the basic idea of [Russell’s] theory that the division of linguistic expressions
into true and false is not sufficient, that a third category must be introduced
which includes meaningless expressions. It seems to me that this is one of the
deepest and soundest discoveries of modern logic. (157, p. 37)
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A brief note on nomenclature before proceeding: While the following is not uniformly
observed by proponents of nonsense logics, the distinction between syntax and semantics
demands that some attention is paid to terminology.
We use the terms ‘sentence,’ ‘statement,’ and ‘formula’ to denote a syntactic item, a
certain type of string of symbols. The term ‘proposition’ is used to denote a semantic or
intensional item corresponding to the meaning of the sentence. This usage is by no means
standard; e.g., the positivists at times used the term ‘statement’ to refer only to a meaningful
string of symbols, the term ‘pseudo-statement’ being awarded to the remainder of syntactic
items. In this chapter, we will remain ontologically neutral, putting aside the question of
whether a ‘meaningless proposition’ is a contradiction in terms.
As logics of nonsense were first described in order to address problems of meaningless-
ness in early twentieth century analytic philosophy, we will survey three occasions in which
meaninglessness or nonsense emerge in this tradition.
2.2.1 Semantic Paradoxes
Semantic paradoxes have been discussed in one form or another since at least Epimenides of
Knossos. A very simple version is the Liar sentence, the statement ‘this sentence is false’: its
truth seems to entail its falsehood while its falsehood entails its truth. The instance of such
paradoxes that drove the development of Bochvar and Halldén’s systems was presented in
Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica, in which such paradoxes of self-reference
are dismissed by appeal to a syntactic notion of meaninglessness.
We need not rehearse the formalism of the Principia to describe the problem. In Intro-
duction to Mathematical Philosophy, Russell gives a sketch of the type of semantical paradox
which he is interested in solving and how the theory of types is intended to resolve it. In the
background is the assumption that for any property P , there exists a class of all objects of
which P is true. The particular paradox is this:
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From... the assemblage [class] of all classes which are not members of themselves.
This is a class: is it a member of itself or not? If it is, it is one of those classes
which are not members of themselves, i.e., it is not a member of itself. If it is
not, it is not one of those classes that are not members of themselves, i.e., it is
a member of itself.(170, p. 136)
By the Principle of Excluded Middle, either this class—which Russell calls ‘κ’—is a
member of itself or not; yet that each entails the contradiction that both κ ∈ κ and not-
κ ∈ κ implies that the statement ‘κ ∈ κ’ is both true and false. This is problematic because
classically, a contradiction entails all propositions and hence all sentences are true in this
theory of classes.
Among the various solutions to this problem described by Russell is one in which problem
cases are cleared away syntactically at the level of language. By iteratively constructing the
formal language in which we work, Russell shows that one can banish self-reference in the
language itself. In the type of language Russell describes, the statement ‘such-and-such a
class is a member of itself’ can be prevented from entering the language at every stage.
In such a setting, self-referential statements are syntactically ill-formed and are therefore
meaningless.
In Russell’s words,
a statement which appears to be about a class will only be significant [meaningful]
if it is capable of translation into a form in which no mention is made of the class.
(170, p. 137)
The class κ cannot be defined without such self-reference; the term ‘class of all classes not
members of themselves’ is thus a pseudo-name, a syntactical object that does not denote.
And according to Russell’s solution,
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a sentence or set of symbols in which such pseudo-names occur in wrong ways is
not false, but strictly devoid of meaning. The supposition that a class is, or that
it is not, a member of itself is meaningless in just this way.(170, p. 137)
The resolution offered by Russell thus appears to demand that certain statements (or
statement-like objects) are neither true nor false but are rather nonsense. Hence, the state-
ment ‘κ ∈ κ’ is not both true and false and the problem is purportedly resolved.
Importantly, this resolves apparent nonsense by appeal to syntax, i.e., the recursive rules
for a language should prevent ‘κ ∈ κ’ from ever appearing and it is thus an ill-formed string
of symbols. In the introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Russell
writes that ‘a logically perfect language has rules of syntax which prevent nonsense’(196,
p. 8), i.e., a correct account of language would dissolve occasions of nonsense before they
could even arise.
2.2.2 Positivism and Verifiability
The early twentieth century philosophical movement known as logical positivism gives a
further appearance of a precise treatment of meaninglessness or nonsense both related to
and contemporary with the issues raised by Russell.
A central theme in logical positivism is the verifiability or empiricist criterion of meaning.
Hempel describes this criterion as:
A sentence makes a cognitively meaningful assertion, and thus can be said to
be either true or false, only if it is either (1) analytic [logically true] or self-
contradictory [logically false] or (2) capable, at least in principle, of experiential
test.(106, p. 108)
We will set aside the nuances of such a principle, such as the feasibility of verification or
the necessity of falsifiability as these are all variations on the same theme. Note however,
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that a criterion of meaningfulness gives rise to a criterion of meaninglessness as well; those
statements not satisfying the criterion will be meaningless.
Importantly, a number of claims fail to meet these criteria; wielding the verifiability crite-
rion precludes a great number of statements from being counted as meaningful propositions,
e.g., ethical, theological, and metaphysical theses are judged to be nonsense. Much of the
effort of the logical positivists was hence directed at defusing (or, more emphatically, ‘elim-
inating’) philosophical traditions such as ethics or metaphysics, employing the criterion to
dismiss their central theses and points of debate as meaningless.
Rudolph Carnap, for example, initially distinguishes between three types of meaningless
statements (or ‘pseudo-statements’): Those meaningless in virtue of containing a meaningless
term such as ‘good,’ those meaningless in virtue of being ill-formed, and those meaningless in
virtue of ‘type confusion.’ In the first case, a sentence such as, ‘This is teavy’ is meaningless
because an artificial term like ‘teavy’ is nonsensical and thus cannot be employed in an
empirical test of the statement.
More importantly, Carnap’s examples for the second case and third cases are ‘Caesar is
and’ and ‘Caesar is a prime number.’ The former is clearly ill-formed as this string cannot be
formed by the usual rules of English syntax. According to Carnap, the latter is meaningless
in virtue of the fact that the predicate ‘...is a prime number’ can ‘be neither affirmed nor
denied of a person.’(39, p. 68)
Interestingly, in many of the logical positivists’ theories, nonsensical statements of the
third kind are in fact instances of the second kind of nonsense, that is, despite appearing
to be syntactically well-constructed sentences, they are ill-formed. In a perfect language,
something implicitly similar to Russell’s typing ought to occur, so that the verb phrase ‘...is
a prime number’ would fail to syntactically apply to a noun phrase such as ‘Caesar.’
Carnap writes:
If, e.g., nouns were grammatically subdivided into several kinds of words, ac-
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cording as they designated properties of physical objects, of numbers etc., then
the words ‘general’ and ‘prime number’ would belong to grammatically different
word-categories, and [‘Caesar is a prime number’] would be just as linguistically
incorrect as [‘Caesar is and’]. In a correctly constructed language, therefore, all
nonsensical sequences of words would be of the kind of [‘Caesar is and’].(39, p. 68)
That we fail to recognize this fact is diagnosed as an artifact of the imperfections of our
own natural language. Hence, from the standpoint of the logical positivists, as for Russell,
meaninglessness tends to be reducible to ill-formedness. But this is not the only resolution
available.
2.2.3 Category Mistakes
Prior to this syntactical observation, there is a sense in which both Russell’s rejection of
the meaningfulness of ‘κ ∈ κ’ and Carnap’s dismissal of the statement ‘Caesar is a prime
number’ are instances of a more general notion. Suggesting that the propositional function
x̂.x ∈ κ cannot be applied to κ or that ‘is a prime number’ is not the sort of predicate which
may be asserted of a man suggestions that the subject is of the wrong category ; these are
each occasions of making a category mistake.
Gilbert Ryle introduces this term in his 1949 book The Concept of Mind, defining the
making of a category mistake as the treating of objects ‘as if they belonged to one logical
type or category (or range of types or categories when they actually belong to another.’(171,
p. 16) The primary philosophical thesis is that, contra Descartes, taking the language and
intuitions behind our experience of the physical world and applying them to the mental leads
to illicit inferences. As the physical and mental are of different types, predicates applying to
the former are not merely false of the latter, but lead to meaningless statements.
Importantly, throughout the work, Ryle continually associates making a category mistake
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with uttering nonsense.
It is nonsense to speak of knowing, or not knowing, this clap of thunder or that
twinge of pain, this coloured surface or that act of drawing a conclusion or seeing
a joke; these are accusatives of the wrong types to follow the verb ‘to know.’(171,
p. 161)
As a result, on Ryle’s account, Cartesian philosophy is not merely false, it is literally non-
sense.
Following Ryle, the theory of category mistakes has been taken up by a number of authors
independently of the questions raised by Russell or Carnap. Importantly, in the literature
on category mistakes (also, ‘type crossings’) the emphasis on syntactical ill-formedness of
such statements is eschewed in favor of more semantically-oriented analyses.
Works such as Theodore Drange’s Type Crossings ((64)) and Shalom Lappin’s Sorts, On-
tology, and Metaphor ((125)) tend to assume that such statements are semantically evaluable.
There are, to be sure, debates concerning how to evaluate such statements, but it tends to
be taken for granted that the problematic statements are, in general, well-formed. Note that
this does not necessarily demand a novel logic of nonsense nor a new semantic value. It is
perfectly coherent to either assign these statements values of truth and falsity at random or
uniformly evaluate them as true or false.
Drange’s own account, for example, is that such category mistakes (which he calls ‘type
crossings’) are well-formed and express propositions, albeit propositions that are ‘unthink-
able.’ On Drange’s account, there is no way that one can conceive of a state affairs in which
a proposition such as that expressed by ‘Caesar is a prime number’ turns out true. This
does not entail that the sentence is meaningless, although it does bear the consequence that
‘Caesar is a prime number’ is false.
This position—that nonsensical sentences are false—is like Russell and Carnap’s appeal
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to syntax in that it precludes a need for a logic of nonsense.
2.2.4 Many-Valued Semantics for Two Nonsense Logics
Bochvar and Halldén’s systems each distinguish two types of connectives: On the one hand
are the connectives whose truth functions that output a ‘nonsense’ value whenever one or
more of their arguments contain a ‘nonsense’ value. The semantical value of nonsense is
thus ‘infectious’ or ‘contaminating’ with respect to such connectives, a property that Åqvist
colorfully labels the ‘doctrine of the predominance of the atheoretical element’ in (1). Such
connectives—described by Bochvar and Halldén as ‘internal’ or ‘classical’—are identified
with the operations employed in, e.g., the Principia Mathematica. The languages employed
by Bochvar and Halldén complement these connectives with so-called ‘external’ connectives
whose corresponding truth functions map all arguments to ‘meaningful’ values, i.e., either
truth or falsity. For example, Halldén intends for his unary ‘meaningfulness’ connective +
to evaluate meaningless statements as false and to evaluate meaningful statements as true.
For present purposes, we look at the fragments of Bochvar and Halldén’s logics corre-
sponding to only these ‘internal’ connectives. By ‘Σ0’ and ‘C0,’ we denote the systems that
(48) describes as the ‘classical fragments’ of the nonsense logics of Bochvar and Halldén,
i.e., the systems restricted to ‘internal’ negation, disjunction, and conjunction. Consequence
with respect to the systems Σ0 and C0 can be defined by a standard account of many-valued
semantics. We will follow the presentation in (33) and consider binary consequence relations
induced by logical matrices.





 VM is a nonempty set of truth values
 DM ⊆ VM is a nonempty set of designated values
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 f ¬̇M is a unary truth function on VM
 f ∧̇M and f
∨̇
M are binary truth functions on VM




M〉. Then an M valuation v is a function
v : At→ V extended to Lzdf by the recursive scheme:
 v(¬̇A) = f ¬̇M(v(A))
 v(A ∧̇ B) = f ∧̇M(v(A), v(B))
 v(A ∨̇ B) = f ∨̇M(v(A), v(B))
Definition 2.2.3. A logical matrix M characterizes a consequence relation for L if
Γ ⊢L A holds iff for all M valuations v such that v[Γ] ∈ DM, also v(A) ∈ DM.
In the sequel, when L is a deductive system characterized by M we will slightly abuse notation
and conflate L with M so that, e.g., we will call an M valuation an ‘L valuation.’
Definition 2.2.4. Σ0—the classical fragment of Bochvar’s Σ—is the consequence relation







〉 where VΣ0 = {t, u, f} and DΣ0 = {t}.




, and f ∧̇
Σ0





t u f f ∨̇
Σ0
t u f
t f t t u f t t u t
u u u u u u u u u u
f t f f u f f t u f
We also may note that the matrices provided are equivalent to the weak tables of Kleene. It
is fair to think of the classical fragment of Σ0 as the weak logic described—and rejected—by
Kleene in (122, p. 334).
The logic C0—the classical fragment of Halldén’s C without the unary meaningfulness
operator—differs from Σ0 only with respect to its set of designated values.
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 VC0 = VΣ0





for ◦ ∈ {¬̇, ∧̇, ∨̇}
Now, given Halldén’s ‘...is meaningful’ operator + and Bochvar’s ‘...is true’ operator T,
one can embed classical logic within the full systems; hence, the PP⊢ will not hold in C or
Σ. Even in the classical fragments Σ0 and C0 without projection operators, this property
fails. However, in special cases, the PP⊢ holds and Addition fails; moreover, studying why
the PP⊢ fails is instructive and yields a road map of sorts for transforming logics of nonsense
into containment logics.
An observation important to this end is that with respect to a logic of nonsense, four
theses jointly entail the PP⊢. Recall that when v is a valuation and Γ is a set of formulae,
v[Γ] represents the image of Γ under v. Then:
Observation 2.2.1. Suppose that in a semantical presentation of a logic L
1. ‘nonsense’ values are infectious, i.e., for any n-tuple of truth values ~v in which a
nonsense value appears and an n-ary truth-function f , f(~v) is a nonsense value,
2. ‘nonsense’ values are not designated,
3. every set of formulae Γ has a valuation v such that v[Γ] ⊆ DL, and
4. Γ L B is read as ‘every valuation assigning all A ∈ Γ designated values also assigns
B a designated value’
Then L obeys the PP⊢.
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Proof. Suppose that L enjoys the above four properties and suppose for contradiction that
Γ L B while some atom in B is not found in any A ∈ Γ. Let C be an atom witnessing
this fact. Now, Γ [from 3] has a valuation v in which all A ∈ Γ are designated. Consider a
valuation v′ identical to v except for its mapping C to a nonsense value. Since C /∈ At[Γ],
all A ∈ Γ remain designated. Since C ∈ At(B), B is assigned a nonsense value by v′ [from
1] and such a value is not designated [from 2]. Given the traditional, semantic reading of
Γ L B [from 4], we infer that Γ 2L B.
The PP⊢ fails in the classical fragment of Halldén’s system because the meaningless value
is designated.1 To wit, it can be easily checked that A C0 A ∨̇ B. In Bochvar’s system this
inference fails in general—that A is true does not entail that A ∨̇ B is true as B, after all,
could be meaningless, rendering the disjunction meaningless. Nevertheless, the PP⊢ fails
in Bochvar’s system. Σ0 does not tolerate contradictions, i.e., contradictions cannot take a
designated value, and hence, A ∧̇ ¬̇A Σ0 B holds vacuously. The PP
⊢ holds, on the other
hand, for consistent premises.
This clearly lays out a means to construct a Parry system from a logic of nonsense. The
central question is that of the inferential status of sets of formula Γ which have no valuations
mapping their formulae to designated values; the existence of such sets prevents Σ0 from
enjoying the PP⊢. We may consider two strategies for weakening Σ0 to a nonsense logic.
One strategy is to inferentially quarantine such sets of formula by allowing nothing to be
inferred from contradictory premises; this entails rewriting the usual rules for turnstile. A
second strategy is to homogenize formulae so that all non-empty sets not only have models,
but that inconsistent sets will maintain a similar inferential behavior to that of sets of
consistent formulae.
1Cf. (104, p. 47) for Halldén’s explanation and defense of this feature.
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2.3 Two Strategies for Containment
The relationship between nonsense logics and containment logics is underscored by the ways
in which Parry logics can be generated from nonsense logics. To illustrate, we will consider
Bochvar’s Σ0 and provide two strategies to yield a fragment that qualifies as a containment
logic. The first strategy is to consider what may be thought of as a connexive fragment of Σ0
and the second is to consider a paraconsistent fragment. In Chapter 4, we will add a third
strategy, by showing the intuitionistic, implicational fragment of Σ0 is also a containment
logic.
2.3.1 Containment Through Connexivity: Johnson’s RC
Parry’s AI was not the only cousin of (or competitor to) relevant logics to receive space
in Anderson and Belnap’s (7). Additionally, pages were set aside to provide an account
and examination of connexive logics, although the systems described therein—due to Storrs
McCall—are distinct from the connexive logics we will employ in the sequel.
What we wish to show in this section is that by employing connexive principles along the
lines of (155), one may make use of the proof of Observation 2.2.1 to generate a containment
logic from a logic of nonsense. Indeed, what we will show is that such a system has already
appeared as the containment logic RC introduced by Frederick Johnson in (116) and that it
is the intersection of the classical fragment of Bochvar’s Σ0 and a connexive logic described
by Graham Priest in (155).
The characteristic feature of connexive logics is the satisfaction of a pair of theses gov-
erning the behavior of implication, Aristotle’s Thesis :
AT→ ¬̇(A→ ¬̇A)
and Boethius’ Thesis :
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BT→ ¬̇[(A→ B) ∧̇ (A→ ¬̇B)]2
Similar principles can be captured as metalinguistic statements as well:
AT⊢ For all A, A 0 ¬̇A
BT⊢ For all A,B, if A ⊢ B then A 0 ¬̇B
Now, there is a subtle distinction between the two formulations of these theses. That the
symbol ‘¬̇’ appears twice in AT→ suggests that each instance is a species of the same type
of negation, yet this is not necessarily the case with respect to its metalinguistic counterpart
AT⊢. The metalinguistic negation indicated by 0 and the object language negation symbol-
ized by ¬̇ may very well diverge in meaning. We must thus content ourselves with the claim
that AT→ and AT⊢ are similar, rather than identical, principles.
Proposals abound as to how to properly motivate connexive logics, ranging from the
thesis that such systems capture the subjunctive conditional (defended by Richard Angell
in (8), where AT→ is called the ‘principle of subjunctive contrariety’) to the thesis that
negation ‘cancels’ or ‘annihilates’ an affirmation (described, but not defended, by Priest in
(155)). McCall’s (131) and Heinrich Wansing’s (193) provide thorough surveys of the history,
philosophy, and motivation of connexive principles; for a deeper discussion of these matters,
the reader is referred to these sources.
To tie this to the strategy of inferential quarantine, note that there is an apparently
very obvious motivation for why one might expect AT⊢ and BT⊢ to hold. With respect to
contingent formulae—those formulae having a model in which they are verified and one in
which they are not—classical logic satisfies these principles.
Observation 2.3.1. If A and B are classically contingent, then if A CL B then A 2CL ¬̇B
2BT is typically stated as (A → B) → ¬̇(A → ¬̇B) in the literature on connexive logic. Priest’s
formulation from (155) (which we employ in this chapter) has been called ‘Strawson’s Thesis’ due to P.F.
Strawson’s endorsement of the principle in (181). Priest’s formulation bears a strong resemblance to the
formula (A→ B) ⊃ ¬̇(A→ ¬̇B), called ‘weak Boethius’ Thesis’ by Pizzi and Williamson in (151).
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Proof. Suppose that A CL ¬̇B; then from A CL B and A CL ¬̇B, we may infer that
A CL B ∧̇ ¬̇B. This can only hold if A is itself a contradiction, from which we infer that it
is not the case that both A and B are classically contingent.
Observation 2.3.2. If A is classically contingent then A 2CL ¬̇A
Proof. Immediate from Observation 2.3.1, substituting A for B and noting that A CL A.
Implicitly employing these observations, Priest introduced a pair of connexive logics—with
‘plain’ and ‘symmetrized’ versions—in (155). We will call these PN and PS, respectively, and
will consider their respective consequence relations to be defined over the language L+ from
Definition 1.1.1.
The systems share a model structure and we will thus define models for PN and PS in
tandem:
Definition 2.3.1. Models for PN and PS are 3-tuples 〈W, g, V 〉, where W is a set of points
such that g ∈ W and V is a function mapping At to subsets of W .
As the two systems interpret the conditional connective differently, we must define distinct
forcing relations,3 defined identically for all cases with the exception of the truth condition
for →. Following (155), we represent the condition peculiar to the symmetrized system PS
in square brackets:
 w  A iff w ∈ V (A) for A ∈ At
 w  ¬̇A iff w 1 A
 w  A ∧̇ B iff w  A and w  B
 w  A ∨̇ B iff w  A or w  B
3In a number of works (e.g., (88) and (178)), Melvin Fitting and Raymond Smullyan have detailed the
intimate relationship between Cohen’s forcing introduced in (46) and (47) and the relation of truth-at-a-
world in Kripke models. The term ‘forcing relation’ is frequently used to describe truth-at-a-world in models
with possible worlds, even in contexts in which the strict analogy with Cohen forcing is lost.
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∃w′ ∈ W such that w′  A,
∀w′ ∈ W , if w′  A then w′  B
[and ∃w′ ∈ W such that w′ 1 B]
We will call the relation for PN (without the clause in square brackets) PN and that for PS
(with the clause in square brackets) PS.
We are thus now able to define the notion of validity for the two systems.
Definition 2.3.2. PN validity







there is an M such that for all B ∈ Γ, g PN B
for all M such that for all B ∈ Γ, M , g PN B, also g PN A
PS validity is defined in an analogous fashion, substituting PS for PN.
Priest’s approach has appeared in various forms in other contexts; e.g., David Lewis
offers a conditional connective  in (128) that determines a weak subsystem of Priest’s
system PN. In (151), Claudio Pizzi and Timothy Williamson also indirectly describe another
subsystem of Priest’s PN, although its semantics are couched in terms of a conditional logic
rather than a logic of strict implication (cf. (75)).
A further (and isolated) appearance of this approach is found in Frederick Johnson’s
containment logic RC described in (116). Johnson was interested in identifying a simple
and natural means of precluding C.I. Lewis’ famous argument for the principle of explo-
sion found in (127), where explosion is the validity of an inference to an arbitrary formula
from a contradiction. Concerned with the apparent irrelevance of the consequent to the an-
tecedent in such an inference, Johnson aligned his system—described as ‘syntactic relevance
entailment’—with the field of relevant logics rather than with containment or connexive
logics. Neither of the latter themes is mentioned in the paper. Even in the later (117), in
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which a related system is introduced, that the system enjoys the PP⊢ is mentioned only en
passant.
The system RC is semantically described by recalling the logical matrix MΣ0 from Defi-
nition 2.2.4, in which t the only designated value.
Definition 2.3.3. Consequence in the system RC is defined so that:







there is a Σ0 valuation v such that for all B ∈ Γ, v(B) = t
for all Σ0 valuations v s.t. for all B ∈ Γ, v(B) = t, also v(A) = t
Although it is probably clear that RC is a subsystem of both Σ0 and PN, we are able to
obtain an even stronger result:
Observation 2.3.3. RC = PN ∩ Σ0
Proof. We first note that the matrices Johnson provides for RC are Bochvar’s matrices for
Σ0. As validity in Σ0 is a necessary condition for validity in RC, RC ⊆ Σ0.
Moreover, if the inference Γ  A is RC valid, then we may infer a number of things. For
one, we require that Γ must be non-empty. Were it empty, then all Σ0 valuations would
vacuously map each of its members to t; by the definition of validity, this would entail that
all Σ0 valuations map A to t, i.e., that A is a theorem of Σ0. But Σ0 has no theorems.
Furthermore, we infer that there exists a Σ0 valuation v by which all formulae in Γ ∪ {A}
are designated. Any such valuation, however, restricted to At[Γ] is classical, i.e., the image
of At[Γ] under v is {t, f}. (Otherwise, granted the infectiousness of u, v(B) = u for some










v(B) if B ∈ At[Γ]
f otherwise
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The range of v′ is {t, f} and v′ is thus a classical valuation mapping all formulae in Γ to t,
which is just to say that Γ is classically consistent. Additionally, as Σ0 is a subsystem of
classical logic, Γ classically entails A. From these two considerations, we infer that Γ PN A,
whence RC ⊆ PN.
Suppose that an inference Γ  A is both PN- and Σ0 valid. Then Γ Σ0 A holds either
vacuously or it does not. The inference cannot hold vacuously; were it to do so, then there
would be no Σ0 valuations granting every B ∈ Γ a designated value and thus, a fortiori,
no classical valuations. But this would imply that Γ is classically a contradiction, entailing
that Γ 2PN A and contradicting the hypothesis. Hence, there is a Σ0 valuation mapping all
B ∈ Γ to designated values and in all such valuations A receives a designated value; but this
is just to say that Γ RC A.
It is extraordinarily interesting that the conjunction of two unrelated theses concerning
implication—that of formally accommodating meaninglessness and that of cancellation
negation—should prove equivalent to an entirely distinct intuition, that of Johnson.
The system RC is not without problems. Most disastrous of these is that, as in PN, the
inference A RC A is not valid. While the account given by Priest of PN makes some sense
of the failure of this inference, it is not clear that Priest’s story serves to resolve such a
pathology in the context of RC.
Quarantining the problematic cases is not the only strategy; we have also mentioned a
strategy of homogenizing inference. Merely providing all sets of sentences with a model is
of little use if such models are trivial; rather, we may want a way to maintain nontrivial
yet inconsistent models. This can be performed by taking a paraconsistent fragment of a
nonsense logic.
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2.3.2 Containment Through Paraconsistency: The System Sfde
As Parry was a student of Lewis, it is not surprising that many of the ‘paradoxes’ of im-
plication, e.g., the principle of explosion, were of concern to him. As noted in the case
of Johnson, such an inference is in some quarters taken to be suspicious due to a lack of
relevance between the antecedent and consequent.
As shown in Observations 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, the relationship between Parry’s system and
relevant logic is a clear one: Relevant logics enjoy the variable-sharing property, establishing
all Parry systems as relevant logics. But if we take the notion of relevance as a desideratum
seriously, even in PAI, there are theorems in which apparent irrelevance arises. The PAI
theorem
((A ∧̇ ¬̇A) ∧̇ B)→ ¬̇B
might arouse—and has indeed aroused—similar suspicions. Harry Deutsch describes this as
‘the fallacy of making too much of one small, if nasty, mistake’ (59, p. 139) and asserts that
this principle is as suspicious as the principle of explosion.
Carlos Oller essentially rediscovers this perceived shortcoming, diagnosing what he calls
the ‘the paradoxes of Parry’s analytic implication’ (140, p. 93) in the first-degree fragment
of PAI:
A ∧̇ ¬̇A ∧̇ B PAIfde ¬̇B
Deutsch and Oller independently introduced a four-valued logic in order to rectify such
perceived pathologies by further weakening Parry’s system.4 The system has appeared by a
4While the position outlined by Oller against the Parry ‘paradoxes’ is clear, it is also obvious that
inferences such as
B Sfde B ∨̇ ¬̇B
are correct modulo Sfde, although such inferences appear to run afoul of the spirit of Deutsch and Oller’s
complaint.
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number of names, e.g., Deutsch calls the system ‘g’ when it is first introduced in (58), ‘Dfde’
in (60), and ‘Sfde’ (which we ourselves will adopt in the sequel) in (61) while Oller introduces
it with identical matrices in as ‘AL’ in (140).
Definition 2.3.4. Sfde is the first-degree logic induced by the matrix





















t b u f f ∨̇
Sfde
t b u f
t f t t b u f t t t u t
b b b b b u f b t b u b
u u u u u u u u u u u u
f t f f f u f f t b u f
Although the conclusion that Sfde enjoys the PP
⊢ is proven in (140), it will be instructive
to rehearse our own proof.
Observation 2.3.4. Sfde enjoys the PP
⊢
Proof. A brief inspection of the matrices for Sfde will establish that u is infectious in the
sense of Observation 2.2.1, while a glance at DSfde shows that u is not designated.
Moreover, every set of formulae Γ has an Sfde valuation in which all B ∈ Γ take designated
values. The map v′ : A 7→ b for all A ∈ At assigns a designated value to all atoms. By
inspecting the matrices for Sfde, we can easily observe that this propagates through the
language, assigning every formula the value of b. With the language itself having a model,
each of its subsets has a model.
By Observation 2.2.1, this entails that the PP⊢ holds for Sfde.
CHAPTER 2. NONSENSE AND PROSCRIPTION 43
That consideration of logics of nonsense played a role in proving that Sfde enjoys the PP
⊢
is no coincidence. Sfde is a logic of nonsense; indeed, it is a subsystem of Σ0.
Observation 2.3.5. Sfde ⊆ Σ0
Proof. By examining the matrices appearing in Definitions 2.2.4 and 2.3.4, one may confirm
that every Σ0 valuation is also an Sfde valuation. Hence, if Γ entails A modulo Sfde the same
can be said a fortiori for Σ0.
Recall that a logic is paraconsistent if explosion—the inference A ∧̇ ¬̇A  B—is not a
valid inference in that logic. Also, recall that it was explosion that most clearly prevented Σ0
from enjoying the PP⊢, because A ∧̇ ¬̇A had no models at all. Just as employing connexive
principles to eliminate this case generates a containment logic, so, too, does relaxing Σ0 to
a paraconsistent logic yield a containment logic.
A paradigmatic paraconsistent logic is the system LP introduced by Priest in (154).
Definition 2.3.5. LP is the first-degree logic induced by the matrix MLP:













are defined by the following matrices:
f ¬̇ f ∧̇ t b f f ∨̇ t b f
t f t t b f t t t f
b b b b b f b t b b
f t f f f f f t b f
Clearly, Sfde is a subsystem of LP, as we may easily prove.
Observation 2.3.6. Sfde ⊆ LP
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Proof. Examining the matrices shows that every LP valuation is an Sfde valuation. Hence,
if some property holds for all Sfde valuations it holds a fortiori for all LP valuations as well.
Hence, if Γ Sfde A then Γ LP A, i.e., Sfde ⊆ LP.
Corollary 2.3.1. Sfde ⊆ Σ0 ∩ LP
Proof. Immediate from Observations 2.3.5 and 2.3.6.
This result is encouraging but, although we come close, we do not enjoy the nice alignment
that we found in Observation 2.3.3, notably, there are some inferences both Σ0 valid and LP
valid.
Observation 2.3.7. Sfde 6= Σ0 ∩ LP
Proof. Observe that both A ∧̇ ¬̇A Σ0 A ∨̇ B and A ∧̇ ¬̇A LP A ∨̇ B. In the former case,
there is no Σ0 valuation granting A ∧̇ ¬̇A a designated value and the inference is satisfied
vacuously; in the latter cases, that A ∧̇ ¬̇A is designated entails that A is also designated,
whence A ∨̇ B is designated. Clearly, this inference fails to satisfy the PP⊢ and is thus not
a valid Sfde inference.
What is especially interesting about this is that the inference witnessing the inequality
between Sfde and Σ0 ∩ LP holds in the latter systems for entirely different reasons.5
With respect to a first-degree logic L, use the notation LPP to denote the class of L valid
inferences satisfying the PP⊢, i.e., the system defined by
Γ LPP A iff Γ L A and At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]
We may think of this as the ‘analytic fragment’ of L. Then we are able to correctly charac-
terize Sfde:
5We will encounter a similar phenomenon in the sequel when we describe the axiom Safety that is a
hallmark of the first-degree fragment of R−Mingle.
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Observation 2.3.8. Sfde = LPPP
Proof. For left-to-right, we note that Observations 2.3.5 and 2.3.6 entail that any Sfde en-
tailment is valid in LPPP.
For right-to-left, suppose that Γ LP A and At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]. Note that Sfde valuations
come in two varieties: those whose restrictions to At[Γ ∪ {A}] are LP valuations and those
that are not, i.e., those in which for some B ∈ At[Γ ∪ {A}], v(B) = n. By hypothesis,
for all valuations of the former type in which all formulae of Γ are designated, A is likewise
designated—this is precisely what Γ LP A means. With respect to the latter type, by
hypothesis, At(A) ⊆ At[Γ], and hence, some formula B ∈ Γ has a constituent atom valued
at n. By the ‘infectiousness’ of this value, it follows that v(B) = n. Hence, in any such
valuation, some B ∈ Γ fails to take a designated values, i.e., the only valuations in which all
B ∈ Γ take designated values are the LP-like valuations. But we have assumed that in such
valuations, A takes a designated value when all formulae in Γ do.
These observations will come into play again shortly, as we make a deeper examination
of Sfde and its role in paraconsistent Parry systems in general.
2.4 The Role of Sfde in Paraconsistent Parry Systems
While Johnson’s RC is rather anomalous, playing no role with respect to the broader family
of containment logics, the Deutsch-Oller system Sfde plays a central role in the structure of
paraconsistent Parry systems. To observe this, we offer, with minor notational deviations,
the semantics for PAI discovered by Kit Fine in (81). We first define a PAI model:
Definition 2.4.1. A PAI model is an ordered 5-tuple 〈W,R,C, Γ, V 〉 with the following in-
terpretations:
 W is a non-empty set of points
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 R is a transitive, reflexive relation on W
 C is a set {Cw : w ∈ W} such that Cw = 〈Cw, ◦w〉 is a lower semilattice for all w ∈ W
 Γ is a set {γw : w ∈ W} such that γw maps each element of At to an element of
Cw, extended through the language by γw(A) = γw(B0) ◦w ... ◦w γw(Bn), where each
Bi ∈ At(A)
 V is a pair of functions 〈V +, V −〉 mapping all elements of At to ℘(W ) with the con-
dition that for all A ∈ At, V +(A) and V −(A) are pairwise disjoint and exhaust W
The elements of W may retain the usual interpretation of possible worlds while the intended
interpretation of the elements of a set Cw are the ‘concepts’ that occur at world w.
Define a ≤w b as a ◦w b = b. Then we may describe a pair of forcing relations, defined
and interpreted as follows:
Definition 2.4.2. In a PAI model, the positive relation + can be thought of as holding when
a formula is true at a point:
 w + A iff w ∈ V +(A) for A ∈ At
 w + ¬̇A iff w − A
 w + B ∧̇ C iff w + B and w + C
 w + B ∨̇ C iff w + B or w + C








∀u such that wRu, γu(C) ≤u γu(B), and
∀u such that wRu and u + B, u + C
Similarly, the negative relation − may be read as holding when a formula is false at some
point:
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 w − A iff w ∈ V −(A) for A ∈ At
 w − ¬̇A iff w + A
 w − B ∧̇ C iff w − B or w − C
 w − B ∨̇ C iff w − B and w − C








w 1+ B → C, or
w + B and w − C
The notation employed here is inspired by Wansing’s (192) in which a pair of forcing
relations—one positive, one negative—is defined. Also note that a deeper analogy with
Wansing’s logics IjCk introduced in (192) is available. The conditions are virtually identical
to Wansing’s treatment of Nelson’s N of (135). Wansing observes that there isn’t necessarily
a privileged interpretation of the falsity condition of an implicational formula and offers four
distinct approaches to evaluating falsity of a conditonial at a point or possible world.6 Just as
Nelson’s logic of constructible falsity admits such variations, we could just as easily give the
same treatment to Deutsch’s S by selecting alternative falsity conditions for the conditional.
We say that a formula is true in a model—M  A—if for all points w in that model,
M, w  A.
Definition 2.4.3. PAI validity
Γ PAI A if for every PAI model M if for all B ∈ Γ, M  B then M  A
An interesting observation is that the first-degree fragment of PAI is effervescent, popping
up repeatedly in the literature. The first-degree fragment has been independently discovered
by no fewer than four authors. In addition to Parry himself, the system was described by
6Also see (74) and (80) for more discussion on the theme of falsity conditions for conditionals.
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Zinov'ev as the system S1 in (202), as Parks-Clifford’s first-degree Z in (141), and was also
labeled NDR in (117) when rediscovered by Frederick Johnson.
An important relationship holds between PAI, S1, and the classical propositional calculus
CL. In regard to a logic L defined over a language including an intensional conditional
connective →, let Lfde denote the first-degree fragment of L, i.e., for a finite, non-empty set
of formulae Γ and formula A with no appearances of →, Γ Lfde A iff L
∧
Γ→ A.
Observation 2.4.1. Γ S1 A iff Γ CL A and At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]
Proof. That S1 = CLPP is well established; the reader is referred to proofs in (202) or
(117).
The correspondence between S1 and PAIfde has been asserted on several occasions. With
respect to Zinov'ev’s work, that S1 = PAIfde has been observed in (166) (in which S1 is called
‘ZV’) while Parry asserts in (145) that PAIfde is characterized by the equivalent bipartite
condition. In neither case is this assertion proven, however, so it is prudent to provide proof
here.
Observation 2.4.2. S1 is the first-degree fragment of Parry’s PAI, i.e., A S1 B iff PAI
A→ B
Proof. By Observation 2.4.2, we are free to equate S1 with CLPP; that PAIfde = CLPP can
be easily seen by considering an arbitrary PAI model and a point in that model. For left-to-
right, consider a first-degree entailment A→ B, where A and B are zeroth-degree formulae;
if A → B is a theorem of PAI then, as a subsystem of CL, it is a theorem of CL. That PAI
obeys the PP→ entails that At(B) ⊆ At(A).
For right-to-left, as CL is the ‘internal’ logic of every point w, that w  A entails that
w  B. Moreover, as At(B) ⊆ At(A), γw(B) ≤w γw(A) for any point w. Hence, at any
point w′, w′  A→ B.
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In Section 2.3.2, we referred to a critique of PAI shared by both Deutsch and Oller. We
have seen how Oller responded; Deutsch, influenced by the semantical picture laid out by
Fine in (81), detailed three fully intensional (i.e., higher degree) systems of paraconsistent
containment logic, S, S′, and S′′ over the course of several papers: (59), (61), and (62).
In the above semantics for PAI, there was a qualification on the functions V + and V −
that for any atom A, V +(A) ∩ V −(A) 6= ∅ and V +(A) ∪ V −(A) = W . Relaxing this
requirement would permit either an atom to be simultaneously true and false at a point or
to be neither true nor false at a point, i.e., would yield a paraconsistent or paracomplete
logic. The semantics presented earlier with this restriction relaxed to permit paraconsistency
corresponds to Deutsch’s S.
Definition 2.4.4. An S model is defined by rehearsing the conditions from Definition 2.4.1
while relaxing the condition on V + and V − to the weaker clause that
For all A ∈ At, V +(A) ∪ V −(A) = W
Definition 2.4.5. Validity in S is defined by the following scheme:
Γ S A if for every S model M if for all B ∈ Γ, M  B then M  A.
We can make a few further observations concerning the relationship between Sfde and
other containment logics. In analogy to the fact that S1 = CLPP, Observation 2.3.8 shows
that Sfde = LPPP. For one, this enables us to provide a characterization of Sfde along the
lines of Observation 2.3.3.
Corollary 2.4.1. Sfde = S1 ∩ LP
A further analogy may be made, however, between Sfde and Deutsch’s S. That Sfde is the
first-degree fragment of S is reflected by our choice of notation and is asserted by Deutsch in
(60) and (61). However, this assertion receives no proof and we thus provide a proof here.
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Observation 2.4.3. Sfde is the first-degree fragment of Deutsch’s S, i.e., A Sfde B iff
S A→ B
Proof. We recall that in Deutsch’s semantics, for each point w, all atoms are given valuations
of either {t}, {f}, or {t, f}. With small changes in notation, for negation, conjunction, and
disjunction, Deutsch provides the following:
(¬̇ t) t ∈ vw(¬̇A) iff f ∈ vw(A)
(¬̇ f) f ∈ vw(¬̇A) iff t ∈ vw(A)
(∧̇ t) t ∈ vw(A ∧̇ B) iff t ∈ vw(A) and t ∈ vw(B)
(∧̇ f) f ∈ vw(A ∧̇ B) iff f ∈ vw(A) or f ∈ vw(B)
(∨̇ t) t ∈ vw(A ∨̇ B) iff t ∈ vw(A) or t ∈ vw(B)
(∨̇ f) f ∈ vw(A ∨̇ B) iff f ∈ vw(A) and f ∈ vw(B)
Essentially, that t ∈ vw(A) and that f ∈ vw(A) in Deutsch’s original presentation correspond
to w + A and w − A, respectively.
Let h be a function equating the values of vw with LP truth values so that singleton truth
















t if vw(A) = {t}
b if vw(A) = {t, f}
f if vw(A) = {f}
We may note by a simple induction that the ‘internal logic’ of a point is precisely LP. This
is to say that if vw is a valuation mapping atoms to ℘({t, f}), then for a first-degree formula,
not only is h ◦ vw an LP valuation, but for any zeroth-degree formula B and a truth value v,
v ∈ vw(B) iff h(vw(B)) = h(v).
Suppose that S A→ B. Then, in every point w in every model, at all points w
′ such that
wRw′, γw′(B) ≤w′ γw′(A). Moreover, if A takes a designated value at w′, i.e., t ∈ vw′(A),
then B takes a designated value at w′. If at all points in all models does γw′(B) ≤w′ γw′(A)
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then At(B) ⊆ At(A). Suppose there is an atom D ∈ At(B) not in At(A); then for
some model, one could assign γw′(D) to be an element d ∈ Cw′ such that γw′(A) w′ d,
whence γw′(B) w′ γw′(A). Moreover, if at all points in all models a zeroth-degree formula
A entails a zeroth-degree formula B, then whenever t ∈ vw(A), also t ∈ vw(B). By the
above considerations, however, this is just to say that in every LP valuation in which A is
designated, B is designated, i.e., A LP B. By Observation 2.3.8, these two observations
mean that A Sfde B.
On the other hand, if A Sfde B where A and B are zeroth-degree formulae, then at any
point w in any model, if w + A then w + B. Likewise, that At(B) ⊆ At(A) entails that
at any such point, γw(B) ≤w γw(A), whence S A→ B.
Given that Deutsch’s system is the natural result of modifying PAI to yield a paraconsistent
system, the Deutsch-Oller system plays a central role in the theory of S. It also provides
insight into further means of generating Parry systems. For example, the system S⋆
fde
—the
PP-fragment of Efde introduced by Priest in (156)—would play a central role in a paracon-
sistent and paracomplete logic similar to S.
2.5 Conclusions
As Parry frequently referenced, Kurt Gödel conjectured in (101) that AI might enjoy a
‘double-barrelled’ analysis, i.e., A→ B is an AI theorem iff
1. A⇒ B is a theorem in a ‘carrier logic’ for some connective ⇒, and
2. At(B) ⊆ At(A)
In providing his semantics for PAI in (81), Fine essentially confirms Gödel’s conjecture and
remarks on the wide variety of logics that can be generated by altering the ‘carrier logic,’
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e.g., by interpreting ⇒ as intuitionistic or relevant implication. (The ‘carrier logic’ in the
case of PAI itself is S4.)
We have observed that the same can be said for the Deutsch-Oller system Sfde and similar
conclusions may be drawn about Johnson’s RC and Deutsch’s S. Does this suggest that, as
Sylvan suggests in (166), containment logics are merely a syntactic gimmick?
If anything, the opposite conclusion should be drawn from the structure of RC and Sfde.
Rather than resting, as Sylvan suggested, ‘on a narrow and arbitrary assumption as to
what counts as a concept’ (166, p. 101), aligning containment logics with logics of nonsense
provides an alternative foundation. That an isomorphism exists between concepts and atomic
formulae is not necessary; merely making the claim that meaningfulness must be established
in order to ensure the validity of an inference already starts one down the path towards
Parry systems.
Moreover, however syntactical the flavor of the PP may be, this does not entail that
Parry calculi deal in gimmickry. The VSP—an equally syntactical criterion—is, after all,
a symptom of relevance rather than its explication. That the PP is suggested by a number
of distinct and relatively natural positions on inference demonstrates that the Proscriptive
Principle may emerge without overt appeal to syntax.
In the coming two chapters, we are going to examine two distinct contexts in which
this relationship between nonsense and containment is apparent. In Chapter 3, we will
examine Kit Fine’s analysis of Richard Angell’s containment logic AC in which nonsense will
correspond to the absence of any truthmaker or falsemaker for a sentence at a world. In
Chapter 4, we will consider containment logics through the lens of computation, in which
nonsense will correspond to the failure of a procedure to terminate its computation.
Chapter 3
Metaphysical Considerations on State
Space Semantics
In this chapter, we review elements of Kit Fine’s project of truth maker semantics, in which
models are constructed on spaces of states—fine-grained semantical devices that can stand
in for many objects, such as facts, truthmakers, situations, and so forth. Fine’s framework
has rapidly borne fruit, providing very natural semantics for many logics and providing
elegant solutions to many thorny semantical problems. Fine’s state spaces may be counted
as a member of a tradition of fine-grained, objectual approaches to semantics including
the distinct fact-based semantics of Bas van Fraassen and Roman Suszko and the situation
semantics of Jon Barwise and John Perry. More recent examples of this lineage are found in
Greg Restall’s own truthmaker semantics and Fabrice Correia’s version of Fine’s semantics.
Restall and Correia both suggest that intuitions concerning facts and their relationship
with propositions lead to justifications for various consequence relations (or consequence-like
relations), although the two projects each have some unusual features when truthmaking is
considered from a metaphysical perspective. Although Fine has cautioned against placing
too much metaphysical weight on state space semantics, this chapter suggests that recasting
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Restall and Correia’s work in the setting of Fine’s truthmaker semantics provides insight
into the metaphysical presuppositions and commitments of these projects.
3.1 State Space Semantics
3.1.1 Facts and Their ‘Philosophical Entourage’
We can consider state-space semantics as a descendant of the semantical analyses of conse-
quence modeled on states that sprung up in the 1960s. It will thus be useful to examine the
more fine-grained analyses of entailment made possible by appeal to proper parts of worlds
more generally. The interpretation of the central objects of such models, i.e., ‘facts and their
philosophical entourage’ (189, p. 477) in van Fraassen’s words, vary; we will use words like
‘states of affairs,’ ‘facts,’ ‘situations,’ and ‘truthmakers’ interchangeably.
Intuitively, moving from worlds to parts of worlds is semantically liberating. Refusing to
consider parts of the world as playing a semantical role restricts the richness of the theory and
leads to counterintuitive consequences that might be thought of as pathologies. Just as the
coarse-grained apparatus of possible worlds (without their parts) forces us into the paradoxes
of strict implication, when worlds are taken to be the most fine-grained semantical device
available, the semantics leads us towards other paradoxes of relevance in the truthmaker case.
For example, truthmaker maximalism—which is such a coarse-grained theory—pushes us
towards the thesis that tautologies count all facts as truthmakers, a feature that Restall (159)
considers one of the ‘darker properties’ (159, p. 333) of the implicit theory of truthmaking
underlying classical semantics.
While Armstrong (17) points to Aristotle’s Categories as an early example of appeal to
truthmakers in the world, these types of objects briefly flourished in the early 20th Century,
although always in an informal and inchoate fashion. Mulligan, Simons, and Smith capture
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some of this prehistory:
Some thinkers however, such as Russell, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, and
Husserl in the Logische Untersuchungen, argued that instead of, or in addition
to, truth-bearers, one must assume the existence of certain entities in virtue of
which sentences and/or propositions are true. Various names were used for these
entities, notably ‘fact’, ‘Sachverhalt’, and ‘state of affairs’.(134, p. 287)
Despite the frequency of appeals to facts and other truthmakers in the 1930s, the accounts
remained informal for the most part and fell out of vogue until, as van Fraassen describes,
the prevalent opinion seems to be that facts belong solely to the prehistory of
semantics and either have no important use or are irredeemably metaphysical or
both.(189, p. 477)
In the late 1960s, two projects independently emerged that provided interesting models that
demonstrated the power and legitimacy of appeal to facts in the work of Roman Suszko
initiated in (182) and the work of van Fraassen in (189).1
Suszko’s (182) (further developed in collaborations with Stephen Bloom (29) and (30))
and van Fraassen’s (189) provide roughly contemporary semantical accounts in which atomic
facts or situations are taken to be primitive. Both take the representation of facts endorsed
by, e.g., Wittgenstein and Russell, as a starting point and consider how theories of facts
influence theories of entailment. As an illustration of the notion of fact to which Suszko and
van Fraassen appeal, consider one of the quintessential remarks concerning this philosophical
entourage in Bertrand Russell’s Lectures on Logical Atomism:
1It would not be unreasonable to include the contemporary work of Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood in
(168) within this group. However, Sylvan and Plumwood’s interpretation of the novel semantical invention
of (168)—the set-up—bears more of a likeness to possible worlds than their parts.
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When I speak of a fact—I do not propose to attempt an exact definition, but an
explanation, so that you will know what I am talking about—I mean the kind of
thing that makes a proposition true or false. If I say ‘It is raining’, what I say is
true in a certain condition of weather and is false in other conditions of weather.
The condition of weather that makes my statement true (or false as the case may
be), is what I should call a ‘fact’.(169, pp. 500–501)
Working in a first-order language, both Suszko and van Fraassen describe facts in terms
of complexes with respect to a domain M , i.e., tuples 〈R, a0, ..., an−1〉 where R is an n-ary
relation on M and a0, ..., an−1 ∈M . In van Fraassen’s case,
[t]he representation of the complex that-aRb may now conveniently be achieved
by identifying it with the triple 〈R, a, b〉. (189, p. 482)
An important feature in both accounts is that these primitive complexes are inherently
signed. In Suszko’s formalism, for each primitive complex 〈R, a0, ..., an−1,+〉 there exists a
primitive complex 〈R, a0, ..., an−1,−〉 corresponding to the negation of that-aRb; in (189),
this is represented as 〈R̄, a0, ..., an−1〉. This type of representation has carried forward to the
present day. In, e.g., (51), such primitives are interpreted as ‘the obtaining of certain atomic
states of affairs and the nonobtaining of certain atomic states of affairs.’(51, p. 2)
There are subtleties with respect to the way in which this interpretation departs from
Russell. For one, while the terms ‘fact’ or ‘truthmaker’ are typically taken to indicate
veridicality, this is not in general required. Although it indeed seems reasonable to suggest
that the existence of a truthmaker for a statement A entails the truth of A, it is equally
reasonable to think that there are things—possibly mere fictions—that would have made a
statement true had they obtained.
Furthermore, on the Russellian account, when a complex 〈R, a, b〉 fails to hold, (i.e.,
〈a, b〉 /∈ R), the literal ¬̇Rab is made true by the absence of the tuple 〈a, b〉 from the
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interpretation of R, i.e., ¬̇Rab is made true by a negative fact in a very literal sense.
Suszko and van Fraassen and their inheritors, however, generally allow that there is a robust
truthmaker corresponding to ¬̇Rab, which is, of course, the complex 〈R̄, a, b〉.
There are good reasons for accepting that falsemakers are primitive, that is, on an onto-
logical par with truthmakers. In the theory of truthmaking, for example, that a truthmaker
fails to make true a statement A should hardly entail that it is a falsemaker for A. Further-
more, there exist problems with respect to our ability to apprehend negative truths should
we deny the existence of atomic falsemakers. In (165), Jay Rosenberg details such a problem:
if the falsity of an atomic proposition consists in its failure to correspond to
any atomic fact, it may seem as if, in order to discover that a given atomic
proposition was false, we should have to compare it one by one with each atomic
fact, noting in each case that it fails to correspond. And this, of course, is an
absurd supposition.(165, p. 36)
This last assertion doesn’t seem quite true. One could suggest, for example, that the falsity
of a proposition ϕ consists in a demonstration that there can be no truthmaker for ϕ, then
one could arguably falsify atomic propositions without being forced to survey all possible
truthmakers for the statement. All one would need would be a method of showing that the
supposition that a truthmaker for ϕ exists leads to absurdity.
This is, of course, to equate falsity with intuitionistic negation, which suggests an inter-
esting parallel in the work of Nelson (e.g., (135), (137)) concerning the distinction between
intuitionistic and constructible or strong negation. Intuitionist negation asserts that any
demonstration of some proposition could be converted into a demonstration of absurdity;
the analogous interpretation in terms of truthmakers, would be that the existence of a truth-
maker for a statement ϕ is absurd. Nelson in (135) and (136) suggests that such an account
of falsity is inadequate in a number of ways and promotes a constructible negation assert-
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ing the existence of what is essentially a constructible falsemaker for a formula ϕ. This
distinction is illustrated well in the discussion of falsification in Heinrich Wansing’s (194).
Wansing cites the example of (102) and suggests that a yellow lemon falsifies the statement
‘the lemon is red’ just as directly as it verifies the statement ‘the lemon is yellow.’ We will
assume that theories of truthmaking also must provide accounts of falsemaking and that
theories of verification also must provide theories of falsification.
3.1.2 Fine’s Truthmaker Semantics
Fine’s state space semantics, like the frameworks of Suszko, van Fraassen, and Barwise and
Perry, allow a more fine-grained verification relation between statements and things in virtue
of which they are true than is available when coarser objects such as possible worlds are taken
to be primitive objects.2 For example, given the logical equivalence between formulae A and
A ∨̇ (A ∧̇ B), it is reasonable to expect that the formulae are true at precisely the same
worlds. However, although there is a sense in which statements are true in virtue of worlds,
this intuition doesn’t exhaust the underlying story. After all, we may be reluctant to suggest
that A and A ∨̇ (A ∧̇ B) are true in virtue of precisely the same facts.
Fine describes this additional richness afforded by state space semantics in the following
terms:
For consider a disjunction of the form A ∨̇ (A ∧̇ B), say ‘it is rainy or rainy
and windy’ and compare it with its first disjunct A (‘it is rainy’). The exact
verifiers of the disjunction are the presence of rain and the presence of rain and
wind. But the exact verifier for the disjunct A is simply the presence of rain.
Thus within the exact semantics, there is a semantical distinction between A and
2See (149) and (180) for a discussion of how fine-grained an analysis is possible from semantics using
possible worlds.
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A ∨̇ (A ∧̇ B)3 while, within the inexact semantics, there is no such distinction;
the verifiers of either statement will be the same, viz. those states that involve
the presence of rain.(86, p. 4)
Moreover, Fine has assembled a host of topics concerning the semantical evaluation of state-
ments that encounter problems when evaluated against the backdrop of coarse devices like
possible worlds, including counterintuitive features of possible-worlds evaluations of scalar
implicature, of the logic and meaning of imperatives, and of counterfactuals. In work such
as (83), Fine shows that these problems evaporate when one appeals to the additional ex-
pressiveness of state space semantics. In particular—and relevant to the matter of Parry’s
PP—state space semantics allow a very elegant way to model the subject-matter of a propo-
sition.
To examine Fine’s truthmaker semantics, we will first describe the formalism. The pri-
mary structure that underlies the models we will employ is a state space:
Definition 3.1.1. A state space is a pair 〈S,⊑〉 where S is a nonempty set of states and
 ⊑ is a partial ordering on S
 Every subset of S has a least upper bound with respect to ⊑
This is to say that 〈S,⊑〉 is an up-complete poset. The intended reading of ⊑ is a parthood
relation so that for states s, t, s ⊑ t is read as ‘s is a part of t.’
Furthermore, since least upper bounds are guaranteed to exist, in any state space we can
define a binary operation ⊔ on states s, t ∈ S as the least upper bound of s and t under
⊑. This is read as the fusion of states s and t. We can extend this definition to fusion over
arbitrary sets of states so that for a set T ⊆ S,
⊔
T is defined as the least upper bound of
all elements of T . By completeness of any state space, we are guaranteed that a state space
3N.b. that this presupposes that A and B are distinct.
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S counts as members the fusion  of all states in S as well as the fusion  of the empty set
(the ‘null state’).
For many purposes, such as providing accounts of the equivalence of propositions, this
structure may suffice, providing all the structure required, for example, in Correia’s state
space semantics of (51). But for some purposes, some additional structure is necessary; in
(85), Fine considers a notion of possibility, codified by the addition of a subset S✸ ⊆ S
interpreted as possible states, that is, those states that could obtain in a world.
Definition 3.1.2. A modalized state space 〈S, S✸,⊑〉 is a triple where 〈S,⊑〉 is a state space
and S✸ ⊆ S is a nonempty set such that
If s ∈ S✸ and t ⊑ s, then t ∈ S✸
We can consider some further definitions concerning states in a modalized state space:
Definition 3.1.3. A state s is consistent if s ∈ S✸ and inconsistent otherwise.
Definition 3.1.4. States s, t are compatible if s ⊔ t ∈ S✸ and incompatible otherwise.
Note that consistency, compatibility, and their contrary properties are not defined in terms of
valuations but are determined pre-linguistically, that is, in virtue of the structure 〈S, S✸,⊑〉.4
We also are interested in subsets of S and extend the relation ⊑ in the following way:
Definition 3.1.5. Let T, U ⊆ S. Then:
 T ⊒ U—read ‘T subsumes U ’—if for all states t ∈ T , there exists a state u ∈ U such
that u ⊑ t
4The appearance of notions of compatibility and incompatibility is especially interesting due to the role of
these notions in the development of modal logic. In early presentations of Lewis’ systems of strict implication,
entailment ‘J’ is not primitive, but is defined in terms of the primitive, binary compatibility or co-consistency
connective ‘◦.’ Lewis goes so far as to refer to the Survey System as the ‘Calculus of Consistencies’ in (126).





Figure 3.1: T ⊒ U and U ′ ⊑ T ′
 U ⊑ T—read ‘U subserves T ’—is defined as the property that for all states u ∈ U there
exists a t ∈ T such that u ⊑ t
Fine provides the ‘pictorial’ interpretation by the analogy that explicates containment as
the condition that ‘each member of T will look down at a member of U and each member of
U will look up at a member of T .’(87, p. 9) Note that the two relations are not necessarily
inverses of one another, as is implicit in the illustration of these relations in Figure 3.1.
From these two definitions, Fine provides a further notion of containment :








T ⊒ U , and
U ⊑ T
Combining the semantic features of a number of models built off of state spaces (in (51),
(82), (87)), we arrive at the following definition of a model:
Definition 3.1.7. A strong modalized state space model is a tuple 〈S, S✸,⊑, |·|+, |·|−〉 where
〈S, S✸,⊑〉 is a modalized state space and valuations |·|+ and |·|− are functions mapping atoms
to nonempty subsets of S such that the following properties hold:
 Semi-Regularity: |p|+ and |p|− are complete, i.e.,
⊔
|p|+ ∈ |p|+
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 Exclusivity: for all s ∈ |p|+ and t ∈ |p|−, s ⊔ t /∈ S✸
 Exhaustivity: for all s ∈ S✸, either there exists t ∈ |p|+ such that s ⊔ t ∈ S✸ or there
exists a t′ ∈ |p|− such that s ⊔ t′ ∈ S✸
|p|+ and |p|− are interpreted as the sets of exact verifiers and exact falsifiers of p, respectively.
Note that the requirement of Semi-Regularity is not assumed by Fine in, e.g., (87).5 The
assumption, however, makes the models easier to work with while not impacting any of the
deductive systems defined in terms of state-space semantics. With respect to the properties
of Exclusivity and Exhaustivity, Fine offers the following interpretation:
The first constraint rules out there being too many falsifiers for a given set of
verifiers and corresponds to the principle that no proposition should be both true
and false; and the second rules out there being too few falsifiers for a given set of
verifiers and corresponds to the principle that every proposition should be [either]
true or false. (85, p. 5)
In (87), distinct verification conditions are provided—an exact verification in the style of
(189) and an inclusive verification. However, given completeness of valuations (i.e., Semi-
Regularity), the two types of verification coincide. Hence, we will provide the inclusive
variety:
Definition 3.1.8. The exact verification and falsification conditions between states and
formulae are recursively described as:
 s + p if s ∈ |p|+
 s − p if s ∈ |p|−
5N.b. that the canonical model Fine gives in (87) is a term model with ⊑ construed as set inclusion.
Hence, valuations in the canonical model are complete and Semi-Regularity can be assumed without loss
of generality. We sacrifice a modest amount of the flexibility of Fine’s models, but nothing upon which
anything in the sequel turns.
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 s + ¬̇A if s − A
 s − ¬̇A if s + A
 s + A ∧̇ B if there exist t, u ∈ S such that t + A, u + B, and t ⊔ u = s
 s − A ∧̇ B if s − A, s − B, or there exist t, u ∈ S such that t − A, u − B, and
t ⊔ u = s
 s + A ∨̇ B if s + A, s + B, or there exist t, u ∈ S such that t + A, u + B, and
t ⊔ u = s
 s − A ∨̇ B if there exist t, u ∈ S such that t − A, u − B, and t ⊔ u = s
From these conditions, Fine provides definitions for several distinct notions of content.
Definition 3.1.9. The set ⌈A⌉+ of exact verifiers of A or its complete content is the set
{s ∈ S | there is an s′ ⊑ s such that s′ + A}6
Likewise, the set ⌈S⌉− of exact falsifiers of A is the set
{s ∈ S | there is an s′ ⊑ s such that s′ − A}
Fine is especially interested in a notion of subject-matter. The subject-matter of A
might be reasonably construed as those states—whether states in a world or not—that A
is about. Because ⌈A⌉+ is complete, its fusion
⊔
(⌈A⌉+) ∈ ⌈A⌉+ and thus may be taken to
be a state from which the information in ⌈A⌉+ may be recovered. Given the relevance that
holds between a proposition and its possible verifiers, the maximal verifier is the fusion of
all states that A is about and is a natural contender for the role of the subject-matter of a
sentence. Fine suggests that we take this state to represent the subject-matter of A.
6Fine also defines a notion of content |A| as the set of exact verifiers without the constraint that |A|
is complete. As we are considering complete valuations, however, completeness will be inherited by the
content-sets of complex formulae and the definitions will coincide, that is, for any A, |A| = ⌈A⌉ in any
model.
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([¬̇A]), respectively, i.e., the maximal verifier and the maximal
falsifier of A.
The elegance of identifying the maximal verifier of A with its subject matter is apparent in
many properties of the semantics.
The appropriateness is especially exhibited by Fine’s definition of the replete content of
a statement as the convex closure of ⌈A⌉+.
Definition 3.1.11. The convex closure T∗ of a set T ⊆ S is defined as
{s ∈ S | there exist t, t′ ∈ T such that t ⊑ s ⊑ t′}.
Definition 3.1.12. The set [A]+—the replete content of A—is ⌈A⌉+∗ , i.e., the convex closure
of the complete content of A.
It is interesting to note that Fine’s account of subject-matter is subtly encoded within
the notion of replete content. An alternative definition for the replete content could have
explicitly invoked the subject-matter of a statement A, i.e., σ+(A), as illustrated in the
following:
Theorem 3.1.1 (Fine). [A]+ = {s ∈ S | there exist t ∈ ⌈A⌉ such that t ⊑ s ⊑ σ+(A)}
I.e., the replete content of A is the span of its set of exact verifiers and its subject matter.
This is an especially interesting result when described in the following terms:
Thus the verifiers of A [in its replete content] are those states ‘big’ enough to
contain an exact verifier but ‘small’ enough to be included within the subject-
matter of the statement. They conform to what might b called the ‘Goldilocks’
Principle’, according to which a state s counts as a verifier if it is neither too
small (i.e., s ⊒ t [for] some t ∈ ⌈A⌉) nor too large (i.e., s ⊑
⊔
(⌈A⌉).(87, p. 12)
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3.1.3 Validity and Consequence: Two Systems
Given the notion of content defined by Fine, there are a number of ways that the concept of
entailment could be construed. While it seems plausible to suggest that entailment requires
the containment of content from premise to conclusion, it seems equally natural to suggest
that entailment holds when all verifiers of a premise verify the conclusion. Fine’s models are
flexible enough to accommodate many of these intuitions and, as we might expect, different
consequence relations emerge as a result. Two such systems are Richard Angell’s logic of
analytic containment AC and the Belnap-Dunn logic of Efde.
Various understandings of entailment defined within Fine’s state space semantics as de-
scribed by Fine in (87) gives rise to the deductive system AC of (9) and (11). Correia—who
described the first semantics for AC in (49)—had argued in (50) that AC indeed gave an
appropriate characterization of factual equivalence.
The deductive system of analytic containment introduced by Richard Angell in (9) and
examined anew in (11) was intended by Angell to characterize a notion of synonymity. Angell
interpreted AC so that the property that A and B are consequences of one another in AC is
intended to provide an adequate analysis of synonymity between A and B.
A number of potential applications for AC have been proposed since its introduction.
Belnap suggested the use of AC in (25) to amend some perceived shortcomings of Nicholas
Rescher’s system of hypothetical reasoning of (158). After providing semantics for AC in
(49), Fabrice Correia argued in (50) that AC characterizes a notion of factual equivalence,
i.e., that A and B are logically equivalent in AC precisely when the two describe the same
collection of facts. (N.b. that in (51), Correia abandoned this view, arguing that a subsystem
of AC provides the correct account.)
In (11), Angell considers formulae of the form A↔ B to be primitive, where A,B ∈ Lzdf,
while Correia considers an equivalent account of AC employing formulae of the form A→ B.
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Angell himself remarks that A → B and A ∧̇ B ↔ A are equally good characterizations of
the notion of analytic containment. In the present account, we aim to hew close to Correia’s
own presentation and thus consider the language of first-degree formulae Lfdf.
Definition 3.1.13. Lfdf is defined so that
Lfdf = {A→ B | A,B ∈ Lzdf},
Now, let us examine the axiomatization of AC as it appears in (49).
Definition 3.1.14. The system AC is defined by the following axioms:
AC1a A→ ¬̇ ¬̇A
AC1b ¬̇ ¬̇A→ A
AC2 A→ A ∧̇ A
AC3 A ∧̇ B → A
AC4 A ∨̇ B → B ∨̇ A
AC5a A ∨̇ (B ∨̇ C)→ (A ∨̇ B) ∨̇ C
AC5b (A ∨̇ B) ∨̇ C → A ∨̇ (B ∨̇ C)
AC6a A ∨̇ (B ∧̇ C)→ (A ∨̇ B) ∧̇ (A ∨̇ C)
AC6b (A ∨̇ B) ∧̇ (A ∨̇ C)→ A ∨̇ (B ∧̇ C)
while the rules of AC are:
AC7 From A→ B and B → A infer ¬̇A→ ¬̇B
AC8 From A→ B infer A ∨̇ C → B ∨̇ C
AC9 From A→ B and B → C infer A→ C
This gives us a standard account of theoremhood in AC.
Definition 3.1.15. We say that a formula A → B ∈ Lfdf is a theorem of AC when there
exists a finite sequence σ of formulae, each of which is either an axiom of AC or an application
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of one of the inference rules to an earlier formula or formulae in the sequence such that σ
terminates in A→ B.
One of the remarkable results of (87) is the characterization of AC as a natural consequence
relation arising in truthmaker semantics. Indeed, Fine regards his work in (87) as a sort of
‘vindication’(87, p. 2) of Angell’s work. In the context of state space models, Fine provides
a semantical relation corresponding to AC entailment, characterized so that:
Observation 3.1.1 (Fine). A→ B is a theorem of AC iff for every strong state space model,
[A]+ > [B]+, that is, the replete content of A contains the replete content of B.
In plain language, AC entailment holds when every verifier for A contains a verifier for B
and every verifier for B is contained within a verifier for A.
Fine also observes that this relation of containment can be decomposed into a bipartite
condition:








⌈A⌉+ ⊒ ⌈B⌉+, and
σ+(B) ⊑ σ+(A)
It is interesting to note the proximity between Observation 3.1.2 and the explication of con-
tainment provided by Yablo in (200), in which we find the following assessment of semantic
containment:
A contains B, I propose, if the argument A, therefore B, is both truth-preserving
and subject-matter preserving.(200, p. 3)
Yablo’s explication of containment in terms of the containment of subject-matter can also
be thought of as a containment with respect to content or that which a statement is about.
The resemblance between these schemata and Sylvan’s so-called ‘double-barrelled anal-
ysis’ makes it worthwhile to appraise Fine’s observation by the lights of Sylvan’s criticism
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of Parry logics. This charge has some prima facie plausibility; the canonical model of (81),
for example, identifies ‘concepts’ with atomic formulae, filtering out problematic entailments
on the basis of whether certain sentence letters appear in the antecedent and consequent.
In (87), however, this double-barrelled analysis falls out so elegantly from the state space
semantics—in what Fine acknowledges is ‘an especially pleasing way’(87, p. 12)—that it is
hard to see how a charge of artificiality could possibly be sustained.
Fine’s semantics is rich enough to accomodate other intuitions concerning entailment,
including a vindication of van Fraassen’s discussion in (189) of the Belnap-Dunn logic Efde
of tautological entailments. The truth-functional semantics for first-degree system Efde—
so-called because it is the first-degree fragment of the relevant logic E and is often labeled
‘FDE’—was introduced by Dunn in (66). Belnap’s interpretation of this semantics—outlined
in (23) and (24)—will be of special importance in the sequel.
From a proof-theoretic perspective, Efde may be defined as follows:
Definition 3.1.16. The system Efde is defined axiomatically by adding the following axiom
to the axiomatic presentation of AC:
FDE1 A→ A ∨̇ B
A four-valued semantics for Efde may also be given, described as follows:
Definition 3.1.17. The logic Efde is the logic induced by the matrix MEfde
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Belnap considers the problem of what occurs when a computer or ‘artificial reasoner’ receives
contradictory messages. E.g., a central computer can be set up to receive values from sensors
concerning the velocity of a vehicle. Suppose there are two such sensors in the vehicle and
that one is malfunctioning so that the computer is being informed by two equally trustworthy
sources that the vehicle is moving at two different speeds. Classically, faced with inconsistent
data, one has warrant to infer any arbitrary conclusion. But from the standpoint of a relevant
logician—Efde is ⊢-relevant—such contradictions should not ‘pollute the data,’ in Belnap’s
words.
On this reading, that A is evaluated as t is read as ‘I have a source that has told me that
A is true.’ When A is evaluated as f, this is read as ‘I have a source that has told me that
A is not true.’ Naturally, one can be faced with a situation in which both these statements
hold, which corresponds to the value b, while when one has received no statements regarding
A, this is represented by A’s being evaluated as n.
Now, while the most salient interpretation Efde is in terms of computation, Efde and fact-
like semantics enjoy a deep and effervescent relationship. Both van Fraassen in (189) and
Barwise and Perry in (21) suggest that Efde captures an important and interesting entailment
relationship between propositions. It is not surprising, then, that Fine proves in (87) that
Efde can be recast in his semantics in a natural way.
Fine defines inexact consequence in the following way:
Definition 3.1.18. B is an inexact consequence of A if in any state space model, ⌈A⌉+ ⊒
⌈B⌉+
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It is proven in (87) that Efde corresponds to the logic of inexact consequence.
Theorem 3.1.2 (Fine). A Efde B if and only if in any state space model, ⌈A⌉
+ ⊒ ⌈B⌉+
3.2 Correia on Factual Equivalence
In (49), Correia studied Angell’s AC in the context of a strong equivalence between facts.
Correia defines a notion of factual equivalence so that two sentences A and B are factu-
ally equivalent whenever any statement of the form “s grounds A” can be replaced by “s
grounds B” salva veritate. In (50), Correia further argued for the suitability of AC as an
axiomatization of the logic of factual equivalence.7
3.2.1 Correia’s Logic of Factual Equivalence
In (51), Correia rejected his earlier position that AC captured an adequate notion of factual
equivalence, arguing that there are equivalent formulae that do not describe precisely the
same facts. AC is thus rejected by Correia as too strong, compelling Correia to provide a
weaker notion of factual equivalence, one that is a subsystem of the equivalential formulation
of AC. Correia provides no name for this system, and we will default to the easily recognizable
label “Cor.”
Definition 3.2.1. The system Cor is determined by the following axioms:
7There is a parallel between how models are employed by Fine and Correia and how models are employed
by van Fraassen and Suszko. van Fraassen was concerned with providing fine-grained accounts of entailment
while Suszko was concerned with an appropriate account of identity. A similar divide occurs between Fine
and Correia: Correia is concerned with the equivalence of two formulae in a model while Fine is concerned
with representing consequence in a model.
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Cor1 A↔ ¬̇ ¬̇A
Cor2 A↔ A ∧̇ A
Cor3 A ∧̇ B ↔ B ∧̇ A
Cor4 A ∧̇ (B ∧̇ C)↔ (A ∧̇ B) ∧̇ C
Cor5 A↔ A ∨̇ A
Cor6 A ∨̇ B ↔ B ∨̇ A
Cor7 A ∨̇ (B ∨̇ C)↔ (A ∨̇ B) ∨̇ C
Cor8 ¬̇(A ∧̇ B)↔ ¬̇A ∨̇ ¬̇B
Cor9 ¬̇(A ∨̇ B)↔ ¬̇A ∧̇ ¬̇B
Cor10 A ∧̇ (B ∨̇ C)↔ (A ∧̇ B) ∨̇ (A ∧̇ C)
The rules of Cor are:
Cor11 From A↔ B infer B → A
Cor12 From A↔ B and B ↔ C infer A↔ C
Cor13 From A↔ B infer A ∧̇ C → B ∧̇ C
From a proof-theoretic perspective, Correia notes that AC may be derived from Cor by the
addition of rule AC7 or by adding the pair of axioms AC6a and AC6b. Furthermore, in Cor we
may define a notion of entailment where A→ B serves as an abbreviation for A ∧̇ B ↔ A.
As a subsystem of Angell’s AC, the first-degree entailment version of Cor so defined will enjoy
the Proscriptive Principle and may be thus considered a Parry logic as well.
In order to provide a semantics for Cor, Correia modifies the strong state space models
of (87) by relaxing the condition that valuations be total, i.e., Correia assumes only that |·|+
and |·|− are partial functions. Correia calls his modification of Fine’s state space semantics
“fitting description semantics” as the relation of exact verification s + A is interpreted by
Correia as the property that a situation s is fittingly described by A.
Definition 3.2.2. A weak state space model is a tuple 〈S,⊑, |·|+, |·|−〉 where 〈S,⊑〉 is a
state space and valuations |·|+ and |·|− are partial functions mapping atoms to complete and
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nonempty subsets of S.
In (51), Correia argues that for two statements A,B to be factually equivalent is for A and
B to fittingly describe precisely the same states in each weak state space model. That two
formulae A,B fittingly describe the same states in every model is described as supervalidity
of the equivalential formula A ↔ B. Equivalently, supervalidity may be defined as the
property that the complete content of A is identical to that of B in every weak state space
model.
Definition 3.2.3. A formula A ↔ B is supervalid if in every weak state space model S,
⌈A⌉+ = ⌈B⌉+
Soundness and completeness between the axiomatic and semantical presentations of Cor is
proven in (51).
Theorem 3.2.1 (Correia). A↔ B is a provable in Cor if and only if A↔ B is supervalid.
Note, of course, that Fine’s strong models are trivially weak models. However, in order
to induce the logic Cor, the class of models with respect to which it is complete must be
weak. Hence, accepting Cor comes with a semantical commitment as well. If the facts qua
semantical device are believed to reflect any features of facts qua metaphysical object, then
Correia’s reliance on weak models bears rather heavy metaphysical commitments as well.
3.2.2 Correia’s Rejection of Distribution
In (51), Correia diverges from Angell because of worries that the relation of factual equiv-
alence “does not validate the distributivity principle according to which A ∨̇ (B ∧̇ C) is
always equivalent to (A ∨̇ B) ∧̇ (A ∨̇ C).”(51, p. 2) In both (50) and (51), the importance of
a logical account of factual equivalence is motivated by concerns of intersubstitutivity within
contexts of explanation or grounding.
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Justifying the rejection of distributivity in AC requires that one provides a case in which
some fact grounds a sentence of the form (A ∨̇ B) ∧̇ (A ∨̇ C) but fails to serve as a ground
for A ∨̇ (B ∧̇ C). Correia gives the following example to suggest there are instances of
these two formulae that are not factually equivalent, i.e., intersubstitutable in contexts of
grounding. Correia supposes for the argument that the sentences “Sam is sad” and “Sam is
ill” are true and presents the following three sentences:
1 The fact that Sam is sad grounds the fact that (Sam is sad or Sam is bad)
2 The fact that Sam is ill grounds the fact that (Sam is sad or Sam is ill)
3 The facts that Sam is sad and that Sam is ill ground the fact that ((Sam is sad or
Sam is bad) and (Sam is sad or Sam is ill)).
Were distributivity to hold, then from 3, we could infer
4 The facts that Sam is sad and that Sam is ill ground the fact that (Sam is sad or
(Sam is bad and Sam is ill)).
But Correia wants to reject this proposition, and hence, must reject distributivity.
But intuitively [4] is false. For we may suppose that Sam is not bad, in which
case ‘Sam is bad and Sam is ill’ will be false, and accordingly the fact that Sam
is ill will play no role whatsoever in grounding the disjunctive fact. (The fact
that Sam is sad will do the work.)(51, p. 17)
In order to more precisely parse this, let us turn to an example of a weak state space model
that witnesses a failure of distribution. For simplicity’s sake, we will not consider the state
space to be modalized.
Example 3.2.1. Let SC be defined so that
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 S = {s0, s1, s2}
 s0 ⊑ s2 and s1 ⊑ s2
 |p|+ = {s0} and |q|+ = {s1}
Given this model, we observe that s0 
+ p, whence s0 
+ p ∨̇ r. Furthermore, because
s1 
+ q, also s1 
+ p ∨̇ q. Because s2 = s0 ⊔ s1, it follows that s2 + (p ∨̇ r) ∧̇ (p ∨̇ q).




+ (r ∧̇ q), or
3. there exist t, u ∈ S such that s2 = t ⊔ u, t + p, and u + r ∧̇ q
The first fails to hold by construction of S. The failure of the second and third conditions
illustrates the need for Correia’s requirement that |·|+ and |·|− be partial functions. Both
would require that for some t ⊑ s2, t 
+ q.
We note that formalizing Correia’s plain language example required that the model be
weak insofar as |r|+ = ∅. But, as we noted, this assumption carries semantical baggage,
requiring an account of logical space in which it is not logically possible that some statement—
r in the example—has verifiers or falsifiers. This has the consequence that it is only when
certain states of affairs are entirely absent from logical space that Correia’s account of factual
equivalence holds true.
3.2.3 Hypernonsensicality
Depending on how much interpretive weight we place on the semantics, it is reasonable to find
Correia’s assumption to be quite metaphysically charged. Correia follows Fine in interpreting
state space models as representing the collection of logical space, i.e., the totality of possible
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facts. Correia’s weak models essentially allow that some atom p may not have verifiers or
falsifiers.
Now, the absence of both verifiers and falsifiers may be reasonable in a number of
contexts—in the actual world, if p has a verifier then we expect it to lack a falsifier. In-
deed, the possibility that a proposition may lack verifiers and falsifiers is reflected in Parry’s
suggestion that a god could “create a world in which the proposition p is true, without
thereby creating all the objects contained in any other proposition q,” a crucial element of
his motivations for (142). Likewise, in Peter Loptson’s (129) and (130), Loptson develops
possible worlds semantics that captures the observation that in a possible world in which
an individual a (say that it is denoted by “a”) does not exist, any Russellian proposition
corresponding to a sentence containing the name “a” will not exist. For example, according
to Russell, the structured proposition corresponding to the statement
 Either Barack Obama is president or Barack Obama is not the president.
contains the referent of “Barack Obama” as a part. Hence, the proposition itself will not
exist at any world w in which Obama was not born, and the sentence would therefore not
be true at w due to the absence of any truth bearer. In such occasions, the position of
e.g. Bochvar ((31)) or Halldén ((104)) that some statements are nonsensical seem rather
reasonable.
But S, under Correia and Fine’s readings, is taken to represent logical space, and while
some statements (e.g. “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.”) may lack verifiers or falsifiers
with metaphysical necessity, it is another matter entirely that some statements lack verifiers
or falsifiers with logical necessity, that is, there is no possible assignment of the terms in
the sentence to meanings such that the sentence would turn out true. In a sense, Correia’s
condition then corresponds to the possibility of a proposition’s being hypernonsensical—that
not only might a proposition be meaningless at a world but also meaningless in logical space.
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Our earlier considerations on logics of nonsense provide cases related to grammaticality
in which examples of hypernonsensical statements might seem plausible. Åqvist’s (1), for
example, considers “an important class of meaningless sentences [to be] those that are not
well formed in accordance with certain syntactical rules.”(1) Certainly, if mere juxtapositions
of syncategorematic terms are identified as paradigmatic “nonsensical” statements, Åqvist’s
example seems to provide a case of “statement” that lacks verifiers and falsifiers in logical
space, e.g., it is entirely reasonable to exclude truthmakers for the string “and or and” from
logical space. However, as Dawson notes in (57), to identify ill-formed strings of symbols
with formulae is to misunderstand Bochvar and Halldén, something reflected in such strings
not appearing in the language with which we have so far worked. This sentiment is also
reflected in the related work of Leonard Goddard and Richard Sylvan, who, in discussing
such systems, ‘exclude from consideration both gibberish and garbled word-strings.’ (99,
p. 42) More problematically for the present case, Correia’s example requires an occasion
in which a statement lacks verifiers but has possible falsifiers, but Åqvist’s example of ill-
formed formulae seems to preclude such instances. For example, the string “not-(and or
and)” seems as ill-formed as “and or and”; the suggestion that there are no verifiers for an
ill-formed string seems to entail that neither are their falsifiers.
A more plausible—albeit analogous—case is found in Carnap’s strain of logical positivism
(e.g., (39)), in which category mistakes such as “Caesar is a prime number” are considered to
be literally nonsensical. Carnap’s solution to the problem of category mistakes is to reduce
these statements to the category of the ungrammatical. Recall that “Caesar is a prime
number” is “just as linguistically incorrect” (39, p. 68) as “Caesar is and” and this pseudo-
statement is therefore meaningless with logical necessity. With no possible verifiers in logical
space, on Carnap’s account, category mistakes are indeed a type of “hypernonsense.”
However, although Dawson’s worry is perhaps superficially resolved, other problems re-
lated to Åqvist’s suggestion reappear. If “Caesar is a prime number” is of the same species
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as “Caesar is and,” then it is not clear how the sentence could have a possible falsifier while
lacking any possible verifiers. More importantly, Correia’s examples—being on their faces
well-formed, meaningful sentences—are not of this type, no matter how category mistakes
are treated. Correia’s example requires that the sentence “Sam is bad” fittingly describes
no state—that is, that the sentence has no verifiers—and “Sam is bad” should hardly be
counted as a category mistake, much less ungrammatically so.
A representation of logical space in which a modest statement like “Sam is bad” has
no possible verifiers seems to be a questionable representation. That strong state space
models prohibit the hypernonsensicality of such statements seems to be a mark in their
favor, making it reasonable to ask whether the metaphysical intuitions that Correia seeks to
model lead inevitably to such scenarios, i.e., whether these intuitions require weak state space
models. In what follows, we will attempt to dismiss the specter of hypernonsensicality by
accommodating Correia’s intuitions concerning distribution within the framework of strong
state space models.
3.2.4 Factual Equivalence Without Hypernonsense
That the metaphysical stakes are relatively high entails that it is reasonable to ask if this
alteration to Fine’s models is indeed necessary, that is, whether Correia’s intuitions about
factual equivalence can be accommodated by strong models. In order to examine this, let
us introduce the following notation:
Definition 3.2.4. For a state s and formula A, let ⌈A⌉↾s—the s-restricted content of A—be
defined as {t ∈ S | t ⊑ ⌈A⌉ and t ⊑ s}.
It can be easily demonstrated that given completeness of valuations, ⌈A⌉↾s is complete for
all s and A.
We can now proceed to provide an alternative semantical account of Cor more harmonious
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with the semantics of (87) in that it requires valuations to be total, that is, we can impose
the condition of completeness of valuations without impacting the logic itself.
Observation 3.2.1. A ↔ B is a theorem of Cor iff in all strong modalized state space
models, for any state s ∈ S, ⌈A⌉↾s = ⌈B⌉↾s
Proof. For left-to-right, we prove the contrapositive. Given a strong modalized state space
model 〈S, S✸,⊑, |·|+, |·|−〉, one can construct a weak state space model (not necessarily
modalized) 〈{t ∈ S | t ⊑ s},⊑, |·|+, |·|−〉 where |p|+ and |p|− are defined as ⌈p⌉↾s and
⌈¬̇ p⌉↾s, respectively. Furthermore, as the verification and falsification conditions at a state t
are determined exclusively by states t′ ⊑ t, the restrictions of the verification and falsification
conditions at each t ⊑ s will remain unchanged in the corresponding weak model. Hence, if
there is a strong state space model such that there exists an s where [A]↾s 6= [B]↾s, we can
extract from this a weak model witnessing this. By completeness of Correia’s semantics of
(51), this entails that A↔ B is not a theorem of—is not supervalid in—Cor.
For right-to-left, we again prove the contrapositive. Suppose that A↔ B is not a theorem
of Cor. Then we note that Correia’s completeness proof for Cor found in (51) appeals to Fine’s
canonical model of (87), in which |p|+ = {p} and |p|− = {¬̇ p}. By completeness, in the
canonical model |A| 6= |B|, whence |A|↾ 6= |B|↾. Furthermore, we can follow (85) and
define a strong, modalized state space model by defining
S✸ = {s ∈ ℘(Lit) | for all p ∈ At either p /∈ s or ¬̇ p /∈ s}.
Hence, the canonical model provides the counterexample we require.
It follows that the questionable picture of logical space in which there may be atoms with
no possible verifiers or falsifiers is not essential to Correia’s account of equivalence.
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We are thus free to read supervalidity in Cor as the assertion that with respect to any
complex state of affairs s, the elements of s verifying A are precisely those that verify B.
This seems to be a reasonable characterization; assertions are not made in a vacuum but
carry presuppositions—i.e., states against which a proposition is evaluated—no matter how
meager these presuppositions may be.
Both AC and Cor can be considered to be containment logics and the state space semantics
brings to the fore the sense in which some account of nonsense or meaninglessness plays a role.
In particular, a fact-based semantics allowed us to frame—and resolve—related questions
with respect to Correia’s preferred account of factual equivalence in (51). Before returning
to the matter of nonsense and containment in the context of computation, though, we may
briefly consider a further way in which Fine’s state space semantics can aid in the clarification
of matters of entailment and truthmaking.
3.3 Restall on Truthmaking
State space semantics may also be employed to shed light on competing fact-like semantics.
In a series of papers (159), (161), and (162), Restall has worked to provide a formal, se-
mantical account of truthmaking faithful to the Australian Realist tradition as exemplified
by, e.g., the work of Armstrong in (17). In the introduction to (159), Restall cites Frank
Jackson as an illustration of the obvious connection between truthmakers and entailment:
If Φ entails Π, what makes Φ true also makes Π true (at least when Φ and Π are
contingent).(111, p. 32)
Of particular interest is the following thesis:
Whever something is true, there must be something whose existence entails in
an appropriate way that it is true.(26, p. 126)
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The models that we will now review are intended to capture this thesis.
3.3.1 Restall’s Truthmaker Semantics
Restall’s models of (159) are simpler than Fine’s state space models but insofar as the two
semantics are meant to capture similar intuitions, there is much in common between the
two frameworks. For his models, Restall assumes a space S of truthmakers and defines the
semantics so that each statement ϕ is mapped to some set of elements of S—the truthmakers
of ϕ.
Definition 3.3.1. A Restall model is a 3-tuple 〈S,⊑, |·|〉 where 〈S,⊑〉 is a state space and
|·| is a function from Lit to ℘(S) such that:
 For no s does s  p and s  ¬̇ p
 For all p, there exists a state s ∈ S such that either s  p or s  ¬̇ p
As in the case of state space models, we extend a forcing relation between truthmakers (i.e.,
states) and complex formulae:
Definition 3.3.2. In a Restall model, we extend a truthmaking relation  so that for literals,
 s  p if s ∈ |p|
 s  ¬̇ p if s ∈ |¬̇ p|
This is extended to the case of complex positive formulae:
 s  A ∧̇ B iff s  A and s  B
 s  A ∨̇ B iff s  A or s  B
And in negative complex formulae, we appeal to Boolean equivalences:
CHAPTER 3. STATE SPACE SEMANTICS 81
 s  ¬̇ ¬̇A iff s  A
 s  ¬̇(A ∧̇ B) iff s  ¬̇A or s  ¬̇B
 s  ¬̇(A ∨̇ B) iff s  ¬̇A and s  ¬̇B
Truth in a model is defined as we expect, that is, M  A holds when there exists a truthmaker
for A.
Definition 3.3.3. A Restall model M makes a statement A true—M  A—if there exists
an s ∈ S such that s  A.8
Like van Fraassen in (189), Restall has an interest in describing classical consequence in
terms of facts or truthmakers, suggesting that more fine-grained models will provide insight
into the role that facts/truthmakers play with respect to logical consequence. Having defined
truth in a model—where a model M stands in for a possible world—classical entailment can
be recovered as truth preservation at all possible worlds.
Theorem 3.3.1. (Restall) A CL B is a classically valid inference if at every Restall model
M such that M  A, also M  B.
That classical consequence can be so naturally recast in terms of Restall’s models attests to
the flexibility of his semantics.
Now, insofar as a model M is identified with a possible world (with S serving to catalog
its parts), this account of classical consequence coincides with the interpretation as truth
preservation at all possible worlds. Despite the added power of the semantics, construing
entailment in this way leads to familiar problems. For example, the familiar paradoxes of
strict implication of (126) or (127) appear so that all propositions A bear this relationship
to the tautology B ∨̇ ¬̇B.
8While using “” both as a relation between formulae and as a relation between a model and a formula
might be considered an abuse of notation, this is standard in model theory.
CHAPTER 3. STATE SPACE SEMANTICS 82
It is thus interesting to pursue truthmaker accounts of stronger, more subtle entailment
relations between antecedent and consequent than is reflected in the classical account, and
Restall offers two competing versions of “real” entailment in (159) that reflect a more robust
role played by truthmakers in the inference from A to B. Restall’s first account of truthmaker
entailment (or truthmaker entailment in the first sense) imports the familiar notion of strict
entailment as preservation of truth across all worlds, i.e., that A J B is true if at every
world at which A is true, B, too, is true. Restall assigns an analogous role to truthmakers
so that A→ B holds if “every truthmaker for A is a truthmaker for B.” (159, p. 339) More
formally, we define
Definition 3.3.4. A  B is a truthmaker entailment in the first sense if at every Restall
model M, for every truthmaker s ∈ S such that s  A, also s  B.
Restall continues to show that the deductive system corresponding to this first sense of
truthmaker entailment is a familiar one. The logic of truthmaker entailment in the first
sense corresponds to consequence in the strong Kleene three-valued logic K3, introduced in
(122) as an account of classical logic in which valuations may be partial functions.9
K3 may be defined over the language Lzdf by the following matrix:
















are defined by the
following matrices:
9Recall that Bochvar’s internal nonsense logic Σ0 was also introduced by Stephen Kleene in (122) and is
thus frequently referred to as Kleene’s “weak” three-valued logic, whence the description of K3 as “strong.”
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In (159), Restall shows that truthmaker entailment in the first sense and K3 consequence
coincide, captured by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3.2. (Restall) A  B is a truthmaker entailment in the first sense if and only
if A K3 B
While Kleene introduced K3 in the context of studying partial functions, its appearance in
this context is not altogether surprising. It is worth mentioning that Barwise and Perry’s
situation semantics in (20) yields K3 consequence as well. Although the later semantics of (21)
(like van Fraassen’s factual entailment) yields Efde, the earlier paper disallows inconsistent
situations, a condition that corresponds to the suppression of the truth value n and, hence,
the collapse of the matrix semantics for Efde to the matrix semantics for K3.
10
There is a long tradition of using facts not only to define and explain weak consequence
relations, but also to shed light on classical logic by recovering classical entailment within
some framework of facts or situations. It seems that it is an equally worthy goal to see what
light can be shed on Restall’s account by reseating it within the framework of state space
semantics.
3.3.2 Worlds, Again
Reviewing Fine’s “classical recapture”—i.e., the account of classical validity in terms of state
space models—is worthwhile for two reasons. On the one hand, such a review will provide
10Precluding inconsistent situations is analogous to removing the “both” value b from the semantics for
Efde described in Definition 3.1.17. Removing this value leads to the many-valued semantics for K3 in
Definition 3.3.5.
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us insight into how to bring Fine’s account of CL into harmony with the underlying picture
in Restall’s Theorem 3.3.1. On the other hand, examining alternative characterizations of
classical logic in state space semantics will allow us to introduce a handful of interesting
observations.
Fine’s recovery of classical consequence in (86) is given in terms of verification by states
in general. However, an equivalent notion of entailment in sympathy with Restall’s repre-
sentation of classical consequence may be described as well. But in order to define truth
preservation across possible worlds, we have to first define an appropriate representation of
a world in state space semantics.
The most intuitive interpretation of states is that they represent states of affairs or facts.
If the Tractarian view is that world is an aggregates of states of affairs, then it is clear that
state space semantics can support a similar, combinatorial notion of possible world. A very
prominent example of this is found in (16), the main thesis of which is described by Sider in
the following terms:
The core idea of David Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility is at-
tractive. Rearrangement is the key to modality; possible worlds result from
scrambling bits and pieces of other possible worlds.(176, p. 679)
The corresponding notion to a combinatorial possible world is a fusion of other primitive
states that meets certain criteria. In Fine’s paper (84), he provides a corresponding definition
of a particular type of state called a world-state.
Definition 3.3.6. A world-state is a state w ∈ S✸ such that for all s ∈ S✸, either s ⊑ w
or s is incompatible with w.
Fine’s world-states are factually saturated in the sense that with respect to a world w,
every possible state s ∈ S✸ is either part of w—that is, obtains in w—or is incompatible
with w in a strong sense. Compare this account of world-states with Armstrong’s (16):
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The simplest way to specify a possible world would be to say that any conjunction
of possible atomic states of affairs, including the unit conjunction, constitutes
such a world.(16, p. 47)
It is arguable that invoking possible worlds carries more metaphysical commitments than
merely invoking situations or facts. Consistent with this position, Fine shows that classical
logic can be recovered without appeal to worlds and chooses to present classical consequence
as the preservation of loose verification across arbitrary states.
Definition 3.3.7 (Loose Verification). A state s loosely verifies A—written s l A—if any
state that is compatible with s is compatible with some t ∈ ⌈A⌉.
Observation 3.3.1 (Fine). A CL B is a classically valid inference if for every state space
model S and every s ∈ S, if s l A then s l B
But consider Fine’s definition of world-states and assume the natural position that the truth
of a statement A at a world w is precisely the existence of a truthmaker s ⊑ w such that
s  A.
Then we are free to recast classical entailment—as Restall supposes in (159)—as truth-
preservation at any possible world.
Observation 3.3.2. A CL B if for every state space model and world-state w, if w inexactly
verifies A, then w inexactly verifies B.
Recasting the recapture of classical entailment in this way provides an analogy by which we
may represent Restall’s account of entailment and truthmaking. In (159), Restall’s mod-
els are taken to represent possible worlds containing truthmakers as their parts. So it is
reasonable to consider the following definition relating parts of worlds to worlds themselves:
Definition 3.3.8. Call a state s w-actual if w is a world and s ⊑ w.
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A state’s being w-actual is analogous to saying that the state is a truthmaker at w or
that w obtains as a fact at w.
Observation 3.3.3. A K3 B iff for every world-state w, w-actual verifier of A contains a
w-actual verifier of B
Proof. For left-to-right, we prove the contrapositive. First, if s ⊑ w for a world w ∈ S✸,
then for no atom p does s + p and s − p. Suppose that t ⊑ w and t′ ⊑ w and t + p and
t′ − p. Then because t ⊑ w and t′ ⊑ w, t ⊔ t′ ⊑ w. But by definition of S✸, that w ∈ S✸
and t ⊔ t′ ⊑ w entails that t ⊑ t′ ∈ S✸. But by Exclusivity, t ⊑ t′ /∈ S✸.
Hence, with respect to any s ⊑ w, for every p ∈ At, either there is an exact verifier t ⊑ s
for p, there is an exact falsifier t ⊑ s for p, or there are no exact verifiers or falsifiers of p
that are part of s. We can thus recursively construct a K3 valuation vs by initially assigning

















t if ∃t ⊑ s such that t + p
f if ∃t ⊑ s such that t − p
n otherwise
The initial valuation can be extended recursively easily. The cases for truth, for example:
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vs(¬̇A) = t iff ∃t ⊑ s such that t + ¬̇A
iff t − A
iff vs(A) = f
vs(A ∧̇ B) = t iff ∃t ⊑ s such that t + A ∧̇ B
iff ∃t, u ⊑ s s.t. t + A and u + B
iff vs(A) = t and vs(B) = t
vs(A ∨̇ B) = t iff ∃t ⊑ s such that t + A ∨̇ B
iff ∃t, u ⊑ s s.t. t + A or u + B
iff vs(A) = t or vs(B) = t
Analogous conditions can be derived in the case of falsity and the third value n. The K3
truth tables can be reconstructed, whence given a world-state w and a w-actual verifier s
for B that contains no exact verifier for A, vs will serve as a K3 valuation witnessing that
A 2K3 B, i.e., will verify that vs(A) = t and vs(B) 6= t.
For right-to-left, let v be a K3 valuation serving as a counterexample to A K3 B and
consider the set:
Lv = {{p} | if v(p) = t} ∪ {{¬̇ p} | if v(p) = f}





Lv is a state present in the canonical model described in (87). Moreover, it is a





{{p} | {p, ¬̇ p} ∩ (
⋃
Lv) = ∅}
An easy induction establishes that v(A) = t if and only if there exists a state s ⊆
⋃
Lv such
that s  A. Hence, any truth-functional counterexample yields an appropriate part of a
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world-state in the canonical model.
We can also rephrase this by defining a notion of “worldy content” of a statement at a world
w. Recall the notation of Definition 3.2.4. Then ⌈A⌉+↾w is the set of the w-actual verifiers
of A.
Hence, we are free to rephrase Observation 3.3.3 in the following terms:
Observation 3.3.4. A K3 B iff for every world-state w, ⌈A⌉
+↾w ⊒ ⌈B⌉
+↾w
So Restall’s account of K3 in terms of state space semantics appears entirely natural. As
we’ve suggested, there is some precedent for this, as Barwise and Perry implicitly endorsed
this consequence relation in (20).
3.3.3 The Emergence of RMfde
In the concluding two paragraphs of (159)—immediately after discussing K3 as a candidate
for a form of “real” entailment—Restall briefly suggests a second sense of truthmaker entail-
ment. After observing that A ∧̇ ¬̇A entails an arbitrary formula B in truthmaker entailment
in the first sense, Restall suggests this second species of truthmaker entailment in two lines.
Where ⇒ represents the first sense of “real” entailment, the brief passage is:
But we can get closer to first-degree entailment by setting A⇒2 B if and only if
A⇒ B and ¬̇B ⇒ ¬̇A. Then we do not have A ∧̇ ¬̇A⇒2 B, but we still have
A ∧̇ ¬̇A⇒2 B ∨̇ ¬̇B.(159, p. 339)
Granted the role Efde has played in the semantics of (189) and (21), the attractiveness of
“approximating” Efde is understandable. What is especially interesting—and perhaps a bit
surprising—about Restall’s suggestion is the subsequent remark that this second species
of truthmaker entailment corresponds to the deductive system RMfde, i.e., the first-degree
fragment of R-Mingle.
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From a proof-theoretic perspective, RMfde is a relatively natural system. Syntactically, a
proof theory for RMfde can be defined by enriching the axiomatic definition of Efde provided
in Definition 3.1.16 with the so-called Safety axiom (cf. (68)):
Safety ϕ ∧̇ ¬̇ϕ→ ψ ∨̇ ¬̇ψ
Of course, we can recognize that Safety corresponds to the final valid entailment mentioned
by Restall in the earlier quote. Syntactic consequence in RMfde thus springs easily from Efde.
Within the setting of Restall’s models, consequence for RMfde can be defined in (159) as
follows:
Theorem 3.3.3. (Restall) A  B is valid in RMfde if at every Restall model M, every
truthmaker s ∈ W such that s  A, also s  B and every truthmaker s ∈ W such that
s  ¬̇B, also s  ¬̇A.
Now, Restall’s presentation of RMfde as a logic of real entailment is extraordinarily terse
and seems to come from nowhere. Although Restall takes care to interpret and motivate
the first species of entailment (i.e., K3), the paper lacks any explanation of why one might
embrace the picture assumed by the second sense of truthmaker entailment. In conjunction
with the somewhat unusual semantical account for RMfde, that Restall floats the system as
an account of real entailment may be puzzling. By rephrasing Restall’s intuitions in the
setting of state space semantics, however, we can provide some insight into why someone
may embrace consequence in RMfde as a logic of “real” entailment.
Restall’s endorsement is helped little by the fact that from the perspective of many-valued
semantics, RMfde is a rather odd system. As the axiomatic account suggested, RMfde is a
proper extension of Efde, as are Priest’s LP and Kleene’s K3. However, while from the many-
valued presentations of LP and K3 (cf. Definitions 2.3.5, 3.1.17, and 3.3.5), each of these
subsystems can be defined as restrictions of the matrix MEfde , there is no similar restriction
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of the matrix of Efde that yields RMfde. Rather, as shown implicitly by Dunn in (67) (and
more explicitly in (68)), many-valued semantics for RMfde are provided by appealing to the
pair of matrices MLP and MK3.
11 Semantics for RMfde can be described in terms of the
matrix semantics for LP (in Definition 2.3.5) and K3 (in Definition 3.3.5) as follows:








for all LP valuations v s.t. v(A) ∈ DLP, v(B) ∈ DLP, and
for all K3 valuations v s.t. v(A) ∈ DK3, v(B) ∈ DK3
It follows from this presentation that RMfde is the intersection LP ∩ K3. Now, the lack of a
standard matrix semantics for RMfde might be considered a mark against the system. But
the characterization of RMfde in Definition 3.3.9 yields a clue concerning how RMfde might
be a plausible—perhaps attractive—candidate for an account of truthmaker entailment.
Given the duality between LP and K3 we have the following observation (which has, for
example, been noted by Jc Beall in (22)):
Observation 3.3.5. A K3 B if and only if ¬̇B LP ¬̇A
Hence, an equivalent way of characterizing RMfde consequence would be:








A K3 B is valid, and
¬̇B K3 ¬̇A is valid
A natural interpretation of Definition 3.3.10 would be that RMfde consequence identifies
entailment not only with truth preservation but also with non-falsity preservation. The case
of logics of nonsense provide one of the most important examples of interpreting entailment
11It is worth noting that there exists an intriguing connection between Dunn’s semantics for RMfde and
the more recent swap structure semantics introduced by Walter Carnielli and Marcelo Coniglio in (41). In
many cases, swap structures are isomorphic to finite collections of logical matrices, enabling Carnielli and
Coniglio to show that a number of logics of formal inconsistency (cf. (42)) that are not characterizable by a
finite matrix have characterizations by collections of such matrices.
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as non-falsity preservation. For present purposes, we will consider for now Bochvar’s logic
of nonsense Σ (and its “internal fragment” Σ0) outlined in (31) and Halldén’s C introduced
in (104) (alongside its “classical fragment” C0).
Recall that Σ0 and C0 differ only in that the latter takes the “nonsense value” to be
designated while the former does not, i.e., logical consequence to Halldén is construed as
ensuring that consequence preserves non-falsity. The motivation for this has enjoyed a num-
ber of distinct interpretations. For example, in (195), Timothy Williamson suggests that
“[t]he rationale for Halldén’s designation policy is clear”(195, p. 105) asserting that Halldén
designates the value u precisely because Σ0’s lacking theorems is a pathology that can be
averted in C0 when nonsense is designated. Halldén’s position is unusual in that designated
values are often interpreted as “truthlike,” a property that is hard to attribute to meaning-
less statements. Ross Brady and Sylvan, for example, reject Halldén’s position by claiming
that it commits us “to sometimes asserting logical nonsense.”(38, p. 219)
Halldén is, in fact, sensitive to this, writing that with respect to such an objection,
[t]he answer... is, roughly, that a formula is to be taken as asserting something
only about those values of which it can meaningfully assert something. The
formula is true if the property or relation it asserts applies to all those values of
which it can be meaningfully asserted.(104, p. 47)
The upshot of Halldén’s response is that selection of designated values is determined by
concerns about validity rather than concerns about truth. Whereas, e.g., Brady and Sylvan
look at the “local” level and judge the treatment of an individual meaningless sentence as
having a “truth-like” property, Halldén is looking to how to judge the validity of an inference
in general.
The requirement that logical consequence must preserve non-falsity becomes all the more
natural when non-falsity preservation is recast in terms of truthmakers. Because of the
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entrenchment of Efde in these types of semantics, it will be useful to observe that in Efde
consequence-as-truth-preservation and consequence-as-non-falsity-preservation coincide. Re-
casting this observation in terms of truthmaking and falsemaking, this phenomenon can be
described in the following observation:
Observation 3.3.6. The following are equivalent
1. In all state space models, ⌈A⌉+ ⊒ ⌈B⌉+
2. In all state space models, both ⌈A⌉+ ⊒ ⌈B⌉+ and ⌈B⌉− ⊒ ⌈A⌉−
3. In all state space models, ⌈B⌉− ⊒ ⌈A⌉−
Proof. By the rules for Efde, A → B is valid, i.e., ⌈A⌉+ ⊒ ⌈B⌉+ holds in all models, if and
only if ¬̇B → ¬̇A is valid. This latter claim is equivalent to ⌈¬̇B⌉+ ⊒ ⌈¬̇A⌉+, which is
equivalent to ⌈B⌉− ⊒ ⌈A⌉−.
Likewise, the type of bipartite scheme represented by RMfde could have been imposed in,
e.g., (189) without any loss of generality.
This observation has consequences for how different entailment relations are construed
in state space semantics. For example, if we recall Fine’s definition of inexact consequence,
Observation 3.3.6 entails that the following provides an equivalent definition for inexact
consequence:








⌈A⌉+ ⊒ ⌈B⌉+, and
⌈B⌉− ⊒ ⌈A⌉−
From this observation, then, we can infer that this equivalent notion of inexact consequence
will correspond to Efde as well:
CHAPTER 3. STATE SPACE SEMANTICS 93








⌈A⌉+ ⊒ ⌈B⌉+, and
⌈B⌉− ⊒ ⌈A⌉−
Now, suppose that someone is taken by Fine’s account of truthmaker semantics but
doggedly subscribes to a combinatorialist view, accepting that the only possible states of
affairs are those that are actual. Such an individual would presumably wish to follow the
general scheme of, e.g., inexact consequence while restricting the verifiers and falsifiers of
a formula A by which inexact consequence is evaluated to those that actually obtain in a
world w. In other words, such a combinatorialist might embrace a “local logic of inexact
consequence.” However, granted the equivalence of Definitions 3.1.18 and 3.3.11, there is no
one deductive system that serves as the unique local logic of inexact consequence.
Moreover, although equivalent globally (i.e., when evaluated against arbitrary states),
Definitions 3.1.18 and 3.3.11 diverge locally (i.e., when considering only states that are w
actual). Let us explicitly represent these notions of local inexact consequence by making the
requisite restrictions on Definitions 3.1.18 and 3.3.11, respectively:
Definition 3.3.12. B is a local inexact consequence of A in the first sense if in every state
space model and world-state w, ⌈A⌉+↾w ⊒ ⌈B⌉
+↾w
Definition 3.3.13. B is a local inexact consequence of A in the second sense if in every












The similarity between these local particularizations of inexact consequence and the charac-
terizations of K3 and RMfde in state space semantics is pronounced.
For example, if we recall Observation 3.3.4, the following is immediate:
Observation 3.3.7. A K3 B iff B is a local inexact consequence of A in the first sense.
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And from the structure of Definition 3.3.13, the claim of RMfde to the mantle of the logic of
wordly inexact consequence appears just as legitimate as the claim of K3. This observation
follows from an alternative formulation of RMfde consequence in state space semantics.












Proof. As described in (68), consequence in RMfde can be defined so that:








A K3 B, and
A LP B
Where LP is Priest’s “logic of paradox” of (154) (defined in Definition 2.3.5). Furthermore,
we have noted that
A K3 B iff ¬̇B LP ¬̇A
Granted these observations, we may appeal to Observation 3.3.4 to immediately secure the
observation.
Just as Observation 3.3.4 and Definition 3.3.12 bore a clear resemblance, Observation 3.3.8
allows us to appeal to its similarity to Definition 3.3.13 to draw the following conclusion:
Observation 3.3.9. A RMfde B iff B is a local inexact consequence of A in the second
sense.
Not only does this characterization show that RMfde has a legitimate claim as the logic of
inexact consequence but it also reflects a natural picture of truthmaking entailment. Note
that Observation 3.3.8 boils down to the claim that in any world w, every exact verifier of A
contains an exact verifier of B and that every exact falsifier of B contains an exact falsifier
of A.
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This latter condition may be rephrased as the demand that any exact-non-falsifier of
A is an exact-non-falsifier of B. From a näıve perspective, we expect correct reasoning to
preserve non-falsity and this intuition is reinforced once we move from thinking about truth
values to truth makers. We undoubtedly expect of falsifiers that they support this analysis
of consequence. When, e.g., a suspected criminal is on trial, the body of evidence employed
by the court can count as a truthmaker or falsemaker for his or her testimony. Suppose that
the accused has provided an alibi while on the stand; then the role of the prosecution is to
employ the body of evidence as a falsifier for the accused’s alibi. It seems reasonable to
expect that if the evidence fails to reveal “I was at Abel’s house at the time the crime was
committed” as perjury—if the evidence is too weak to disprove the alibi—then the evidence
should also fail to reveal “I was either at Abel’s house or Becky’s house during the crime”
to be a falsehood.
Note that the K3 account of “real” entailment fails to validate this intuition. For example,
the inference A ∧̇ ¬̇A K3 B is valid for arbitrary formulae B. Now, for an arbitrary state
s ∈ S✸, s is a non-falsemaker for a contradiction A ∧̇ ¬̇A. Considering an arbitrary model
in which a contingent proposition ¬̇B holds shows that the fact that s is a non-falsemaker
for the contradiction does not preclude s from serving as a falsemaker for a contingent
proposition B. Hence, RMfde as a type of truthmaker entailment captures intuitions that K3
does not support.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
Although we have noted that Suszko’s (182) is contemporary to van Fraassen’s (189), Fine’s
state space semantics for Angell’s containment logic AC and Correia’s account of Cor are
clearly counted in the lineage of van Fraassen’s work. It is worth noting, however, that
Parry-type systems in general—and AC in particular—admit analyses within the framework
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of Suszko and Bloom’s non-Fregean logics from (29) and (30).
In (139), Marek Nowak cites (20) and (21) as motivation for the formulation of a so-called
Barwise and Perry’s principle concerning the identity between two formulae:
BP Two sentences whose logical forms are logically equiv-
alent and have the same extralogical constants, [ex-
press the same proposition].
As a particularization of BP to the propositional case, Nowak attributes to (197) a constraint
he calls Wójcicki’s principle (WP):
WP Two sentences whose logical forms in sentential lan-
guage are logically equivalent and have the same sen-
tential variables [express the same proposition].
The system so determined can be seen to be the set of first-degree biequivalences in Parry’s
PAI, that is, strong consequence in the propositional case (via Wójcicki) is equivalent to con-
sequence in PAIfde. Further work in which the containment logics induced by such constraints
is developed has appeared by Andrzej Bilat in (27) and (28).
But AC, too, has received an analysis within this framework. Tadao Ishii, in (109)
and (110) has described systems of propositional logic with identity in which AC emerges.
It stands to reason that Cor can be folded into this framework as well. Although these
two traditions—that of van Fraassen and that of Suszko—differ, it should still be worth
considering Cor and state space semantics through the lens of non-Fregean logic.
Chapter 4
A Computational Interpretation of
Conceptivism
One of the hallmark features of the deductive systems known as ‘conceptivist’ or ‘contain-
ment’ logics is that the principle of Addition (the inference to A ∨̇ B from A) fails. In this
chapter, we examine a number of prima facie unrelated deductive contexts that do not sup-
port Addition and attempt to harmonize them by developing a computational interpretation
of conceptivist logics. With a computational interpretation ready-to-hand, further applica-
tions of conceptivist systems emerge, including themes in propositional dynamic logic and
constructive logic.
4.1 Formal Remarks
In order to be as precise as necessary, we will stop to formally define a number of properties
that deductive systems may exhibit before moving on to formally introduce a number of the
more well-known conceptivist systems.
For example, we will deal with three distinct propositional languages in the sequel: the
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familiar propositional language of zeroth degree formulae Lzdf introduced in Definition 1.1.2
whose logical connectives include negation (‘¬̇’), conjunction (‘∧̇’), and disjunction (‘∨̇’),
the language L+ of Definition 1.1.1 that enriches Lzdf by the addition of an intensional
conditional connective (‘→’), and a pure implicational language L→ whose sole connective
is the intensional conditional →.
4.1.1 A Family of →-Parry Deductive Systems
While a number of→-Parry logics have been introduced, some—like Parry’s original system
and Sören Halldén’s S0, introduced in (103)—lack semantics. There are, however, a number
of systems in the literature that can be given a common semantical framework.
Parry, in (144), had enriched his system of (142) and (143) with the axiom:
(A ∧̇ ¬̇B)→ ¬̇(A→ B)
When the matter of analytic implication was taken up by (65), (188), and (81), this axiom
was included. However, Parry’s attitude in (144) seems to be that this axiom is in keeping
with the spirit of his dissertation and, as such, does not represent so much an extension of
his original system but a correction thereto. It is this system—PAI—in terms of which the
remaining three are motivated.
Dunn’s ‘demodalized’ analytic implication DAI follows from the observation that necessity
in logics of strict implication can be defined so that ✷A =df (A → A) → A. Hence, adding
an axiom A→ ((A→ A)→ A), i.e., A→ ✷A, effectively eliminates modal distinctions and
demodalizes the system PAI. The addition of this axiom to the logic of strict implication
S4, for example, collapses the system to classical logic. After providing algebraic semantics
for his system, Dunn cites Robert Meyer as suggesting a very simple semantical approach to
DAI.
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The abstract (69) is the first appearance of DAI as ‘dependence logic’ as a species of
Epstein’s larger program of set-assignment semantics. In (71), in which the system is called
‘D,’ retains the truth-function nature of the connectives but adds a function s from At to
a set of ‘subject-matters.’ A model is thus a pair 〈v, s〉, where v behaves classically for








f if either s(B) * s(A) or both v(A) = t and v(B) = f
t otherwise
While finding set-assignment semantics for weaker systems is an interesting question, there
are at present no semantics for, e.g., PAI in the style of Epstein.
While Dunn and Epstein explore a strengthened form of analytic implication, we have
encountered Harry Deutsch’s S, motivated by the assertion that PAI is overly strong. For
the time being, Deutsch’s S will remain the weakest of the systems studied. Recalling the
semantics for S in Chapter 2, we will characterize the stronger systems in terms of restrictions
of S models. The language over which these logics are defined is L +.
Deutsch’s semantics are a modification of Fine’s models for PAI in (81), which themselves
employ Kripke frames. Like other logics with Kripke-style semantics, restricting frames
〈W,R〉 often yields stronger deductive systems. In the present case, restricting our attention
to only models in which R linearly orders W yields the system S′ studied in (61).
Definition 4.1.1. Γ S′ A iff for all S models M such that 〈W,R〉 is a linear order and
points w ∈ W , if M , w + B for all B ∈ Γ, then M , w + A
In (60), Deutsch also defines a system S′′ (appearing in his dissertation as “D′′”) correspond-
ing to the class of S models for which W is a singleton.
Definition 4.1.2. Γ S′′ A iff for all S models M for which W is a singleton {w}, whenever
M , w + B for all B ∈ Γ, it follows that M , w + A
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PAI DAI
S S′′S′
Figure 4.1: Relationships Between →-Parry Systems
As the frames for S′′ models are degenerate examples of linear orders, we may observe that
S′′ is an extension of S.
As is clear from Definition 2.4.1, we may recall that Fine’s original semantics for PAI
correspond to the class of all S models whose distributions of formulae are consistent, i.e.,
PAI corresponds to S models for which V + and V − assign only consistent valuations of atoms:
Definition 4.1.3. Γ PAI A iff for all S models M such that for all p ∈ At, V +(p)∩V −(p) =
∅, and points w, if M , w  B for all B ∈ Γ, then M , w  A
Finally, the Dunn-Epstein system DAI defined as the restriction of PAI to single-pointed
frames:
Definition 4.1.4. Γ DAI A iff for all S models M such that
 for all p ∈ At, V +(p) ∩ V −(p) = ∅, and
 W is a singleton {w}
if M , w  B for all B ∈ Γ, then M , w  A.
This definition makes it clear that Dunn’s possible worlds semantics and Epstein’s set-
assignment semantics are equivalent, as the single lattice 〈Cw, ◦w〉 is analogous to a set
of subject matters in Epstein’s set-assignment semantics for D. To wit, the canonical models
for DAI and D, the lattice 〈Cw, ◦w〉 and the set of subject matters are isomorphic.
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The picture of this family of systems is represented by Figure 4.1. As mentioned earlier,
other conceptivist systems have been described in the literature, although their semantics do
not immediately admit an account in the above terms.1 For example, Charles Daniels’ story
logic—which we will identify as ‘S⋆’—first described in (54) is a further conceptivist system
whose semantics we will omit here.2 Daniels’ interpretation of ‘story implication’ employs
stories as its primitive semantical device so that A → B is valid in S⋆ if in every ‘story’ in
which A is true, B is also true. Daniels suggests that if a story is thought to have a ‘cast,’
one must ‘discard the idea that if A is in a story, A ∨̇ B and B ∨̇ A are also in it,’ as the
sentence denoted by B, after all, may ‘introduce new and unwanted characters.’(54, p. 222)
Daniels acknowledges the proximity to Parry’s system and motivates the de facto rejection
of Addition on the basis of names—a wholly syntactic, yet not ad hoc, motivation.
Daniels’ system deserves special mention as its first-degree fragment S⋆
fde
will play a role
in the sequel.
4.1.2 A Family of ⊢-Parry Deductive Systems
Many of the ⊢-Parry systems in the literature—and other propositional logics with which we
will be concerned—can be semantically characterized by a simple set of matrices. Central
will be the system S⋆
fde
, which makes up the first-degree fragment of Daniels’ S⋆. Properly
speaking, Angell first described this deductive system in passing in his abstract (9), in which
S⋆
fde
is described as the logic corresponding to the intersection Efde ∩ PAIfde.3 An axiomatic
account of S⋆
fde
was independently introduced by Daniels in (55), in which Daniels declared
1Included among these systems is Parry’s original AI of (142) and (143) for which no corresponding
semantics has been introduced.
2Although Daniels’ semantics does not immediately conform to the underlying semantical picture de-
scribed in, e.g., Definitions 2.4.1 and 2.4.4, the intuitions implicit in his work on these systems (e.g., (54),
(55), (56)) bear many similarities to Parry’s own work. Thus, it is plausible that S⋆ might be given semantics
within a modification of Fine’s framework, although we set this aside for future work.
3Proof of the identity of S⋆
fde
and Angell’s Efde ∩ PAIfde has not appeared in the literature but proof of
this identity will be provided in Observation 5.4.1.
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without proof that S⋆
fde
coincided with the first-degree fragment of his logic with ‘story
semantics.’4 The truth-functional semantics for this system was independently discovered
by Graham Priest in (156) as “FDEϕ” in the context of the catus.kot.i, an element of Buddhist
dialectics, in which Priest enriches the truth values of Efde (cf. Definition 3.1.17) with a fifth
semantical value u (called “e” by Priest) that formalizes an alethic value corresponding to
emptiness, following Priest’s interpretation of remarks made by the Buddhist philosopher
Nāgārjuna.
The semantical presentation of S⋆
fde
we will employ, like Priest’s account in (156), can be
interpreted as an enrichment of the set of truth values VEfde with an additional, infectious
value.
Definition 4.1.5. The logic S⋆
fde



















= {t, b, u, n, f} ( i.e., VEFfde ∪ {u}) and DS⋆fde = {t, b}.






, and f ∨̇
S⋆
fde







t b u n f f ∨̇
S⋆
fde
t b u n f
t f t t b u n f t t t u t t
b b b b b u f f b t b u t b
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
n n n n f u n f n t t u n n
f t f f f u f f f t b u n f
The Belnap-Dunn system Efde and the Deutsch-Oller system Sfde can be clearly defined by
placing additional conditions on the valuations of V,e.g., Efde corresponds to validity with
respect to S⋆
fde
valuations v such that u /∈ v[At].
4Problematically, Daniels, like Deutsch, calls his intensional system “S” in (55), ensuring that the notation
“Sfde” is ambiguous when unqualified. Decorating Daniels’ system with a star was introduced in (79) to
distinguish the two first-degree systems.
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The final first-degree conceptivist system playing a role in this chapter is Johnson’s system
RC from (116), semantics for which was described in Definition 2.3.3.
Inspection of the matrices yields a few important facts concerning the relationship be-
tween these systems. In particular, we provide a particular schematic analysis of validity
in the systems S⋆
fde
, Sfde, and RC. Recall Gödel’s conjecture of (101) that Parry’s system
of analytic implication AI would permit what Sylvan called a ‘double-barrelled’ analysis,
according to which the theoremhood of a formula A (or validity of an inference A ⊢ B) in
a deductive system L can be characterized by a pair of constraints: Validity in a distinct
system L′ in conjunction with the satisfaction of some syntactic criterion by the formula A.
We have noted that a property closely related to Gödel’s conjecture was confirmed for
PAI by Kit Fine in (81), in which it was demonstrated that the Lewis system S4 serves as
the “carrier logic” for PAI. In light of this, we will call an account of a containment logic in
which the logic is characterized by a distinct system L with a syntactic sieve a Gödel-Fine
analysis.
The truth functional semantics for S⋆
fde














A Efde B, and
At(B) ⊆ At(A)
Proof. For left-to-right, because all Efde valuations are trivially S
⋆
fde
valuations, that A S⋆
fde
B entails that A Efde B. Moreover, it is shown in (140) that for the system Sfde—of which
S⋆
fde
is itself a subsystem—A Sfde B entails that At(B) ⊆ At(A). As a subsystem of Sfde,
whenever A S⋆
fde
B, we may infer that A Sfde B and by transitivity, that At(B) ⊆ At(A).
For right-to-left, suppose that A Efde B and that At(B) ⊆ At(A) although A 2S⋆fde B.
Then there is an S⋆
fde
valuation v such that v(A) ∈ DS⋆
fde
but v(B) /∈ DS⋆
fde
. That v(A) ∈ DS⋆
fde
and At(B) ⊆ At(A) tells us that for no p ∈ At(B) is v(p) = u. By the truth functional
CHAPTER 4. A COMPUTATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF CONCEPTIVISM 104
nature of S⋆
fde
, any valuation v′ agreeing with v on the elements of At(A) will likewise map
A to an element of DS⋆
fde
with v′(B) /∈ DS⋆
fde
.
Likewise, Observation 2.3.8 can be rephrased in the style of the Gödel-Fine analysis of Sfde:








Γ LP A, and
At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]
In a sense, then, S⋆
fde
and Sfde are the conceptivist fragments (or, more formally, the ⊢-Parry
fragments) of Efde and LP, respectively.
Johnson’s RC admits a similar analysis. Let Con(Γ) represent the statement that Γ is
classically consistent, i.e., that there is a classical valuation mapping each of its formulae to
t and let CL denote semantic consequence for the classical propositional calculus. Then we
have the analysis:
















Γ CL A, and
At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]
These systems bear a tidy relationship with one another, which can be made still tidier
by defining the first-degree fragment of PAI. As (166) observes, PAIfde enjoys the following
property:








Γ CL A, and
At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]
Then we have the series of containments pictured in Figure 4.2. With these formal remarks,
we are prepared to move forward.






Figure 4.2: Relationships Between ⊢-Parry Systems
4.2 The Failure of Addition
Recall that after identifying Parry’s position with the failure of Addition, Sylvan rejects the
Kantian interpretation of conceptivist logics. If the quasi-Kantian motivation for Parry’s
intuitions is indeed ‘narrow and arbitrary’ and fails to motivate a rejection of Addition, then
what sort of case can be made in support of rejecting Addition? By casting the net a bit more
widely and examining a number of logical and linguistic enterprises that each independently
entail a rejection of the principle of Addition, we may begin filling in alternative motivations
for conceptivism. Some of the areas we will discuss are the so-called ‘logics of nonsense’ and
species of disjunction described as ‘intensional disjunction,’ ‘free choice disjunction,’ and
‘cut-down disjunction.’5
4.2.1 Meaninglessness
The class of logics of nonsense, such as the truth-functional systems described by Dmitri
Bochvar and Sören Halldén in (31) and (104), respectively, are held together by the thesis
that some syntactic objects masquerading as propositions are in fact meaningless, in some
sense of the term. Supposing that this is the case, the usual semantics for classical logic
is ill-equipped to account for such a circumstance as it presupposes that all formulae are
5A thorough investigation into the nature of disjunction in general can be found in (113).
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meaningful ‘out of the gate’; in general, semantic treatments of logics of nonsense employ a
truth-value corresponding to meaninglessness or nonsense.6 Bochvar’s system—with which
we are primarily concerned—has two sets of connectives, ‘external’ connectives which act
as projection operators mapping all arguments to either truth or falsity and ‘internal,’ non-
projective connectives.
Importantly, the system enjoys what Lennart Åqvist labels the ‘doctrine of the predom-
inance of the atheoretical element,’ that is, that with respect to the internal connectives
(which Bochvar takes to correspond to the classical, logical connectives of, e.g., the Prin-
cipia Mathematica), the meaningless value is ‘infectious.’ Nonsense propagates from atomic
formulae to complex formulae so that a subformula’s being nonsense entails that the complex
formula is likewise nonsense when all the connectives in the complex formula are internal
connectives.
We may recall the internal or classical calculi of Bochvar and Halldén defined in Defini-
tions 2.2.4 and 2.2.5, respectively and note that these systems differ only in that both t and
u are designated in C0.
By examining the matrices, the infectiousness of the nonsense value u is sufficiently clear
to demonstrate the failure of Addition in Σ0. Bochvar’s system is truth-functional, whence
altering v to a valuation v′ mapping some B /∈ At(A) to u will not interfere with its mapping
A to t. But by the infectiousness of the nonsense value, v′ will map A ∨̇ B to the nonsense
value with ‘∨̇’ denoting internal disjunction. So A 2Σ0 A ∨̇ B.
7 The motto of the Bochvar
account might be summarized as ‘all subformulae must be meaningful.’ In other words, in
natural language, we have the following property:
6But cf. Timothy Smiley’s interpretation in (177), according to which a formula assigned the meaningless
value of Bochvar has a sense but merely fails to denote a proper truth-value.
7Bochvar’s system fails to satisfy Parry’s Proscriptive Principle only because, e.g., contradictions cannot
take a designated value and B follows from A ∧̇ ¬̇A vacuously.
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either A is true or B is true, and
A is meaningful, and
B is meaningful
A further consequence is more epistemic in nature. Bochvar’s intuition concerning infectious
nonsense values entails that in general the truth of a formula A ∨̇ B cannot be established by
merely examining, e.g., A and determining that it is true. The doctrine of the predominance
of the atheoretical element entails that in order to confirm that a disjunction is true, for each
disjunct some procedure must be carried out to check whether both disjuncts are meaningful.
4.2.2 Intensional Disjunction
In Section 1.1.2, one of the distinguishing features of relevant logics was identified as the
rejection of Disjunctive Syllogism. Yet this rejection was cited in the context of disjunction
as employed by the proof of ECQ outlined by C. I. Lewis, a species of disjunction that
Anderson and Belnap label the ‘truth-functional “or”.’ With respect, however, to intensional
disjunction, there are instances in which instances of Disjunctive Syllogism are in fact valid
inferences:
On the other hand the intensional varieties of ‘or’ which do support the dis-
junctive syllogism are such as to support corresponding (possibly counterfactual)
subjunctive conditionals. When one says ‘that is either Drosophila melanogaster
or D. virilis, I’m not sure which,’ and on finding that it wasn’t D. melanogaster,
concludes that it was D. virilis, no fallacy is being committed. But this is pre-
cisely because ‘or’ in this context means ‘if it isn’t one, then it is the other.’(6,
p. 22)
This condition—that a disjunction is conditional-supporting—is the hallmark of an inten-
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sional disjunction on the relevant account, in which it is often symbolized by ‘⊕’ and referred
to as ‘fission.’ The disjuncts in the Drosophila case ostensibly share a relationship lacking in,
e.g., the disjuncts in the statement ‘either Napoleon was born in Corsica or else the number
of the beast is perfect,’ namely a conditional assertion that the falsehood of one entails the
truth of the other.
If an intensional disjunction carries with it the assertion of such a relationship, then
Addition must fail with respect to fission. To use Anderson and Belnap’s example, while
it is true that Napoleon was born in Corsica, it hardly follows that the falsehood of this
statement would counterfactually entail any arbitrary proposition.
If it is a criterion of relevance between disjuncts that distinguishes the species of disjunc-
tion modulo which Addition is valid from those for which it fails, then it is not immediately
apparent what the failure of Addition for intensional disjunction has to do with the failure
of Addition for Bochvar’s disjunction. The internal disjunction of Bochvar naturally seems
to fall into the category of truth-functional disjunctions. Models for Σ0 are, after all, just
functions from atoms to truth values. Moreover, Anderson and Belnap’s criterion that in-
tensional disjunctions ‘support corresponding... subjunctive conditionals’ (6, p. 22) seems
to fail for Bochvar’s internal disjunction. For example, Anderson and Belnap’s example of a
paradigmatic non-intensional disjunction—‘either Napoleon was born in Corsica or else the
number of the beast is perfect’—appears to be true by the lights of a logic of nonsense. Each
disjunct is plausibly meaningful and the former is true although there remains no support
for the corresponding conditional.
However, viewing the two species of disjunction available to the relevant logician from a
different perspective in fact sheds light on this situation. The rule for introducing fission on
the right in Gentzen-style sequent calculi (as presented in (160)) is as follows:
Γ ⊢ ∆, A, B
[⊕R]
Γ ⊢ ∆, A⊕ B
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Reviewing (98), this also can be seen as an instance of the right introduction rule for the
multiplicative disjunction ` of Jean-Yves Girard’s linear logic, a species of disjunction for
which Addition fails as well.
If we look to the proof theory for Σ0, however, we find that proof theoretically, the truth-
functional disjunction of Bochvar and the intensional disjunction of Anderson and Belnap
or Girard behave identically. In Marcelo Coniglio and Maŕıa Corbalán’s Gentzen-style proof
theory for Σ0 found in (48), the introduction rule for disjunction has the following form:
Γ ⊢ ∆, A, B
[∨̇ R]
Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∨̇ B
In isolation, then, both fission and Bochvar’s disjunction appear to be mere notational vari-
ants of one another.
When one includes the structural rule of Right Weakening, that is,
Γ ⊢ ∆[Wk R]
Γ ⊢ ∆, A
it is immediate that the rules corresponding to classical and intensional disjunction corre-
spond in the sense that a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆, A ∨̇ B is derivable if and only if Γ ⊢ ∆, A ⊕ B
is derivable. In other words, granted Right Weakening, we can introduce extensional and
intensional disjunction in precisely the same contexts.
It is reasonable to question whether one ought to identify what Bochvar calls ‘disjunction’
with disjunction as is practiced in natural language. It seems that this observation provides
a fair response, via the famous remark of Gentzen:
The introductions represent, as it were, the ‘definitions’ of the symbols concerned,
and the eliminations are no more, in the final analysis, than the consequences of
these definitions.(95, p. 80)
From the standpoint of Gentzen, then, these connectives have identical meanings; the dif-
ferences are a function of external factors, e.g., what structural rules are accepted.
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A further semantic point can be made from observing the rules for fission and internal
disjunction. Bochvar’s intuition concerning infectious nonsense values entails that in general
the truth of a formula A ∨̇ B cannot be established by merely examining, e.g., A and
determining that it is true. The doctrine of the predominance of the atheoretical element
entails that in order to confirm that a disjunction is true, for each disjunct some procedure
must be carried out to check whether both disjuncts are meaningful.
This picture is only reinforced by looking to the proof theory. We are unable to add new
formulae at will to the succedent position in order to yield new disjunctions. Each disjunct
must have been introduced into the proof by some nontrivial means, i.e., there was some
rationale for introducing each disjunct. Along with the relevant logicians, one can interpret
this criterion as a demand that each disjunct must bear relevance to the set of assumptions.
However, we can view this just as easily as the demand for the existence of a procedure or
mechanism by which each disjunct has been introduced.
4.2.3 Free Choice Disjunction
A further cue may be taken from the analysis of ‘free choice disjunction’ as described by
Thomas E. Zimmerman in (201). Zimmerman’s interpretation of disjunction is intended to
solve a puzzle about the distribution of modal operators over disjunction in natural language,
the so-called ‘free choice permission’ problem:
how can it be that sentences of the form ‘X may A or B’ are usually understood
as implying ‘X may A and X may B’ ?(201, p. 255)
There is no operator © in the standard modal logics according to which ©(A ∨̇ B) entails
©A ∧̇ ©B, although when ‘©’ is read as a deontic operator representing ‘agent α may...’
this seems to follow in natural language.8 The puzzle is thus how to find a reasonable and
8There are operators which satisfy this inference, e.g., da Costa’s consistency operator ◦ (an account of
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intuitive semantical model supporting this type of inference.
Zimmerman’s solution to this problem involves an atypical, formal treatment of disjunc-
tion, in which a disjunction A ∨̇ B is read as a list of epistemic possibilities, i.e., ‘A is
possible (for all I know) and B is possible (for all I know).’ The näıve semantical approach
to disjunction treats propositions as collections of epistemic possibilities and invokes the
following three conditions to evaluate a disjunction A ∨̇ B:















either A is the case or B is the case, and
A might be the case, and
B might be the case
Zimmerman offers ‘closed’ and ‘open’ readings of disjunction. A disjunction is called closed
if at least one of the disjuncts is thought to hold and open if the list is not believed to be
exhaustive, i.e., closed disjunction must satisfy all three conditions while open disjunction
must satisfy only the latter two.
Importantly, disjunction enjoys what might be read as a ‘disjunction-as-weak-conjunction’
paradigm since Zimmerman’s approach unavoidably makes use of conjunction. With respect
to the ‘list’ reading, a list is in a strong sense a conjunction of items; on the above truth
condition, one must employ conjunction to ensure that the second and third clauses are sat-
isfied. Hence, that it is a disjunction over which ‘may’ distributes is thus merely apparent;
the list’s being a conjunction of possibilities entails that ‘may’ distributes over a conjunction.
This is far less problematic: in virtually any modal logic stronger than S1, necessity and
possibility operators distribute over conjunction.
That Addition must be rejected relative to either species of free choice disjunction is clear.
That A is true says nothing concerning whether B is possible; indeed, B may be thought to
be impossible, whence A ∨̇ B will not hold. Hence, with respect to free choice disjunction,
which may be found in (42)) or the ‘...is meaningful’ operator + of Halldén’s nonsense logic introduced in
(104). Yet there is no clear way to interpret such operators as giving rise to a reading of ‘may.’
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A ∨̇ B does not follow from A. We will consider the motto of free choice disjunction to be
‘all subformulae must be possible.’
The problem of free choice permission and purported solutions to it will play a role in
matters to be discussed in Section 4.4.1; for now, we will continue surveying paradigms of
disjunction in which Addition fails.
4.2.4 Cut Down Disjunction
So, one might challenge the validity of Addition out of concerns related to meaninglessness
or related to relevance. Although these appear to be prima facie distinct concerns, the two
begin to coincide in the treatment of disjunction described by Melvin Fitting as ‘cut-down
disjunction.’
In (91), Fitting provides an account of generalizing the interpretation of the internal
Bochvar logic (represented in Fitting’s paper as the weak Kleene three-valued logic) to the
case of bilattices. Fitting considers bilattices B = 〈B,≤t, ≤k〉, where ≤t is the ‘truth
ordering’ on the underlying set B and ≤k represents the ‘information ordering.’ For elements
a, b ∈ B, a ≤k b means that a is more informative than b; e.g., in the case in which
experts supply both evidence for and against a formula A, this is maximally informative or
constituting ‘information overload.’ Each ordering gives rise to independent join and meet
operators; ⊕ and ⊗, respectively, in the case of ≤k and ∨ and ∧ the case of ≤t.
Continuing with this example: Fitting offers the interpretation of the semantical value of
a formula A as a pair 〈Pi, Ni〉, where Pi andNi are construed as groups of experts (alternately,
collections of data or evidence). Pi denotes those in support of A and Ni denotes those against
A, respectively. Such an account of semantical values is closely related to the interpretation
offered by Belnap in the paper (23), in which an artificial reasoner evaluates formulae A
in terms of whether it has received affirmations or denials of A. On this interpretation,
the operation ∨ is defined so that the alethic join of elements 〈P0, N0〉 and 〈P1, N1〉 is
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〈P0 ∪ P1, N0 ∩ N1〉. This gives a natural interpretation of disjunction, which, indeed, is in
harmony with Belnap’s interpretation. In this setting, the operations ⊕ and ⊗ are defined so
that 〈P0, N0〉⊕〈P1, N1〉 =df 〈P0∪P1, N0∪N1〉 and 〈P0, N0〉⊗〈P1, N1〉 =df 〈P0∩P1, N0∩N1〉.
In the case of the internal Bochvar logic, when considering the semantical status of a
conjunction or disjunction, Fitting offers an interpretation in which one is interested only in
the opinions of experts who have opined on both conjuncts or disjuncts. As it ‘cuts down’ the
field of acceptable data, Fitting describes this species of disjunction as ‘cut-down disjunction.’
Let us sketch this out: Given a formula A with value 〈P0, N0〉, the value assigned to A⊕¬̇A
is 〈P0 ∪ N0, P0 ∪ N0〉. The intended reading of the value 〈P0 ∪ N0, P0 ∪ N0〉 is an ordered
pair each element of which comprises the collection of experts who maintain an opinion
concerning A, that is, those experts who have either provided information supporting A or
have provided evidence against A. We will say that JAK is the cut-down of A that represents
the proposition that there is sufficient evidence to evaluate A. Then the operation which
corresponds to evaluating a disjunction against the opinions of the group of experts opining
on both disjuncts will be defined as follows:
A ▽ B =df (A ∨̇ B)⊗ JAK⊗ JBK
Reading ⊗ as a species of conjunction, it becomes apparent that Bochvar’s logic admits
an interpretation that bears at least a superficial resemblance to Zimmerman’s free choice
disjunction. Fitting’s analysis of this type of disjunction is that A ∨̇ B is designated if A ▽ B
is designated on the bilattice. In English,















some group of experts X supports either A or B, and
all members of X have opined on A, and
all members of X have opined on B
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Addition clearly fails in the context of cut-down disjunction as well; that a group of experts
has affirmed A to be true does not entail that anyone has provided any evidence concerning
B, either in its favor or against it.
We will return to examine Fitting’s cut-down operations with much more detail in Chap-
ter 6.5. For now, note that, beyond the reappearance of a tripartite analysis of disjunction,
Fitting’s interpretation of cut-down disjunction also supports the theme of the necessity of
some procedure surveying each component of a formula that we had found in each of the
above cases. That it is a requirement that all members of some group of experts have given
an assessment of each disjunct appears similar to the demand that such a psychological pro-
cedure exists (in the case of logics of nonsense) or a proof-theoretic procedure exists (in the
case of intensional disjunction in relevant and linear logics). In each species of disjunction
for which Addition fails, the demand that both disjuncts are surveyed in some manner is a
necessary condition for the truth of a disjunction A ∨̇ B.
4.3 Towards a Computational Interpretation
Although Fitting’s analysis of the internal Bochvar logic draws together some formal aspects
of nonsense and free choice disjunction contexts, it fails to bring together the notions of
meaningfulness and possibility. In the case of a disjunction, that one cuts down the data
to experts opining on each disjunct does not intuitively admit an interpretation in terms
of possibility, as experts uniformly condemning (i.e., opining negatively on) both disjuncts
would still make the cut. Nor does it say much about meaningfulness. Nevertheless, we
find the same tripartite scheme demanding that not only must one of the disjuncts be true,
but that each must possess some further property. That these species of disjunction admit
analyses so similar to one another in form suggests that they are related. In this section, we
consider an interpretation of conceptivist logic that harmonizes the Bochvar-Halldén demand
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that subformulae be meaningful with the Zimmerman-type demand that subformulae be
epistemically possible.
We may take a cue from John McCarthy’s computational interpretation—in terms of par-
tial functions—found in (132), in which a novel deductive system is introduced. McCarthy’s
system, while supporting Addition as a valid inference, abandons an inference similar to
Addition; while A  A ∨̇ B is accepted, A  B ∨̇ A is rejected. This is explained in terms of
the terminating (or not) of procedures tasked with evaluating subformulae.
Suppose that p is false and q is undefined; then... p ∧̇ q is false and q ∧̇ p
is undefined. This unsymmetry... turns out to be appropriate in the theory of
computation since if a calculation of p gives F as a result q need not be computed
to evaluate p ∧̇ q, but if the calculation of p does not terminate, we never get
around to computing q.(132, pp. 40–41)
Clearly, considering the truth of p ∨̇ q rather than the falsity of p ∧̇ q yields a similar result.
Arnon Avron and Beata Konikowska formalize the disjunction of ‘McCarthy logic’ in (18),
providing a matrix semantics for the McCarthy logic M:








extensions of the members of the matrix are given so that VM = {t, u, f}, DM = {t}, and the





t u f f ∨̇
M
t u f
t f t t u f t t t t
u u u u u u u u u u
f t f f f f f t u f
The evaluation of a complex formula in McCarthy logic is left-to-right, in what is sometimes
known as a ‘lazy evaluation.’ Consider, for example, a disjunction A ∨̇ B in which A is
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evaluated as t and B is assigned a value of u. In some paradigms in which the disjunction
is evaluated from left-to-right, the discovery that A is true to conclude that the disjunction
is true without having to consider the value assigned to B. If the assignment of the value u
to B indicates that a catastrophic error is triggered whenever one attempts to retrieve the
value of B, in those cases in which A ∨̇ B can be evaluated without retrieving a value for the
rightmost subformula B the accompanying error will be avoided. There exist programming
languages, such as Lisp, in which the ‘lazy,’ McCarthy-style operators exist alongside their
Boolean counterparts.
The nonsense value u has so far been given many readings: u represents ‘undefined’ in
the partial function reading, or nonsense in the Bochvar-Halldén setting, or ineffability in
Priest’s interpretation of S⋆
fde
. In the present case, however, the value u may be given a more
concrete readings as ‘the routine evaluating this formula fails to terminate.’9
McCarthy assumes that the system evaluates a formula sequentially rather than in par-
allel. If the routine evaluates p and finds it to be true, it terminates and evaluates the
complex formula as true, even if it would have been stuck in a loop upon evaluating q. In
this case, the latter procedure is never called and hence never given the opportunity to fail.
However, under any circumstance in which the subroutine evaluating p fails to terminate,
the complex routine evaluating the disjunction will itself never terminate; it will never get
around to calling the procedure to evaluate q. In a parallel context, the counterpart slogan
will be that if one of the subprocedures evaluating p and q fails to terminate, p ∨̇ q will never
be evaluated.
This motivates us to ask under which conditions a system may fail to terminate while
evaluating a subformula, and whether such occasions say anything about possibility and
meaningfulness.
9The truth value u is represented as ‘e’ in (18) for ‘error.’
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4.3.1 Ill-Formedness
We have observed in foregoing sections (e.g., Sections 2.2 and 3.2.3) the coincidence of the
themes of meaningfulness and possibility implicit within the context of logics of nonsense. If
we recall the remarks made by Åqvist while describing his own system of nonsense logic, who
concedes in (1, p. 151) that there are circumstances in which the doctrine of the predomi-
nance of the atheoretical element clearly holds. In labeling ill-formed formulae ‘statements’
and professing that they exhibit a particular type of semantical behavior, Åqvist may be
interpreted as suggesting that ill-formed formulae constitute paradigmatic examples of syn-
tactical objects that, while meaningless, still demand a logical analysis. Indeed, Åqvist’s
rejection of this doctrine is due only to the intuition that the class of ill-formed formulae
does not exhaust the class of meaningless statements.
We may try to apply Åqvist’s comment associating meaningfulness with well-formedness
to shine light on the interpretation of disjunction in Σ0 and C0. Before judging some string
of symbols to be true (or false), one must determine that the string is in fact a well-formed
formula and this demands that all its components must be surveyed. Otherwise, there exists
an open invitation to error.
We can employ a concrete illustration—along the lines of the treatment of conjunction in
(132)—to demonstrate that there is something intuitively correct about this picture. Suppose
for a moment that merely securing the truth of the first disjunct were sufficient to establish
the truth of a disjunction. Then, for example, we could design an algorithm to evaluate a
string of symbols interpreted as positive disjunctive formulae as represented in Figure 3.
At first blush, examining a few cases suggests that such an algorithm is sufficient for the
task. If p is true (i.e., v(p) = 1) and we feed in pp ∨̇ qq, then the algorithm returns true
(by assigning a value of 1 to x); if we feed in pq ∨̇ pq, it returns true. Likewise, if v(p) and
v(q) are both 0, the algorithm will not affirm the string pp ∨̇ qq. The algorithm treats these
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procedure Disjunctive(v,s)
read s
if s = pi then












Figure 4.3: McCarthy-style Algorithm Interpreting Disjunction
formulae correctly and, more importantly, it apparently does so for the right reason: It finds
a disjunct that is valued as true and, on that basis, reports that the disjunction is true.
Consider, however, the case in which p is true and one inputs the string pp ∨̇ ∨̇q to the
algorithm. It reads a propositional variable in the initial position of the string, proceeds
to examine the variable, and, finding this disjunct to be true, judges the entire string to
represent a true formula. Arguably, pp ∨̇ ∨̇q should not be affirmed as a true formula by
the algorithm and, importantly, the clear source of the error is that the algorithm failed to
discover that the second ‘disjunct’ was nonsense.10
Meaningfulness as well-formedness also gives an account of possibility similar to that
expressed in Zimmerman’s free choice disjunction. In a very weak sense, a formula’s being
well-formed is a kind of possibility. While, e.g., the likelihood of a system evaluating pp ∧̇
¬̇ pq as 1 and that of its evaluating pp ∧̇ ¬̇q as 1 are equal, there is still a sense in which
10To this, one might object that it would not be incoherent to evaluate a ‘statement’ of the form ‘The
half life of uranium-238 is approximately 4 billion years, or or or and’ as true. From a phenomenological
perspective, human beings encounter language not in toto but in a stream. Hence, it is plausible to suggest
the evaluation of complex statements by human agents resembles the ‘lazy,’ McCarthy-style paradigm more
closely than it resembles the Boolean picture.
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the former is more possible than the latter. When we draw the conclusion that pp ∧̇ ¬̇ pq is
unsatisfiable, we at least know what it would be for a valuation to map it to the truth.
For example, when determining that A ∧̇ ¬̇A is false by use of indirect proof, it is
necessary that we recreate the steps that would be necessary for its truth. We know that
were A ∧̇ ¬̇A true, both A and ¬̇A would be true and judge this to be impossible; but this
procedure only makes sense against some dim understanding of what conditions its truth
would presuppose. But no such story is available for the string pA ∧̇ ¬̇q; if we try to rehearse
the procedure on this string, we are faced with evaluating the semantical value of the symbol
‘¬̇.’
To sharpen this point, we observe that on the nonsense-as-ill-formedness reading any
procedure evaluating such formulae necessarily maintains some procedure by which each
component of the formula is surveyed. Although the algorithm in Figure 3 is clearly an
oversimplification, it underscores that without such a resource, e.g., McCarthy’s procedure
in some cases is unable to distinguish between pp ∨̇ qq and pp ∨̇ ∨̇q. There must exist
some active process that provides an assurance that the formula is meaningful, whether
this process is psychological or mechanical. In general, that a formula A is epistemically
possible, as free choice disjunction requires, is read as an existential statement, i.e., that
an alternative or scenario exists according to which A obtains. This is apparent in, e.g.,
Hintikka’s analysis of the operator Pa corresponding to epistemic possibility with respect
to an agent a. In regard to a ‘model set’ µ—a consistent set of formulae representing a
knowledge state—Hintikka outlines the intuitive condition:
If Pap ∈ µ then there is at least one alternative µ∗ to µ, (with respect to a) such that
p ∈ µ∗.(107, p. 34)
If we allow that well-formedness yields a weak kind of possibility, the analogy can thus be
extended to provide an analogue of this existential aspect: The existence of a procedure
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actively checking and affirming the well-formedness of a variable or subformula is akin to the
existence of an epistemic scenario witnessing the intelligibility or possibility of some formula.
4.3.2 Declaration of Variables
We find precisely such a species of possibility in the theory of computation. In defining
an environment, we note that the environment is responsible for ensuring the possibility of
semantical interpretations of syntactical symbols. Abelson and Sussman describe this in (2,
p. 8) in the following terms:
It should be clear that the possibility of associating values with symbols and
later retrieving them means that the interpreter must maintain some sort of
memory that keeps track of the name-object pairs. This memory is called the
environment.
A necessary condition for the possibility of a symbol’s having meaning is that there be some
process in the environment associating the syntactical object with a meaning. Note that this
type of possibility is existential in nature, just as Hintikka’s definition of epistemic possibility.
In order for A to be possible in this weak sense, there must exist a resource allocated by the
interpreter tasked with its interpretation.
More importantly, we find that this notion of possibility is precisely aligned with the
notion of meaningfulness :
In an interactive language such as Lisp, it is meaningless to speak of the value
of an expression such as (+ x 1) without specifying any information about the
environment that would provide a meaning for the symbol x. (2, p. 11)
In practice, the guarantee that some atom is possible is secured by the commands to declare
or initialize a variable.
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procedure Declaration(y)
boolean p← 1
x← (p or q)
end procedure
Figure 4.4: Algorithm with Undeclared Variables
In, e.g., C++, in order to render some syntactical object p usable as a Boolean variable,
one must inform the interpreter that p is to be used in this manner. When the program is
run, an instruction will be made allocating sufficient memory for p to take a value. To declare
the Boolean variable p is to allocate the necessary resources; to initialize the Boolean variable
is to declare it and simultaneously assign it a value. Without a variable being declared, it
is meaningless ; even if a formula is well-formed, if its atomic variables have not yet been
declared, it is no more serviceable than an ill-formed string of symbols.
The distinction between declaring a variable and initializing a variable also has an a
priori connection to the notion of possibility implicit in free choice disjunction. In the
former case, memory is merely allocated for the variable; in the latter, not only is the
memory allocated but it is also employed by assigning an initial value to the variable. In
other words, while initializing the variable gives an evaluation, declaring the variable merely
ensures the possibility of an evaluation.
Let us examine the fate of the Principle of Addition by considering a program, represented
by the pseudocode in Figure 4.4. The algorithm is trivially a function of y but operates by
initializing the Boolean variable p with the value 1 before proceeding to return the value of
p or q, where ‘or’ denotes logical (i.e., Boolean) disjunction.
When this algorithm is run, the compiler will arrive at the symbol q and not know how
to respond, yielding an error. q, having not been declared, is merely a symbol like any other.
Hence, the program will terminate with a value of 1 occupying the memory set aside for the
Boolean variable p although it will not return a value of 1 with respect to p or q. What this
means is that Addition is not valid in this setting.
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4.3.3 Three Concrete Cases
The possibility-as-declaration-of-a-variable picture yields an interesting, if näıve, interpreta-
tion of a number of containment logics already in the literature. Before proceeding to this,
however, we take a detour to define what will be called Belnap variables.
A Boolean variable may in principle be assigned only a value of either 1 or 0, correspond-
ing to truth (t) and falsity (f), respectively, although the fact that a variable may be declared
without being initialized suggests a de facto third value. In Section 4.1.2, we defined seman-
tic consequence for the first-degree system Efde, whose set of truth values is {t, b, n, f}. The
semantical approach to this system and its values is given a robust interpretation in (23)
and (24) which serves to generalize the notion of a Boolean variable.
Belnap worries about a computer receiving contradictory data from distinct sources,
e.g., two sensors reporting irreconcilable states of affairs to the system. Classically, such a
situation would be trivializing, that is, it would render every piece of data unusable. Belnap,
however, rightly suggests that a malfunctioning sensor should not interfere with, for instance,
the arithmetical operations of the system. As a solution, Belnap considers values beyond
merely t and f: the value b, i.e., ‘both true and false’ and the value n, i.e., ‘neither true nor
false.’
Belnap anticipates the objection that formulae cannot in reality be both true and false
by taking an explicitly epistemic approach. While one might not be able actually to know
that a formula is both true and false, one can certainly be told that the formula is both true
and false, and can indeed receive these reports from sources regarded as equally reliable.
Belnap’s position, as related in (24), is that ‘the answer does not have the ontological force,
“That’s the way the world is,” but rather the epistemic force, “That’s what I’ve been told
(by people I trust to get it generally right)”.’
Define a Belnap variable to be a variable accepting the Belnap-like values so that any
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procedure may only increase or leave untampered the variable’s information rather than
decrease it, that is, so the variable can not be cleared. This is in keeping with the Belnapian
paradigm in (23), in which a computer is in a sense the passive recipient of data accumulating
over time. A näıve interpretation immediately follows from the demand that a formula B is
a consequence of Γ iff in every program with Boolean variables terminating so that A ∈ Γ
has a value of 1, B is valued as 1. While such an interpretation fails to enjoy the Proscriptive
Principle—and is thus not a conceptivist system—it does suggest a semantical approach to
other systems.
A few complications of this scheme immediately yield new interpretations for conceptivist
systems already present in the literature. We will introduce three consequence relations the
semantics of which are given in terms of programs with respect to sets of formulae Γ ⊆ L
and formulae A ∈ L . The first involves programs for systems employing Boolean variables:
Definition 4.3.2. Γ ⋆1 A iff there exists a program employing Boolean variables terminating
with all B ∈ Γ assigned a designated value and for all such programs, upon termination A
is assigned a designated value.
The second relation is defined for programs employing Belnap variables that introduce values
only by initialization, i.e., in which one must assign a value to a variable upon declaring it.
Definition 4.3.3. Γ ⋆2 A iff for all programs employing Belnap variables introduced only
by initialization, if the program terminates with all B ∈ Γ assigned a designated value, then
A is assigned a designated value.
Of course, in practice, one can declare a variable p without initializing it. If this is considered,
we can define a further relation:
Definition 4.3.4. Γ ⋆3 A iff for all programs employing Belnap variables, if the program
terminates with all B ∈ Γ assigned a designated value, then A is assigned a designated value.
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Now, if we consider the first-degree systems surveyed in Section 4.1.2, we find that the above




We will now proceed to prove these equivalences:
Observation 4.3.1. Γ ⋆1 A iff Γ RC A
Proof. Recall from Section 4.1.2 that Johnson’s conceptivist propositional calculus RC enjoys
the property that
















Γ CL A, and
At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]
.
We can employ this analysis to prove this observation.
For right-to-left, suppose that Γ RC A. Then, from Con(Γ), there exists a classical
valuation v such that v(B) = t for all B ∈ Γ. Such a valuation can clearly serve as the basis
for a program with Boolean variables assigning all formulae in Γ a value of 1 by initializing
each p ∈ At[Γ] and assigning appropriate values. Moreover, in any such program, that
Γ CL A ensures that the value of A will be 1. Hence, we reason that Γ 
⋆
1 A.
For left-to-right, suppose that Γ ⋆1 A. Then from the existence of a program π such
that all formulae in Γ are assigned a value of 1, we can recover a classical valuation v
witnessing that Con(Γ). Moreover, Γ ⋆1 A entails that Γ CL A. Suppose for contradiction
that Γ 1CL A. Then there exists a valuation v′ such that v′(B) = t for each B ∈ Γ while
v′(A) = f. But the equivalence of Boolean operations and classical truth functions entails
that from v′ we could write a program assigning all B ∈ Γ a value of 1 while assigning A a
value of 0, contradicting that Γ ⋆1 A.
Finally, we can observe that this entails that At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]. Suppose that Γ ⋆1 A holds
although At(A) contains a variable p not appearing in any formula in Γ. Then let π be the
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program witnessing the satisfaction of both Γ and A and let π′ be that program that differs
from π only in not declaring p. Then each B ∈ Γ will receive a value of 1 in π′ although
attempting to retrieve a value for A will result in error.
On the basis of Γ ⋆1 A, we have proven each of the three conditions that are together
equivalent to Γ RC A.
Observation 4.3.2. Γ ⋆2 A iff Γ Sfde A
Proof. We first recall some observations concerning Sfde. We may recall that Observation
4.1.2 shows that Sfde consequence is equivalent to LP consequence in conjunction with the
criterion that all atoms appearing in the succedent formula appear in the set of assumptions.
Moreover, by the semantics described in Definition 2.3.5, we may observe that LP is the
restriction of Efde to the values {t, b, f}. By the foregoing discussion, Efde is the logic by
which Belnap variables operate.
Now, for left-to-right, suppose that Γ ⋆2 A. As we are employing Belnap variables, this
entails that Γ Efde A and, as a subsystem of LP, this entails that Γ LP A. To show that this
entails that At(A) ⊆ At[Γ], suppose that there exists a variable p ∈ At(A) not appearing
in any formula in Γ. As there is an Efde valuation that maps all formulae to a designated
value, Γ ⋆2 A does not hold vacuously and there exists a program π terminating with all
formulae in Γ ∪ {A} assigned a designated value. Consider a program π′ differing from π
only by deleting the line declaring the variable p. As p does not appear in any B ∈ Γ, Γ
will take a designated value but A will not be evaluated as the system will not be able to
retrieve a value for p. Hence, At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]. The observation above guarantees that these
two conditions entail that Γ Sfde A.
For right-to-left, suppose that Γ Sfde A, i.e., both Γ LP A and At(A) ⊆ At[Γ], and
suppose for contradiction that Γ 6⋆2 A. The latter condition entails that there be a program
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π terminating with all B ∈ Γ assigned a designated value, but A not be assigned a designated
value. That all formulae in Γ are assigned designated values must entail that all variables in
At[Γ] have been initialized and this, in conjunction with the assumption that At(A) ⊆ At[Γ],
entails that all variables appearing in A have likewise been initialized. Hence, the values of
all formulae in Γ and that of A form a subset of {t, b, f}. But this assignment corresponds to
an Efde valuation restricted to {t, b, f}, which is precisely an LP valuation, whence Γ 2LP A,
contradicting the assumption that this is valid in LP.
Observation 4.3.3. Γ ⋆3 A iff Γ S⋆fde A
Proof. The proof runs virtually identically to that of Observation 4.3.2 except for associating
the truth value n with the state of a variable when it is declared but not yet assigned a
value.
Despite admitting this computational interpretation, Sfde is introduced as a conceptivist
logic, in particular, as a means to repair some perceived shortcomings with Parry’s PAIfde. We
can stop to consider Sfde—and S
⋆
fde
—in more detail and suggest that such systems present a
reasonable first step towards reconciling the prima facie unrelated notions of meaningfulness
and possibility with conceptivist systems.
First, if we examine the matrices for Sfde or S
⋆
fde
, we note that these systems obey the
doctrine of the predominance of the atheoretical element and thus admit a reading similar
to that which we gave to Σ0. Indeed, each is a subsystem of Bochvar’s logic, as can be
confirmed by noting that the Sfde matrices restricted to {t, f, u} are the Σ0 matrices.
More importantly, disjunction in Sfde and S
⋆
fde
also exhibits behavior approximating
Zimmerman’s notion of free choice disjunction. Let DSfde = {t, b}, the set of designated
values of Sfde. By examining the matrices we note that for appropriate valuations v, v(A ∨̇
B) ∈ DSfde if f
∨̇
P (v(A), v(B)) ∈ DSfde . But parsing the intension of f
∨̇
P is interesting in that,
as we saw in the work of Zimmerman and Fitting, there is an unavoidable use of conjunction.
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Then















v(A) ∈ DSfde or v(B) ∈ DSfde , and
v(A) 6= u, and
v(B) 6= u
Assuming the intuitive readings of ‘v(A) ∈ DSfde ’ as ‘A is the case’ and ‘v(A) 6= u’ as ‘A might
be the case,’ we find that the above mirrors Zimmerman’s free choice disjunction perfectly,
i.e.,















either A is the case or B is the case, and
A might be the case, and
B might be the case
Sfde thus gives us an example of a conceptivist logic that can be motivated on computational,
rather than Kantian, grounds. Moreover, by amending the notions of ‘meaningfulness’ and
‘possibility’ to render them suitable to a computational setting, Sfde also unifies the insights
underlying a pair of very distinct semantical traditions.
We thus see how tracing a computational theme yields a conceptivist logic
a. that is a subsystem of a nonsense logic (and is thus itself a nonsense logic) and
b. whose account of disjunction mirrors that of free choice disjunction.
Although näıve, the ‘declaration of variables’ interpretation is able to bring these disparate
rejections of Addition under one roof.
4.4 Enriching the Interpretation
A clear limitation of the näıve account of declaration of variables as outlined above is that
it is static and gives only a snapshot of the state of some program. But computation is
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not static; there are dynamic and temporal aspects of computation that were necessarily
suppressed in the foregoing discussion.
If we are to further develop the theme of reading conceptivist systems as having a salient
interpretation for computing, it will be fruitful to consider systems capable of respecting
this dynamism. This section intends to take some initial steps into doing just this by con-
sidering systems that enrich the declaration-of-variables picture with dynamic and temporal
apparatus.
4.4.1 Conceptivism and Propositional Dynamic Logic
Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) is a multi-modal system of propositional logic in which
the ✷ and ✸ operators of modal logic are given explicit interpretations—[α] and 〈α〉—where
α is interpreted as either a program or an action. Following Harel, Kozen, and Tiuryn in
(105), the interpretation of [α]A for a PDL formula A is ‘every execution of the program α
yields a state in which A is true.’ The dual connective 〈α〉 is read so that 〈α〉A is interpreted
as ‘there exists some execution of α terminating in a state at which A is true.’ (The reading
in terms of actions is easily recovered from these interpretations.)
The syntax of PDL allows a number of operations on programs within the scope of the
brackets. Programs are built up from a set of atomic programs AtΠ = {a, b, c, ...} so that
the set of programs Π is constructed recursively:
 If a ∈ AtΠ then a ∈ Π
 If α ∈ Π then α∗ ∈ Π
 If α, β ∈ Π then α; β ∈ Π and α ∪ β ∈ Π
α⋆ represents a program that nondeterministically selects a finite n and executes program α
n many times, while program α; β is the program executing α followed by β.
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Of present importance is the operator ∪ so that to execute the program α ∪ β is to
‘choose either α or β nondeterministically and execute it.’ In terms of actions, this clearly
has a reading of freely choosing to perform either α or β. An anonymous referee for the
Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics has suggested a prima facie connection between
the distribution of a modal operator over disjunction—that the possibility of a disjunction
entails the possibility of each disjunct—and propositional dynamic logic, notably the axiom
[α ∪ β]A↔ [α]A ∧̇ [β]A
There are two things that can be said of this apparent connection.
Intriguingly, a connection between the problem of free choice permission and PDL has
been investigated by Robert van Rooij in the paper (190). In part, van Rooij diagnoses the
difficulty in inferring ✸(A) ∧̇ ✸(B) from ✸(A ∨̇ B) as an artifact of the possible worlds
reading of propositions. That is, if X is a nonempty set of possible worlds at which A ∨̇ B
holds, then this clearly does not entail the existence of any worlds at which, e.g., B holds.
However, van Rooij cites a different approach to the interpretation of deontic modals:
Another tradition... is based on the assumption that deontic concepts are usually
applied to actions rather than propositions.(190, p. 5)
In essence, van Rooij’s solution is to add an atomic proposition Per representing all ‘permis-
sible worlds.’ Then, [α]Per (which van Rooij symbolizes ‘Per(α)’) means that any execution
of action (i.e., program) α leads to a permissible state of affairs.
Then, substituting the proposition Per for A, we yield
[α ∪ β]Per↔ [α]Per ∧̇ [α]Per,
as a theorem of PDL. This instance suggests the desired reading that if a random selection
between actions α and β each lead to a permissible state of the world, then individually,
both α and β will lead to such a state.
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However, independently of the matter of free choice disjunction, the reading of a term
α as a program is independently interesting inasmuch as it suggests a direct application of
Parry’s syntactic concerns. One cannot, for example, add a new syntactical element, such
as an arbitrary line of code, to a program without concern for its meaningfulness.
In one sense, PDL fulfills the spirit of Parry’s remarks. When terms α are interpreted
as programs, there is a sense in which PDL resists the notion of error-free introduction of
arbitrary syntax. For example, consider the theorem of PDL
〈α〉A→ 〈α ∪ β〉A
At first blush, it may appear that this is a violation of the spirit of the Proscriptive Principle,
as the fact that a particular program α has a property (that some instance of its computation
yields a state at which A is true) entails that some further program α∪ β—where β is arbi-
trary, perhaps even nonsensical or error-ridden—has this property. Upon closer inspection,
however, all that this means is some instance of the program α ∪ β yields A, namely, the
instance witnessed by the antecedent 〈α〉A.
PDL, in fact, seems to have a built in ability to throw away syntactically ill-formed
programs. The formula
[α]A→ 〈α〉A
fails to be a PDL-theorem, whence one can infer that merely because one can write a program
does not mean that it can be executed.
There is, however, tension between some of the observations made in Section 4.3.3 and
the peculiarities of PDL. Consider, for example, that the natural language interpretation of
the formula
[α]A→ [α](A ∨̇ B)
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is that for an arbitrary program α, if any execution of α results in a state at which A is true,
then any execution of α will also result in a state at which A ∨̇ B is true. As the ‘local’ logic
of the models is classical, i.e., the Principle of Addition holds locally at every state w, this is
clearly a theorem of PDL. It is also one which the present considerations seem to contradict.
For example, we noted that one can consider a program π whose sole operation is to
initialize a variable p with a value of 1. If one were to make two amendments to π by adding
code to recover the value of p and to recover the value of p or q (where ‘or’ is the disjunction
from the algorithm), respectively, the first amended program would report that p has a value
of 1 while the second would report an error. π seems to witness that there are programs the
execution of which yields a state such that p is true—assigned a value of 1—while p ∨̇ q is
not.
If this is rephrased in the language of propositional dynamic logic, this is analogous to
the statement that
¬̇([π]p→ [π](p ∨̇ q))
This is apparently a counterexample to the PDL theorem in question.
There seem to be ready-to-hand ways of addressing this matter in PDL. If, for example,
one builds into PDL a definition so that
At(α) =df {p ∈ At | p is declared in α},
then one candidate account of the operator [α] may read:








at all w′ such that wRαw
′, w′  A, and
At(A) ⊆ At(α)
Clearly, the formula [α]A→ [α](A ∨̇ B) will not be a theorem of such a weakened subsystem
of PDL. This appears to be a plausible and conceptually sound revision of PDL respecting
the matter of declaration of variables.
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There are a number of subtle questions with respect to how such a system is to be
formalized and axiomatized. For example, if programs α and β each declare the variable
p, then how should the program α; β—the program executing α and then executing β—be
analyzed? One could arguably reject α; β as ill-formed, answering this question at the level
of syntax. Alternatively, one could either treat the declaration of p in β as redundant or
treat it as clearing the variable. Exploring such questions could take up an entire chapter;
for present purposes, it must suffice to raise these questions and identify them as interesting.
4.4.2 An Intuitionistic Conceptivist Logic
The connection between intuitionistic logic and computation is well-known. By means of
the Curry-Howard correspondence, provability of a formula A in the implicational fragment
of intuitionistic logic corresponds to the existence of a program or function in the λ-calculus
of type A. Similar correspondences exist between other propositional logics and classes of
programs or computable functions; for example, the provability of A in R→—the pure impli-
cational fragment of relevant logic R—corresponds to the class of λI-terms. (179) provides
a very good discussion of this correspondence, as well as many other such correspondences.
This computational picture is reinforced by the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic
first introduced in (124), in which points w in a model can be thought of as states and moving
forward along an accessibility relation R can be read as the evolution of a computational
procedure. Kripke’s semantical picture is prima facie equally well-suited to account for the
declaration of variables as well; one can imagine not only processes evolving and calculating
values but also declaring syntax over the course of these evolutions. As we will see in this
section, doing so yields a conceptivist system.
A basis for such an approach can be found in a program begun by Peter Woodruff of
producing intuitionistic subsystems of many-valued logics in (198). The techniques of his
dissertation are brought to bear on Halldén’s C in (199), in which constructive subsystems
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are provided for C and Krister Segerberg’s D, a further logic of nonsense described in (172).
The ensuing constructive systems are called CI and DI, respectively. CI essentially exports
Halldén’s intuitions about nonsense and applies them to Kripke’s models for intuitionistic
logic.
By some simple revisions of Woodruff’s definitions, the system CI can be further adapted
to provide constructive subsystems of Bochvar’s Σ and Σ0 that admit the very reading we
are after. Inasmuch as the following technique will yield a fragment of Σ0 that qualifies as
a containment logic, we can think of this section as providing a third ‘strategy’ to comple-
ment the two strategies described in Chapter 2, i.e., taking connexive and paraconsistent
fragments.
We will first review Woodruff’s semantics for CI.
Definition 4.4.1. A CI model is a 4-tuple 〈W,R, VT , VM〉 such that
 W is a nonempty set of points
 R is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on W
 VT : At→ ℘(W ) with the condition that if w ∈ VT (p) and wRw′ then w′ ∈ VT (p)
 VM : At→ ℘(W ) with the condition that if w ∈ VM(p) and wRw′ then w′ ∈ VM(p)
 for all p ∈ At, VT (p) ⊆ VM(p)
From these, a pair of forcing relations are defined in tandem.
As we will ultimately be interested in a pure implicational fragment of this system, we
will provide truth conditions only for formulae in the pure implicational language L→, that
is, the collection of propositional formulae in which no connective but → appears. To make
things precise, we define L→:
Definition 4.4.2. The propositional language L→ is recursively defined so that
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 If p ∈ At then p ∈ L→
 If A,B ∈ L→ then A→ B ∈ L→
As we are restricting our attention to a pure implicational language, we will define the
relevant semantic relations only for members of L→:
Definition 4.4.3. Meaningfulness of a formula A at a point w in a model M , symbolized
by M , w M A is defined so that:
 M , w M p if w ∈ VM(p)
 M , w M A→ B if M , w M A and M M B
Truth of a formula A is similarly defined:
 M , w T p if w ∈ VT (p)








∀w′such that wRw′, if M , w′ T A, then M , w′ T B, and
M , w M A→ B
Validity for the intuitionistic system CI is defined by the following scheme.
Definition 4.4.4. Γ CI A iff for all models M and points w, if M , w T B for all B ∈ Γ
and M , w M A, then M , w T A
We wish to construct the analogous system for an intuitionistic version of Bochvar’s logic, but
Woodruff’s semantics does not make use of truth values. If it is a dispute concerning truth
values that distinguishes the accounts of Bochvar and Halldén, it may not be immediately
clear how to adapt Woodruff’s semantics to a system harmonious with Bochvar’s intuitions.
Recall from Section 3.3.3 that Halldén is adamant that designation of the nonsense value
is not to say that nonsense is truth-like in any way, but rather, to say that validity is only
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concerned with cases in which the consequent is meaningful. This is, in effect, to say that
one should never reject an entailment Γ ⊢ A by producing a counterexample in which A is
nonsense. Woodruff’s qualification that Γ CI A is only evaluated in occasions at which A is
meaningful aligns it with Halldén’s taking the nonsense truth value as designated.
This is the difference between the internal calculi of Bochvar and Halldén in a nutshell.
We can thus describe a system ΣI that bears the same relationship to CI that Σ bears to C.
We merely revise the definition of validity so that:
Definition 4.4.5. Γ ΣI A iff for all models M and points w, if M , w T B for all B ∈ Γ,
then M , w T A
Clearly, this furthermore determines a constructive subsystem of Bochvar’s Σ0 when the
connective ‘→’ is identified with Bochvar’s internal implication.
Just as Σ0 is not ⊢-Parry, neither is ΣI0, and for identical reasons. Inasmuch as A ∧̇ ¬̇A
can never be true at a point w, A ∧̇ ¬̇A ΣI0 B will vacuously hold. On the other hand,
inasmuch as a contradiction cannot be expressed without negation, every formula in the
pure implicational fragment of ΣI has a model. Inferences concerning any formulae in this
language will enjoy the Proscriptive Principle with respect to ⊢. Importantly, ΣI→—the
implicational fragment of ΣI—will be ⊢-Parry.11
Intuitively, the semantical picture admits a reading in which variables are declared at
certain stages in a computation. Consider, for example, a ΣI→ model whose frame is a
tree with a root node w. Suppose that w M p holds in the model; this can be read as
p being globally declared by the main procedure w, as all subsequent points recognize p as
meaningful. If, on the other hand, some atom q is not meaningful at w, but there exists a
distinct w′ such that wRw′ and w′ M q, then one can interpret w
′ as a subprocedure called
by w that locally declares q. Calculations made outside of this subprocedure—i.e., outside
11Note that this suggests that the two strategies for defining conceptivist subsystems of Σ0 described in
Section 2.3—that is, by taking connexive or paraconsistent fragments—are joined by a third strategy.
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of the upwards R-cone of w′—will not necessarily be able to employ q.
The implicational system ΣI→ admits a simple natural deduction proof theory. Consider
the following definition.
Definition 4.4.6. The natural deduction calculus for ΣI→ is defined by the rules:
[Ax] A ⊢ A is an axiom.
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ B
[Str]
Γ, A,Γ′ ⊢ B
Γ, A, A,Γ′ ⊢ B
[Con]
Γ, A,Γ′ ⊢ B
Γ, A, C,Γ′ ⊢ B
[Exc]
Γ, C, A,Γ′ ⊢ B
Γ, A ⊢ B
[→ I] provided that At(A) ⊆ At[Γ]
Γ ⊢ A→ B
Γ ⊢ A→ B Γ ⊢ A[→ E]
Γ ⊢ B
As expected, this system is indeed a conceptivist calculus.
Observation 4.4.1. ΣI→ is ⊢-Parry
Proof. This follows from a simple induction on the lengths of proofs. All axioms clearly
satisfy the Proscriptive Principle for ⊢. In each of the inference rules, it can be directly
observed that this property is inherited by each succeeding application of a rule. Hence, all
derivable sequents enjoy the property, whence ΣI→ is ⊢-Parry.
Completeness between the natural deduction calculus and the Woodruff-style semantics can
be established by means of the canonical model technique. We will first define the canonical
model for ΣI→:
Definition 4.4.7. The canonical model S = 〈W,R, VT , VM〉 for ΣI→ is defined so that:
 W = {Γ | Γ is a deductively closed ΣI→-theory}
 R = {〈Γ,∆〉 | Γ ⊆ ∆}
For atoms p, we then set VM and VT so that:
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 VM(p) = {Γ ∈ W | ∃B ∈ Γ such that p appears in B}
 VT (p) = {Γ ∈ W | p ∈ Γ}
That what we have defined is in fact a model in Woodruff’s sense is not trivial; we must
confirm that it enjoys the necessary properties.
Observation 4.4.2. S is a model.
Proof. Clearly, VT ⊆ VM ; that p ∈ Γ trivially implies that each of its atoms is found in Γ.
That R is reflexive and transitive follows immediately from the properties of ⊆. This
also entails that both VM and VT are hereditary, i.e., that if w ∈ VM(p) and wRw′ then
w′ ∈ VM(p) and mutatis mutandis for VT .
Lemma 4.4.1. A ∈ Γ iff S ,Γ T A
Proof. In the case of atomic formulae p, the definition of VT entails that Γ ∈ VT (p) iff p ∈ Γ.
Hence, that Γ ⊢ΣI→ p is equivalent to p ∈ Γ, which is by definition equivalent to Γ ∈ VT (p)
which is just the definition for S ,Γ T p.
Now, we prove this for arbitrary formulae of the form A → B. We will prove this by
induction on complexity of formulae. Suppose for induction hypothesis that this has been
shown to hold for all subformulae of A→ B.
For right-to-left, suppose that Γ ⊢ΣI→ A → B. Then, as A→ B ∈ Γ, trivially all atoms
in A → B appear in some C ∈ Γ, whence S ,Γ M A → B. Moreover, by (→ E), in any
extension Γ′ ⊇ Γ, if A ∈ Γ′ then B ∈ Γ′. By induction hypothesis, this is to say that for
all Γ′ such that ΓRΓ′, if S ,Γ′ T A then S ,Γ
′ T B. But this—with the observation that
S ,Γ M A→ B—entails that S ,Γ T A→ B.
Now, for left-to-right, suppose that S ,Γ T A → B. We infer then that at every Γ′
such that ΓRΓ′, if S ,Γ′ T A then S ,Γ
′ T B which, by induction hypothesis, allows us
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to infer that in any extension Γ′ ⊇ Γ, if Γ′ ⊢ΣI→ A then Γ
′ ⊢ΣI→ B. This, however, does
not immediately allow us to infer that Γ ⊢ΣI→ A → B; we need more work to show that
At(A) ⊆ At[Γ].
This work begins by noting that S ,Γ M A → B, entailing that there exists some
formula C such that both Γ ⊢ΣI→ C and At(A → B) ⊆ At(C). Hence, C ∈ Γ, from
which we may make it explicit that to say that Γ, A ⊢ΣI→ B is equivalent to saying that
Γ, C, A ⊢ΣI→ B. Hence, as At(A) ⊆ At(C), we are licensed to infer that Γ, C ⊢ΣI→ A→ B.
By the redundancy of C, however, we conclude that Γ ⊢ΣI→ A→ B.
Theorem 4.4.1. If Γ ΣI→ A then Γ ⊢ΣI→ A.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. If Γ 0ΣI→ A then A /∈ Γ. By Lemma 4.4.1, this entails
that S ,Γ 1T A, witnessing that Γ 2ΣI→ A.
Theorem 4.4.2. If Γ ⊢ΣI→ A then Γ ΣI→ A.
Proof. This can be established by induction on the length of proofs. In the basis step, note
that all instances of axioms are semantically valid. All inferences in the natural deduction
calculus can be easily seen to be validity-preserving. That this holds for every derivable
Γ ⊢ΣI→ A follows by induction.
Although the picture is suggestive, there is still much to be developed concerning such a
system. For example, inhabitation problems must be rephrased, as ΣI→ has no theorems.
Asking whether there is a function inhabiting such-and-such a formula only makes sense
against the backdrop of a nontrivial environment.
But this is actually quite natural in this context. In the formulae-as-types paradigm,
a set of premises Γ in a judgment is called the ‘environment.’ As we saw in (2), it is the
environment that assigns meanings to symbols in computing. Hence, from an interpretative
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standpoint, it is perfectly natural to expect that no inferences can be drawn from an empty
environment as all symbols remain uninterpreted in such an environment.12
4.5 Conclusions
The interpretation of conceptivist logic offered above provides a way of examining some
formal problems with respect to these systems, such as the matter of dealing with quantifi-
cation and entailment connectives, that differs from the standard semantical interpretations
of conceptivist systems. Moreover, it also is hoped that the computational approach to
conceptivism might bear some practical fruit as well.
The aim of this discussion has been, in part, to rehabilitate Parry-type logics—and
deductive systems rejecting Addition in general—by providing a natural and serviceable
foundation for their intuitions and formalisms. Yet the utility of the present interpretation
very likely goes beyond elucidating an obscure footnote in the history of logic. While Section
4.3.3 provides concrete interpretations of such systems, conceptivist systems may yield more
general fruits as well.
The Belnap account of computing can address one sort of error or problem, that is,
the matter of drawing inferences in the face of inconsistent data. Papers such as (43) are
motivated by a particular instance of this problem: the inconsistent database. In general,
as a matter of fact, paraconsistent systems do appear to be well-equipped to handle such
circumstances. The considerations of this chapter suggest that there are further sources
of error that must be addressed in such a database: beyond occasions in which a system
retrieves inconsistent data lie the occasions in which a system is unable to retrieve any value
at all.
Suppose, for instance, that we are employing a database constructed with Efde as an
12Cf. (55), in which Daniels expresses the sentiment that ‘[i]t’s doubtful whether any sentence is true in
all stories.’(55, p. 424)
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underlying logic, just as Belnap suggests. Querying a database and retrieving Belnap’s value
of n for some proposition is minimally informative in Efde, but this does not necessarily entail
that the receipt of this value conveys no information at all. Belnap’s epistemic interpretation
of retrieving a n value is that the sources have neither reported that the corresponding
proposition is true nor have they reported that it is false. From this circumstance, however,
it is reasonable to infer that the sources possess neither solid evidence in its favor nor a
compelling counterexample; had the sources been in possession of this sort of evidence, it
would have been reported. Concretely, the system knows that the sources did not submit
positive or negative values. Hence, there is something to be learned from retrieving such a
value.
In (92), Luciano Floridi gave an example that illustrates this distinction well. Floridi
considered querying a database (in his case, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy on
CD-ROM ) for such-and-such a search term. In one case, ‘[i]f the database provides an
answer, it will provide at least a negative answer, e.g., the [encyclopedia] will open a small
window with the message “no search hits found”.’ This error imparts negative information
to the end user. Distinct from this, however, is the case in which the database fails to
reply to the query. It either ‘fails to provide any data at all’ or some additional process at
least informs the end user that there is an error in the database. The truth values can be
associated with this interpretation—truth with a positive hit on the search, falsity with a
negative hit on the search, and the nonsense value with some process from the environment
informing the user of some fault or other.
What, however, is there to be learned when the system queries the database only to
find that there is an error, whether it is due to a variable not being declared or data being
corrupted? A corrupted entry in a database provides strictly less information than having
not received any entries. While from, for example, one of the truth values corresponding
to those of Efde one can infer something negative, if an entry is corrupted, or otherwise
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irretrievable, all of these possibilities are a priori equipossible. Efde is thus not able to model
this scenario.
A conceptivist and paraconsistent system such as Sfde provides a way of accounting for
each of these dimensions. For example, a database which includes instances of corrupted
data and instances of data which are inconsistent with each other, will be best modeled by
a system such as Sfde. Clearly, Sfde has some significant limitations. Sfde supports some
inferences difficult to motivate in this context. For example, the inference p ∨̇ q Sfde q ∨̇ ¬̇ q
is valid, which on the present reading suggests that the variable q’s being declared entails
that it has been initialized. Daniels’ system S⋆
fde
—which does not support this inference—
may thus provide a better starting point. In any case, the computational interpretation of
conceptivist logics in general yields a novel way of thinking about such matters.
What is more difficult is embellishing the philosophical aspect. At first blush, there is
no connection between the work of Bochvar and Halldén on the one hand and Zimmerman
on the other. Many epistemically impossible formulae, e.g., A ∧̇ ¬̇A, are meaningful on
the account of logics of nonsense; the work of Zimmerman is particularized to a single case
of the problem of free choice permission, without any appeal to notions of meaningfulness.
That these two, very distinct, formal approaches converge while interpreting a third, equally
unrelated thesis of containment is quite curious. While this chapter does not definitively
account for this phenomenon, further exploration of the coincidence of these three themes
appears to be warranted.
In short, the treatment of conceptivist logic presented in this chapter raises as many
questions as it solves and many matters of interpretation remain up for grabs. That said,
the present interpretation demonstrates that there may still be some life in the conceptivist
scheme and provides further evidence that the obituary Sylvan wrote for it might well have
been premature.
Chapter 5
Faulty Belnap Computers and
Subsystems of Efde
In this chapter we consider variations of Nuel Belnap’s ‘artificial reasoner.’ In particular, we
examine cases in which the artificial reasoner is faulty, e.g., we consider situations in which
the reasoner is unable to calculate the value of a formula due to an inability to retrieve the
values of its atoms. In the first half of the paper, we consider two ways of modeling such
circumstances and prove the deductive systems arising from these two types of models to be
equivalent to the Daniels-Priest system S⋆
fde
and Richard Angell’s AC, making computational
interpretations of these systems possible. The Belnap-type interpretation of AC yields a novel
many-valued semantics for AC, bringing Angell’s system in line with similar treatments of
other containment logics in its neighborhood. The second half of the paper examines formal
questions, such as whether AC admits an analysis along the lines of that given to the related
system of William Parry’s system of analytic implication (PAI), as suggested by Kurt Gödel
and confirmed by Kit Fine. Furthermore, a natural means of extending these systems to
languages with an intensional implication connective is investigated.
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5.1 Introduction
In (23), Nuel Belnap outlines a prescription for how, in light of the practical problem of a
computer’s receiving contradictory data, a computer ought to ‘think.’ In particular, Belnap
suggests that the inconsistency-tolerant logic of first-degree entailment (Efde) can be fruitfully
employed to deal with occasions in which such data were received. In this chapter, we will
not take up the normative question of whether a computer ought to think as Belnap suggests;
rather, for the sake of argument, we will assume that Belnap is correct. What we will consider
is the question: Given that a computer ought to operate in this way, how would it operate?
In particular, we consider a further deviation from theoretically pure computing: occasions
in which the Belnap computer is unable to recover the value assigned to a variable.
Although the earlier presentation of Efde in Definition 3.1.17 considers its semantic values
to be individuals, the semantical values of Efde can also be represented as a pair of data cor-
responding to a truth value and a falsity value. This representation suggests two reasonable
implementations of a ‘Belnap computer’: a case in which the entire semantical value may be
stored at a single address, and a case in which a Belnap variable requires distinct addresses
for each coordinate. The cases in which faults in retrieval of the values occur will thus be
called the ‘single address’ and ‘two address’ accounts, respectively. The logic determined by
the ‘single address’ account is the Daniels-Priest system S⋆
fde
described in Definition 4.1.5.
The logic of the ‘two address’ account is equivalent to Angell’s system of analytic contain-
ment (AC). The semantics introduced in the present paper provide a perspective on AC
differing from those described by Fabrice Correia in (50) or Kit Fine in (87). We will then
shift focus to examine some consequences of the semantics described in this chapter.
The interpretation offered in this chapter has the benefit of providing AC and S⋆
fde
into
alignment with other containment logics, allowing these systems to be extended to higher-
degree logics in a natural fashion. In the case of AC, after introducing the present nine-valued
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semantics (which will initially be denoted by ‘NC’), we will review the semantics introduced
by Correia in (49) before showing the soundness and completeness of the present semantics
to AC. We will then continue the inquiry by employing these semantics to give a deeper
analysis of AC and S⋆
fde
, such as providing the Gödel-Fine analysis of AC. Finally, we adapt
Fine’s semantics from (81) for William Parry’s intensional containment logic PAI to extend
S⋆
fde
and AC to accommodate formulae in a language with nested arrows.
We begin by reviewing the first-degree systems.
5.2 Three First-Degree Logics
We examine three first-degree systems. Such systems are defined over the language Lzdf
that lack an intensional implication connective (although a material conditional ⊃ may be
defined); their novelty lies in the correspondence between valid inferences of the form A  B
in the first-degree case and valid theorems A → B in intensional cases, i.e., in first-degree
entailment Efde, A Efde B iff A→ B is a theorem of Anderson and Belnap’s E, where A and
B have no instances of the intensional entailment connective, i.e., are zeroth degree formulae.
5.2.1 First-Degree Entailment Efde
Belnap’s interpretation of Efde of (23) and (24) plays a central role in the sequel and we
will discuss Belnap’s artificial reasoner in more detail. Recall that Belnap describes both an
interpretation and a proposed application of the four-valued logic of first-degree entailment in
a computational setting. Belnap’s observation is that a computer—or ‘artificial reasoner’—
obtains data from a variety of inputs and it is conceivable that the data from distinct and
independent sources may be contradictory. For example, if a system sends a calculation
for a Boolean variable A to two subprocedures to review in parallel and if a fault in one
of the subprocedures leads it to an error in its calculation, the subprocedures may return
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incompatible values for A. Absent a definitive indication concerning which subprocedure is
in error, the system will have as good evidence for the value of A’s being 1 as it will for the
value being 0.
Of course, in the classical propositional calculus, contradictory data in a theory trivializes
the theory as arbitrary formulae may be deduced from a contradiction. Rather than allow-
ing small, isolated inconsistencies to ‘pollute’ the entire ocean of data in this way, Belnap
proposes the motto ‘Keep our data clean.’ Efde, he suggests, is precisely the means by which
this motto ought to be observed.
In Definition 3.1.17, we have introduced four-valued semantics for the system Efde ac-
cording to which VEfde = {t, b, n, f}. However, an equally salient expression of the semantics
does not interpret the set semantic values as independent and non-classical truth values,
but rather construes them as pairs of classical truth values. In such a bilateral account of
truth values, the first and second coordinates are often construed as representing distinct
and independent truth and falsity values, respectively.
In the more epistemically-oriented context of Belnap’s artificial reasoner, the first coor-
dinate of a semantical value represents whether a formula has been reported as true and the
second coordinate represents whether a formula has been reported as false. For this reason,
the values 〈t, f〉 and 〈f, t〉 correspond to t and f, respectively, in the earlier semantics. Sim-
ilarly 〈t, t〉 corresponds to b (i.e., ‘both true and false”is analogous to ‘it is true that the
system has been told that the proposition is true and it is true that the system has been
told that the proposition is false’) and 〈f, f〉 corresponds to n (with a similar analogy). Many
systems in this work admit a similarly bilateral semantics; we will decorate the names of
such sets of truth values with the symbol ⋆ to indicate that this is the case.
The bilateral semantics for Efde is defined over the language Lzdf and is described as
follows:
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the set of truth values V ⋆
Efde
is defined as {t, f} × {t, f} and the set of designated values
D⋆
Efde




denote the classical truth functions corresponding to conjunction and disjunction,
respectively. Then the truth functions are defined as follows:
 f ¬̇
Efde
(〈v0, v1〉) = 〈v1, v0〉
 f ∧̇
Efde


































 v(¬̇A) = f ¬̇
Efde
(v(A))
 v(A ∧̇ B) = f ∧̇
Efde
(v(A), v(B))
 v(A ∨̇ B) = f ∨̇
Efde
(v(A), v(B))







Note that insofar as the negation switches the two values, it can be thought of as a ‘toggle
negation’ in the sense of Andreas Kapsner’s (119).
That inconsistent data does not ‘pollute’ the broader field of data should be clear; that
a system has been provided data indicating that A is true and also data indicating that
A is false is represented by a valuation v assigning A a semantical value of 〈t, t〉. In such
occasions, v(A ∧̇ ¬̇A) ∈ D⋆
Efde
. Yet this does not indicate that the system has been provided
data suggesting the truth of atomic B, i.e., this does not preclude v from assigning a non-
designated semantical value such as 〈f, f〉 to an atom B. Hence, such a v witnesses that
A ∧̇ ¬̇A 2Efde B.
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5.2.2 Single Address Faulty Efde
While Belnap considers cases in which contradictory data are returned to an artificial rea-
soner, this is not the only type of potentially trivializing circumstance that may occur in
such a system.
Consider how a Belnap computer evaluates a formula A: The system employs an algo-
rithm to read the string of symbols corresponding to A and, upon reading each symbol, acts
in some prescribed manner. For example, upon reading the symbol corresponding to a unary
connective, the system will call a subprocedure (possibly itself) to calculate the semantical
values of the requisite subformulae. Upon reading a variable B, however, the system will
have to recover the value corresponding to B. To do this, it must obtain the address at
which the semantical value of B is stored and access the memory at that address. Call the
case in which both coordinates of the Belnap-type value are stored at a single address (i.e.,
in which only one ‘piece’ of information is necessary to recover both coordinates) the ‘single
address’ case.
Classical logic, of course, presupposes that every variable be assigned one and only one
value so as to obey the principles of excluded middle and contradiction; this is the assumption
that Belnap resists in (23). But a further presupposition—one not challenged by Belnap—is
that the value is always recoverable. Irrespective of which of Belnap’s truth values is assigned
to a variable, Belnap’s assumption is that a system is capable of querying the address at
which this variable’s value is stored and retrieving its value. This does not hold in practice; a
computer, for example, has finite memory and cannot allocate an address to each member of
a denumerably infinite set of propositional variables. Furthermore, even supposing that an
address has been assigned to hold the value, there could exist a physical flaw in the memory
preventing the system from retrieving the value. In such cases, the algorithm to evaluate
A will not be executed. The ‘partial functions’ tradition of interpreting such faults (such
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as Kleene’s interpretation of the weak three-valued matrices of (122) or McCarthy’s truth
tables of (132), appearing in Definitions 2.2.4 and 4.3.1, respectively), suggests that upon
such faults, a system will fail to terminate. In practice, of course, such an occasion will lead
to the system either terminating with an error or being held in an infinite loop as it attempts
to locate a phantom resource. In either case, we may think of such errors as producing a
third truth value.
Note that the situation in which, e.g., an atom p is assigned Belnap’s ‘neither’ value is
distinct from that in which its value is irrecoverable. In the former case, a system is perfectly
capable of calculating the value of formulae C in which p appears; the system can retrieve the
values of all atoms of C and calculate accordingly. If, however, the act of recovering the value
of p triggers an error—suppose that such an action causes the system to crash—the system
will be unable to perform this calculation. From an epistemological perspective, too, these
situations are distinct. Under Belnap’s interpretation, when a ‘neither’ value is recovered
for a variable p, the system possesses some information, namely, that it has received no data
concerning p. When the system is unable to recover the value of p, it lacks even this meager
information. As these scenarios differ in their behavior, it is natural to think of them as
corresponding to distinct truth values.
In the single address Efde case, we are able to model these circumstances by moving to
a five-valued logic that serves as a bilateral version of the semantics for S⋆
fde
from Definition
4.1.5. We presuppose the Belnapian picture that the semantical value of a variable A repre-
sents data corresponding to both its truth as well as its falsity. Moreover, we assume that
whatever data are being sent to the system concerning A may be stored at a single address
so that recovery of the first and second coordinates of a truth value stand and fall together.
In addition to the bilateral semantical values of Efde, then, we consider a fifth value 〈u, u〉
that represents a failure to retrieve a value.1 Note that if variables p0, ..., pn−1 enumerate
1That we are employing the value u ∈ VΣ0 , i.e., an infectious nonsense value, is not by accident.
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At(A), then an algorithm evaluating A demands the successful retrieval of the value of each
atom pi. Therefore, calculating the value of A will fail if for any pi there is an error in its
retrieval.
The bilateral account of the Daniels-Priest system S⋆
fde
is as follows:
Definition 5.2.2. The bilateral semantics for S⋆
fde



















〉 where the set of truth values is V ⋆
Efde













, and f ∨̇
S⋆
fde
can be defined by referencing their analogous

































(〈v0, v1〉, 〈v′0, v
′
1〉) otherwise
While Efde permits the inference to A ∨̇ B from A, i.e., A Efde A ∨̇ B, the principle of
Addition fails for S⋆
fde
. Consider a bilateral S⋆
fde
valuation v such that for atoms p and q,
v(p) = 〈t, f〉 and v(q) = 〈u, u〉. Then v(p) ∈ D⋆
S⋆
fde
although v(p ∨̇ q) = 〈u, u〉, whence
v(p ∨̇ q) /∈ D⋆
S⋆
fde
. Such a valuation witnesses that this inference is not valid in S⋆
fde
.
5.2.3 Two Address Faulty Efde
We will now further complicate the Belnapian picture by revisiting the issue of faults when
retrieving a semantical value. We had considered the case in which both types of report
with respect to a variable p were stored at a single address. This type of reading licenses
the inference A S⋆
fde
A ∨̇ ¬̇A; that A takes a designated value implies that the location at
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which the value of the truth of A is stored is accessible.2 If this is the same address as that
at which the value of ¬̇A, i.e., the value corresponding to whether A is false, is stored, then
the system is able to pull up the value of ¬̇A when evaluating A ∨̇ ¬̇A. In such cases, of
course, it will find A ∨̇ ¬̇A to take a designated value.
That said, an equally—if not more—reasonable implementation of the Belnapian picture
would employ a pair of addresses for each atom p: One to store a flag that p has been affirmed
and another to store a flag that p has been denied, i.e., an address for each coordinate of the
semantical value of p. If, e.g., only a single bit is allocated at a time, then each coordinate
will require a distinct address.
Note that the bilateral semantics for S⋆
fde
was defined in terms of the classical truth
functions that govern reports of truth and falsity so that in a sense, S⋆
fde
can be interpreted
as employing two parallel systems of positive classical logic to calculate truth and falsity
independently of one another. The system that will arise from the ‘two address’ treatment
of Belnap’s picture will bear the same relation to Bochvar/Kleene weak three-valued logic
defined in Definition 2.2.4.
We have seen in the foregoing that Σ0 is closely related to a number of containment
logics. Σ0 bears an equally deep relationship with the semantics we will now outline. Call
the semantical system to be introduced NC, defined with respect to the same language as
that of AC.
Definition 5.2.3. NC is defined by the set of truth values VNC = VΣ0 × VΣ0 and DNC =
{〈t, v〉 | v ∈ VΣ0}.




, and f ∨̇
NC
corresponding to negation, conjunction, and dis-





(〈v0, v1〉) = 〈v1, v0〉
2We will see that this inference in a sense characterizes the single address account, as the proof theory
for S⋆
fde
is equivalent to the addition of this inference to the logic determined by the two address case.
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 f ∧̇
NC




























An NC valuation is a function from At to VΣ0 × VΣ0 extended so that
 v(¬̇A) = f ¬̇
NC
(v(A))
 v(A ∧̇ B) = f ∧̇
NC
(v(A), v(B))
 v(A ∨̇ B) = f ∨̇
NC
(v(A), v(B))
Before connecting the system NC to AC, we pause to demonstrate some useful features of
the system NC.
Observation 5.2.1. NC is a subsystem of Efde
Proof. The set {〈t, f〉, 〈t, t〉, 〈f, f〉, 〈f, t〉} is just VEfde . Furthermore, it can be calculated that
the system Efde, i.e., its values, designated values, and truth functions, can be recovered by
restricting NC to V ⋆
Efde
.
Let Lit denote the set of literals, i.e., Lit = At ∪ {¬̇A | A ∈ At}. Then we provide the
following definition:
Definition 5.2.4. The literal normal form of a formula A (denoted ANF ) is recursively
defined as follows:
 ANF = A for A ∈ Lit
 (A ∧̇ B)NF = ANF ∧̇ BNF
 (A ∨̇ B)NF = ANF ∨̇ BNF
 (¬̇ ¬̇A)NF = ANF
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 (¬̇(A ∧̇ B))NF = (¬̇A)NF ∨̇ (¬̇B)NF
 (¬̇(A ∨̇ B))NF = (¬̇A)NF ∧̇ (¬̇B)NF
Lemma 5.2.1. For any NC valuation v, v(A) = v(ANF )
Proof. By induction on complexity of formulae. Clearly, v(A) = v(ANF ) for A ∈ Lit. As
induction hypothesis, assume that v(A) = v(ANF ) and v(B) = v(BNF ).
For v(A ∧̇ B) and v(A ∨̇ B), note that
v((A ∧̇ B)NF ) = v(ANF ∧̇ BNF ) = f ∧̇
NC
(v(ANF ), v(BNF )) = f ∧̇
NC
(v(A), v(B)).
But this is just v(A ∧̇ B); the case of disjunction proceeds identically, other things being
equal.
There are three cases to consider for negated formulae. For double negation, v(¬̇ ¬̇A) =
v(A) and A is (¬̇ ¬̇A)NF . For negated conjunctions ¬̇(A ∧̇ B), we observe that by defini-
tions and the induction hypothesis, we have the following: v((¬̇(A ∧̇ B))NF ) = v((¬̇A)NF ∨̇
(¬̇B)NF ) = f ∨̇
NC
(v((¬̇A)NF ), v((¬̇B)NF )) = f ∨̇
NC













(v(A), v(B))), i.e., v(¬̇(A ∧̇ B)). Finally, the case of negated disjunctions follows
analogously.
Definition 5.2.5. The sets At+(A)—the positive atoms of A and At−(A)—the negative
atoms of A—are recursively defined:
 At+(A) = {A} for A ∈ At
 At−(A) = ∅ for A ∈ At
 At+(¬̇A) = At−(A)
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 At−(¬̇A) = At+(A)
 At+(A ◦B) = At+(A) ∪At+(B) for ◦ ∈ {∧̇, ∨̇}
 At−(A ◦B) = At−(A) ∪At−(B) for ◦ ∈ {∧̇, ∨̇}
A simple induction can be employed to prove that NC inherits a form of the ‘infectiousness’
of the truth value u from Σ0. Let pr0 and pr1 be the projection functions mapping ordered
pairs to their first and second coordinates, respectively.
Lemma 5.2.2. For an atomic formula A, an arbitrary formula B, and an NC valuation v,
 if A ∈ At+(B) and pr0(v(A)) = u then v(B) /∈ DNC
 if A ∈ At−(B) and pr1(v(A)) = u then v(B) /∈ DNC
Proof. By induction on complexity of formulae.
Having noted these features of the system NC, we will now prove the equivalence of NC with
Richard Angell’s system of analytic containment AC.
5.3 Angell’s Analytic Containment AC
In the following, we will prove equivalence between the nine-valued semantics and the logic
of analytic containment AC, which has been discussed and defined in Section 3.1.3.
We will construe the connective → from the axiomatization in Section 3.1.3 as a con-
sequence relation so that A ⊢AC B will be interpreted as equivalent to the theoremhood of
A→ B in AC.
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5.3.1 Correia Semantics for Analytic Containment
Angell himself never published semantics for AC.3 The first semantics for the system was
discovered by Correia in (49), which we rehearse immediately below:
Correia’s models are essentially collections of elements that we will call Correia pairs.
Let ‘⋐’ denote the finite subset relation (i.e., let X ⋐ Y mean that X is a finite subset of
Y ). Then:
Definition 5.3.1. A Correia pair is an ordered pair 〈Γ,∆〉 where Γ ⋐ At, ∆ ⋐ At, and
Γ ∪∆ 6= ∅.
Note that the definition demands that Γ and ∆ be finite. Although this definition is not
assumed by Correia in (50), we will offer justification for this assumption shortly.
From this constituent material, we define Correia models.
Definition 5.3.2. A Correia model v is a nonempty collection of Correia pairs.
The first step towards generating interesting relations in a Correia model is the recursive
definition of a relation v:
Definition 5.3.3. The relation v⊆ ℘(Lzdf)×℘(Lzdf) is defined recursively by the following
clauses:
 Γ v ∆ iff 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v for Γ,∆ ⋐ At
 Γ v ∆, ¬̇A iff Γ, A v ∆
 Γ, ¬̇A v ∆ iff Γ v ∆, A
 Γ v ∆, A ∨̇ B iff Γ v ∆, A, B
3Angell asserts the existence of a semantics for ‘analytic equivalence’ by employing ‘analytic truth tables’
in the abstract (10). Possibly due to the severe constraints on space, however, Angell’s definition of an
analytic truth table is not entirely clear.
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 Γ, A ∨̇ B v ∆ iff both Γ, A v ∆ and Γ, B v ∆
 Γ v ∆, A ∧̇ B iff both Γ v ∆, A and Γ v ∆, B
 Γ, A ∧̇ B v ∆ iff Γ, A, B v ∆
An instance of the relation Γ v ∆ will be referred to as a ‘pseudosequent’ in the sequel.
Intuitively, a pseudosequent Γ v ∆ is to be read as the assertion that with respect to the
model v, the disjunction whose disjuncts comprise each of the members of ∆ and the negated
members of Γ is true. It follows that a formula A is considered true in a model v if ∅ v A.4
A formula A is true in a model v when the pseudosequent ∅ v A can be derived from a
pseudosequent Γ v ∆ in which Γ,∆ ⊂ At by a finite number of applications of the above
rules.
Correia notes that the logic corresponding to all models without restriction is much
weaker than AC, e.g., there exist countermodels to the AC theorem (p ∧̇ (q ∨̇ r)) → (p ∨̇
q). In order to properly characterize AC, we must restrict our attention to only Correia
models satisfying a particular property. In (49), Correia characterizes AC in terms of models
satisfying the following condition:
Definition 5.3.4 (Condition AC). For all sets of atoms Γ, Γ′, Γ′′, ∆, ∆′, and ∆′′ if 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈
v and 〈Γ′ ∪ Γ′′,∆′ ∪∆′′〉 ∈ v then 〈Γ ∪ Γ′,∆ ∪∆′〉 ∈ v
We will, however be interested also in an alternative (although equivalent) property of vocab-
ulary closure. As an intermediate step towards the introduction of this property, we define
a binary relation 4 between pairs of sets of atoms.
Definition 5.3.5. The relation 4 between two pairs of sets of formulae 〈Γ,∆〉 and 〈Γ′,∆′〉
is defined so that
4Note that as the conditions for v provide no means of eliminating instances of formulae from a pseudose-
quent, whenever a pseudosequent ∅ v A is derivable, it is derivable after a finite number of manipulations
of a finite initial pseudosequent Γ v ∆. Hence, it is always sufficient to consider finite Correia models,
justifying our assumption of the finitude of Correia models v.
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Γ ⋐ Γ′ , and
∆ ⋐ ∆′
Note that the relation 4 is defined for arbitrary pairs of sets of formulae without qualification
(rather than Correia pairs). Hence, the relation 〈Γ,∆〉 4 〈Γ′,∆′〉 is well-defined even when
Γ′ and ∆′ are infinite.
Consider also the following definition:





, respectively—are defined so that:
 Γ⋆
v
= {p ∈ At | ∃〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v such that p ∈ Γ}
 ∆⋆v = {p ∈ At | ∃〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v such that p ∈ ∆}
Now we are prepared to define the alternative property corresponding to the class of Correia
models in terms of which AC validity may be defined.
Definition 5.3.7. The vocabulary closure of a Correia model v—symbolized JvK—is the
smallest Correia model v′ extending v such that:




〉, if there exists a 〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ v such that 〈Γ′,∆′〉 4
〈Γ,∆〉, then 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v′
I.e., the set {〈Γ,∆〉 | ∃〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ v s.t. 〈Γ′,∆′〉 4 〈Γ,∆〉 4 〈Γ⋆v,∆
⋆
v〉}.
We say a Correia model v is vocabulary closed if v = JvK.
The equivalence between vocabulary closed models and those satisfying Condition AC is
clear. Hence, Correia’s results in (49) entail that AC corresponds to the preservation of
truth in vocabulary closed models.
This provides us with the necessary apparatus to define AC validity:
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Definition 5.3.8. A AC B iff for every vocabulary closed Correia model v, if ∅ v A then
∅ v B
5.3.2 Equivalence of NC and AC
We wish to show that the truth functional semantics captures Angell’s system AC. We
proceed by showing that all axioms of Angell’s system correspond to valid inferences in NC
and that the rules of Angell’s system preserve validity when applied to an NC inference.
Recall that the functions pr0 and pr1 are the operators projecting a pair onto the first and
second coordinate, respectively and that the notation ‘f [X ]’ represents the image of X under
f .
Then, the first move towards proving equivalence is proving that anything valid inference
in AC is a valid inference modulo the nine-valued semantics. We show this by evaluating the
rules and axioms of AC and demonstrating that they correspond to valid inferences in NC.
Lemma 5.3.1. The axioms AC1–AC6b are valid in NC
Proof. The validity of each of the axioms may be directly inferred by appeal to the truth
functions.
To establish the validity of other axioms of AC, we prove some intermediate lemmas:
Lemma 5.3.2. If A NC B and B NC A then At
+(A) = At+(B) and At−(A) = At−(B)
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that A NC B and there is an atomic p ∈ At
+(B)
although p /∈ At+(A). Then consider a valuation v such that v(A) ∈ DNC and v(B) ∈ DNC.
Next, construct a valuation v′ differing from v only in that it assigns the first coordinate of
p the value u. Because v′ agrees with v on all atoms appearing in A, the value of A remains
unchanged, i.e., v′(A) ∈ DNC. However, by Lemma 5.2.2, that pr0(v
′(p)) = u entails that
v′(B) /∈ DNC. Hence, A 2NC B.
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Lemma 5.3.3. With respect to an NC valuation v, if u /∈ pr0[v[At
+(A)]] and u /∈ pr1[v[At
−(A)]]
then for any NC valuation v′ agreeing with v with respect to these values, v(A) ∈ DNC iff
v′(A) ∈ DNC
Proof. Suppose that u /∈ pr0[v[At
+(A)]] and u /∈ pr1[v[At
−(A)]]. Then we may prove the
lemma by induction on complexity of ANF (i.e., the literal normal form of A). In the case
of literals p or ¬̇ p, p ∈ At+(A) or p ∈ At−(A). The selection of v′ ensures that v and v′
agree on these sets, whence v(p) = v′(p) or v(¬̇ p) = v′(¬̇ p) as the case requires.
As induction hypothesis, suppose that this property holds for all subformulae of ANF . If
ANF = B ∧̇ C, then v(B ∧̇ C) ∈ DNC iff v(B) ∈ DNC and v(C) ∈ DNC. This by hypothesis
holds iff v′(B) ∈ DNC and v′(C) ∈ DNC, i.e., v′(A ∧̇ B) ∈ DNC. Disjunction follows from an
identical proof.
Hence, as v(A) ∈ DNC iff v(ANF ) ∈ DNC, we conclude that v(A) ∈ DNC iff v′(A) ∈
DNC.
Lemma 5.3.4. The inference rule AC7 is validity preserving
Proof. By Lemma 5.3.2, whenever both A NC B and B NC A we may infer that At
+(A) =
At+(B) and At−(A) = At−(B). But At+(A) = At−(¬̇A) and mutatis mutandis for B,
whence ¬̇A and ¬̇B share positive and negative atoms.
Now suppose for contradiction that ¬̇A 2NC ¬̇B. Then there is an NC valuation v
such that v(¬̇A) ∈ DNC and v(¬̇B) /∈ DNC. By Lemma 5.2.2, that v(¬̇A) ∈ DNC entails
that u /∈ pr0[v[At
+(¬̇A)]] and u /∈ pr1[v[At
−(¬̇A)]]. That At+(¬̇A) = At+(¬̇B) and
At−(¬̇A) = At−(¬̇B) entails that this holds for ¬̇B as well.
Construct an NC valuation v′′ by the following scheme for all atoms p:























〈t, t〉 if v(p) = 〈t, u〉 or v(p) = 〈u, t〉 or v(p) = 〈u, u〉
〈f, t〉 if v(p) = 〈f, u〉
〈t, f〉 if v(p) = 〈u, f〉
v(p) otherwise
Then v and v′′ agree on the first coordinates of the values assigned to At+(¬̇A) and the
second coordinates of values assigned to At−(¬̇A). Hence, by Lemma 5.3.3, v′′(¬̇A) ∈ DNC
iff v(¬̇A) ∈ DNC and v′′(¬̇B) ∈ DNC iff v(¬̇B) ∈ DNC. But v′′ is a bilateral Efde valuation
because the values assigned to all formulae are in V ⋆
Efde
, whence v′′ witnesses that ¬̇A 2Efde
¬̇B.
However, we also note that as a subsystem of Efde, that B NC A entails that B Efde A.
In turn, B Efde A entails that ¬̇A Efde ¬̇B (cf. the axiomatization in (24)), whence we
infer that ¬̇A Efde ¬̇B. This contradicts our earlier conclusion that ¬̇A 2Efde ¬̇B.
Lemma 5.3.5. The inference rules AC8–AC9 are validity preserving
Proof. That AC8 and AC9 preserve designated validity is trivial, AC8 by appeal to the
truth tables and AC9 by the definition of validity.
We are now equipped to prove correctness of AC with respect to NC.
Theorem 5.3.1. If A AC B then A NC B
Proof. Suppose that A AC B. Then, by completeness of the Correia semantics with respect
to the axioms, there exists a proof of A → B from the axioms of AC. But all axioms are
valid inferences of NC and the inferences are validity preserving. Hence, A NC B.
Now, to prove equivalence of AC and NC, we must prove the converse of Theorem 5.3.1, i.e.,
we must show that NC is a subsystem of AC. To do so, we will need some further notation
and a lemma concerning Correia models.
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Definition 5.3.9. The operation
b
is defined so that for two Correia pairs 〈Γ,∆〉 and
〈Γ′,∆′〉, 〈Γ,∆〉
b
〈Γ′,∆′〉 = 〈Γ ∪ Γ′,∆ ∪∆′〉
Note that the relation 4 defined in Definition 5.3.5 admits a characterization in terms of
b
,
i.e., 〈Γ,∆〉 4 〈Γ′,∆′〉 holds if and only if 〈Γ,∆〉
b
〈Γ′,∆′〉 = 〈Γ′,∆′〉.
We also define two further properties in terms of
b
:
Definition 5.3.10. With respect to a Correia model v, a pair 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v is a
b
-minimal
element of v if for all 〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ v, if 〈Γ′,∆′〉 4 〈Γ,∆〉 then 〈Γ′,∆′〉 = 〈Γ,∆〉.
Definition 5.3.11. The set of generators of a Correia model v—symbolized G(v)—is the set
of
b
-minimal elements of v, i.e., the set:
{〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v | ∀〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ v if 〈Γ′,∆′〉 4 〈Γ,∆〉 then 〈Γ′,∆′〉 = 〈Γ,∆〉}.
With these definitions in hand, we can make the following observation:
Lemma 5.3.6. For any Correia model v and every Correia pair 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v, there exists a
Correia pair 〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ G(v) such that 〈Γ′,∆′〉 4 〈Γ,∆〉
Proof. Consider an arbitrary 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v; we prove the existence of an appropriate pair
〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ G(v) by arguing by cases. Either there exists a distinct 〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ v such that
〈Γ′,∆′〉 4 〈Γ,∆〉 or not.
If there is such an element of v, then because Γ,∆ are finite, the chain
... 4 〈Γ′′,∆′′〉 4 ... 4 〈Γ,∆〉
must terminate at some initial pair 〈Γ′′′,∆′′′〉 ∈ v. But if 〈Γ′′′,∆′′′〉 is the terminal element
of the chain, then 〈Γ′′′,∆′′′〉 ∈ G(v) and may thus serve as the required Correia pair in v.
If there is no such element of v, then 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ G(v) and by reflexivity of 4, 〈Γ,∆〉 is
itself the required Correia pair.
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When Γ ⊆ Lzdf, then let Γ¬̇ represent the set {¬̇A | A ∈ Γ}. Now, in (49), Correia
maintains an explicit ‘analogy’ with sequents (or consecutions) in the style of Gentzen, an
analogy made salient by the likeness that a Correia pair 〈Γ,∆〉 bears to a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆.
This analogy permits us to apply a proof-theoretic observation due to William Tait (as
reported by Wolfram Pohlers in (152)) that whenever the antecedent and succedent of a
sequent contain only atomic formulae, one can encode all of the information in that sequent
by means of a single set of formulae, i.e., whenever Γ ∪∆ ⊆ At, one can recover all of the
information in a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ from the set Γ¬̇ ∪∆.
Definition 5.3.12. For a Correia pair 〈Γ,∆〉, the literal projection of 〈Γ,∆〉—symbolized
by 〈Γ,∆〉τ—is the set Γ¬̇ ∪∆. When X is a set of Correia pairs, Xτ will be defined as the
set of literal projections of its elements.
For example, where G(v) is the set of generators of a Correia model v, G(v)τ is the collection
of literal projections of elements of G(v).
Definition 5.3.13. Where G(v) is the set of generators of a Correia model v,
∏
(G(v)τ ) is
the set of all choice functions on G(v)τ , that is:
∏
(G(v)τ ) = {C : G(v)τ → ∪G(v)τ | C(〈Γ,∆〉τ ) ∈ 〈Γ,∆〉τ}
Recall that pr0 and pr1 are the projection operators projecting pairs onto their first and
second coordinates, respectively. Then for each choice function C ∈
∏
(G(v)τ ), we can
associate a many-valued NC valuation vC :
Definition 5.3.14. Suppose that v is a vocabulary closed Correia model and consider a
choice function C ∈
∏
















t if ∃〈Γ,∆〉τ ∈ G(v)τ such that C(〈Γ,∆〉τ) = p
f if ∀〈Γ,∆〉τ ∈ G(v)τ , C(〈Γ,∆〉τ) 6= p but p ∈ ∆⋆
v
u if p /∈ ∆⋆
v
















t if ∃〈Γ,∆〉τ ∈ G(v)τ such that C(〈Γ,∆〉τ) = ¬̇ p
f if ∀〈Γ,∆〉τ ∈ G(v)τ , C(〈Γ,∆〉τ) 6= ¬̇ p but p ∈ Γ⋆
v
u if p /∈ Γ⋆
v
In the sequel, for a Correia model v, F(v) will represent the set containing the NC valuation
vC for every choice function C ∈
∏
(G(v)τ ).
Now we describe a semantic relation on collections F(v) of NC valuations by the following
definition:
Definition 5.3.15. Γ F(v) ∆ is defined so that for arbitrary Γ,∆ ⋐ Lzdf, Γ F(v) ∆ if for











∆] is a well defined formula of Lzdf.
Our strategy will be to provide a correspondence between the manipulations of pseu-
dosequents described in Definition 5.3.3 and the features of the relation F(v). Such a corre-
spondence will permit us to ‘track’ the derivation of a pseudosequent by the truth-functional
semantics. As each of these manipulations must be mimicked by the relation F(v), there are
a number of intermediate lemmas that must be established.
Lemma 5.3.7. Γ F(v) ∆, ¬̇A iff Γ, A F(v) ∆









∆]. Now, Γ F(v) ∆, ¬̇A






∆ ∪ {¬̇A}]) ∈ DNC. By the
truth functional equivalence of the two formulae, this statement is equivalent to the claim




[Γ ∪ {A}]¬̇] ∨̇ [
∨
∆]) ∈ DNC, which is just to say that
Γ, A F(v) ∆.
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Lemma 5.3.8. Γ, ¬̇A F(v) ∆ iff Γ F(v) ∆, A
Proof. This case follows from an argument analogous to that made for Lemma 5.3.7.
Lemma 5.3.9. Γ F(v) ∆, A ∨̇ B iff Γ F(v) ∆, A, B
Proof. This is nearly trivial; the formula
∨
(∆ ∪ {A,B}) differs from the formula (
∨
∆) ∨̇
(A ∨̇ B) only by exporting a single disjunct. The commutativity of disjunction in NC ensures
the equivalence of the two formulae.
Lemma 5.3.10. Γ, A ∧̇ B F(v) ∆ iff Γ, A, B F(v) ∆
Proof. This follows from an argument analogous to that made for Lemma 5.3.9.
Lemma 5.3.11. Γ F(v) ∆, A ∧̇ B iff Γ F(v) ∆, A and Γ v ∆, B






∆] ∨̇ (A ∧̇









∆] ∨̇ B]) ∈ DNC. This is just to say that Γ F(v) ∆, A and Γ F(v) ∆, B.
For right-to-left, suppose for contradiction that both Γ F(v) ∆, A and Γ F(v) ∆, B hold
although there exists an C ′ ∈
∏


















∆] ∨̇ B]) ∈ DNC, entailing that vC′(A) ∈ DNC and
vC′(B) ∈ DNC, which entails that vC′(A ∧̇ B) ∈ DNC, contradicting our earlier assumption
that vC′(A ∧̇ B) /∈ DNC.
Lemma 5.3.12. Γ, A ∨̇ B F(v) ∆ iff Γ, A F(v) ∆ and Γ, B F(v) ∆
Proof. The structure of this follows the proof of Lemma 5.3.11 identically.
We have nearly sufficient material to demonstrate that for every valid inference A AC B,
the inference A NC B is also valid. There remain a few further lemmas to establish.
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Lemma 5.3.13. For all Γ,∆ ⋐ Lzdf and vocabulary closed Correia models v,
Γ F(v) ∆ iff Γ v ∆.
Proof. To begin, we first observe that for all sets Γ,∆ ⊂ At, the equivalence between
Γ F(v) ∆ and Γ v ∆ holds. Consider the assertion that Γ F(v) ∆, i.e., that for all




∆]) ∈ DNC. This assertion is itself equivalent
to the claim that for every selection function C ∈
∏
(G(v)τ ) there exists some Correia pair
〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ G(v) such that C(〈Γ′,∆′〉τ) ∈ Γ¬̇∪∆. This property holds if and only if there exist
Correia pairs 〈Γ0,∆0〉, ..., 〈Γn−1,∆n−1〉 ∈ G(v) such that ∪i<nΓi = Γ and ∪i<n∆i = ∆. By
vocabulary closure of v, this statement is equivalent to the condition that
b
i<n〈Γi,∆i〉 ∈ v.
But this condition is precisely to say that 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v, a statement that we may recognize as
the definition of Γ v ∆.
Before beginning the induction, it is furthermore important to observe that for arbitrary
Γ and ∆, whenever Γ v ∆ there exists a finite sequence σ of pseudosequents such that
the initial element of σ is Γ0 v ∆0 where Γ0,∆0 ⊂ At and the terminal element of σ
is the pseudosequent Γ v ∆. Moreover, for any n less than the length of σ, the nth
pseudosequent appearing in σ follows from the n− 1th pseudosequent by the application of
one of the manipulations described in Definition 5.3.3.
With this observation, we may proceed to prove the lemma by induction on the length of
such sequences. Because in any initial pseudosequent 〈Γ0,∆0〉, Γ0 ∪∆0 ⊆ At, the basis step
for the induction—that is, the case in which only one pseudosequent appears in the sequence
σ—is established by the previously observed equivalence of Γ0 F(v) ∆0 and Γ0 v ∆0.
Now, let Γn v ∆n be the nth pseudosequent of a sequence σ and suppose as induction
hypothesis that the equivalence holds for pseudosequents appearing earlier in σ. In par-
ticular, the induction hypothesis entails that for the n − 1th pseudosequent, the following
holds:
CHAPTER 5. FAULTY BELNAP COMPUTERS AND SUBSYSTEMS OF EFDE 165
Γn−1 v ∆n−1 iff Γn−1 F(v) ∆n−1
Now, the nth pseudosequent Γn v ∆n is derived from Γn−1 v ∆n−1 by the application
of one of Correia’s manipulation rules. But Lemmas 5.3.7–5.3.12 jointly ensure that the
application any one of these rules is mirrored by the relation F(v). Hence:
Γn v ∆n iff Γn−1 v ∆n−1 iff Γn−1 F(v) ∆n−1 iff Γn F(v) ∆n
This establishes the equivalence between Γn v ∆n and Γn F(v) ∆n. Because any derivable
pseudosequent appears as the mth pseudosequent in a finite sequence σ, this equivalence
holds for arbitrary derivable pseudosequents Γ v ∆.
Now we are prepared to prove the theorem.
Theorem 5.3.2. If A NC B then A AC B
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that A 2AC B. Then there exists a vocabulary
closed Correia model v such that ∅ v A and ∅ 1v B. By Lemma 5.3.13, this assertion
entails that ∅ F(v) A, which in turn implies that for all choice functions C ∈
∏
(G(v)τ ),
vC(A) ∈ DNC. But identical reasoning yields that it is not the case that ∅ F(v) B, entailing
the existence of some valuation vC′ ∈ F(v) such that vC′(B) /∈ DNC. As vC′(A) ∈ DNC, vC′
witnesses that A 2NC B.
Corollary 5.3.1. AC = NC
Proof. By Theorem 5.3.1, AC is a subsystem of NC; Theorem 5.3.2 proves the converse.
Hence, AC = NC.
With this reassurance, we are free to abandon talk of NC and may use the nomenclature AC
to describe the nine-valued semantics. For example, we will use the symbol AC in the sequel
to denote consequence with respect to the semantics of Definition 5.2.3.
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In addition to admitting a Belnap-style interpretation of AC, the nine-valued semantics
makes a further type of interpretation available. We have noted that AC bears an identical re-
lationship to Bochvar’s Σ0 to that which Efde bears to classical logic. In (199), Peter Woodruff
remarks that a ‘popular explication’ of Halldén-type nonsense logics, (e.g., Bochvar’s Σ0) lies
in interpreting the truth functions as partial functions, as suggested by Kleene in (122) when
describing the matrices for Σ0. If we understand the semantical functions of AC bilaterally,
that is, as a pair of Σ0 truth functions independently calculating values corresponding to
truth and falsity, the semantics of Definition 5.2.3 opens AC to a similar partial function
interpretation.
5.4 Steps Forward
The simplicity of the above semantics for AC does more than merely to provide a novel way
to interpret the system. It also has a formal upshot in permitting us to address some formal
questions in a simple fashion. For one, we can give a particular type of ‘double-barrelled
analysis’ of AC (and S⋆
fde
), the availability of which is not apparent in the Correia semantics.
Moreover, the nine-valued semantics suggests a natural adaptation of Fine’s semantics for
PAI of Definition 2.4.1 in a way that provides an account of higher-degree extensions of AC
(as well as such extensions of S⋆
fde
).
5.4.1 The Gödel-Fine Analysis of AC
Recall the definition of a Gödel-Fine analysis of a deductive system L in Section 4.1.2.
Virtually every containment logic, e.g., Harry Deutsch’s S (of (59)), can receive such a
characterization. In addition to the analyses described in Section 4.1.2, the many-valued
semantics for AC enable us to provide the Gödel-Fine analysis of AC.
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At+(B) ⊆ At+(A), and
At−(B) ⊆ At−(A)
Proof. The left-to-right direction is proven in (11). For right-to-left, then, suppose that
A Efde B and both At
+(B) ⊆ At+(A) and At−(B) ⊆ At−(A) hold. Suppose for contra-
diction that A 2AC B.
Let v be an AC valuation witnessing this fact. Then from v(A) ∈ DAC if follows
from Lemma 5.2.2 that both u /∈ pr0[v[At
+(A)]] and u /∈ pr1[v[At
−(A)]]. Moreover, that
At+(B) ⊆ At+(A) and At−(B) ⊆ At−(A) entails that the same can be said of B. By




and v′′(B) /∈ D⋆
Efde
, i.e., A 2Efde B.
Observation 5.4.1 has been independently established by Fine in (87), although its statement
is expressed in significantly different terms.
These analyses allow us to make a further observation concerning S⋆
fde
’s relationship with
the field of containment logics. Just as Efde is the first-degree fragment of E, Parry’s PAI
has a distinct first-degree fragment. As Sylvan suggested in (166), the first-degree fragment
PAIfde appeared in Aleksandr Zinov'ev’s (202) as the system S1, the semantics of which were
given as a tacit Gödel-Fine analysis:








A CL B, and
At(B) ⊆ At(A)
where CL denotes classical entailment. Clearly, S
⋆
fde
counts Angell’s AC as a subsystem, but
the analysis of Observation 4.1.1 allows us to prove the equivalence between the many-valued
semantics for S⋆
fde
in Definition 4.1.5 and the two proof-theoretic characterizations due to
Angell (in (9)) and Daniels (in (55)).
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As we noted in Section 4.1.2, the first appearance of a deductive system equivalent to
S⋆
fde
is found in Angell’s abstract (9), in which Angell provides an axiomatization of the
intersection of Efde and PAIfde. Although it has not been mentioned in the literature—
much less proven—consequence in S⋆
fde
in fact corresponds to consequence in the intersection
Efde ∩ PAIfde. By invoking the equivalence of PAIfde and S1, Observation 4.1.1 immediately
implies the following corollary:
Corollary 5.4.1. S⋆
fde
= Efde ∩ PAIfde
In (9), Angell also remarks that the logic Efde ∩ PAIfde is axiomatized by adding the axiom
A ⊢ A ∨̇ ¬̇A to AC. This gives us the following proof-theoretic corollary:
Corollary 5.4.2. S⋆
fde
= AC + A ⊢ A ∨̇ ¬̇A
We have also observed that S⋆
fde
is syntactically introduced by Daniels in (55), in which it
is asserted that S⋆
fde
is the first-degree fragment of the logic corresponding to Daniels’ ‘story
semantics’ of (54). Daniels provides a tacit Gödel-Fine analysis in his syntactic definition
of S⋆
fde
according to which validity of an inference A ⊢S⋆
fde
B is defined as the validity of the
inference A ⊢Efde B in conjunction with the condition that At(B) ⊆ At(A). This gives us a
further corollary:
Corollary 5.4.3. The system described by Daniels in (55) corresponds to the five-valued
semantics for S⋆
fde
These analyses will be reflected in the semantics as we move to higher degree systems.
5.4.2 Extending to Higher Degree Formulae
One of Correia’s suggestions in (49) as an interesting topic future research on AC was to
provide an intuitive means of extending the first-degree system to account for the language
with formulae containing nested conditionals. By the present semantics for AC, we are
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provided with a very natural means of defining such an extension. In Definition 2.4.4, we
observed that subsystems of PAI could be described by relaxing certain conditions implicit
in Fine’s semantics for Parry’s PAI of (81). Just as relaxing the requirement of consistency
for PAI models yielded semantics for Deutsch’s S introduce two higher degree systems, by
further weakening PAI models, we can define semantics for systems PAC (for ‘Parry-like’ AC)
and PFDEϕ (for ‘Parry-like’ FDEϕ).
5
We will not offer axiomatizations for the systems introduced in this section, although
the proximity to Fine’s semantics suggests that his canonical model construction can be
easily adapted for soundness and completeness proofs. Our goal is merely to outline a very
reasonable way of treating such systems that is harmonious with the prevailing treatments
of other containment logics.
The logic PAI is defined over the language L+ defined in Definition 1.1.1 so that formulae
may contained nested instances of the intensional conditional. Working in a richer language
compels us to extend the definition of functions At+(A) and At−(A) from Definition 5.2.5 to
accommodate higher degree formulae. We enrich the definition of these functions by adding
the clauses:
 At+(A→ B) = At+(A) ∪At+(B)
 At−(A→ B) = At−(A) ∪At−(B)
To produce a semantics for logics the first-degrees of which correspond to AC or S⋆
fde
, we
continue the trend from Definition 2.4.1 to Definition 2.4.4 and define an even weaker version
of Fine’s semantics of (81). We will call the structure central to this section a PAC model.
Definition 5.4.1. A PAC model is a 5-tuple 〈W,R,C, Γ, V 〉 where:
 W is a nonempty set of points
5Constancy might suggest that PS⋆
fde
would be a more appropriate name for the Parry-like extension of
S⋆
fde
. But the system has been introduced in print as PFDEϕ and we will retain that nomenclature now.
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 R ⊆W ×W is reflexive and transitive
For each w ∈ W there exists a semilattice Cw ∈ C where Cw = 〈Cw, ◦w〉, so that:
 Cw is a nonempty set
 ◦w is an associative, commutative, and idempotent function on Cw
Because Cw is a semilattice, each induces a relation ≤w so that for all a, b ∈ Cw, a ≤w b if
a ◦w b = b. Finally,
 for all w ∈ W , the set Γ contains a pair of functions γ+w and γ
−
w from At to Cw
 V includes two functions V + and V − from At to ℘(W )
For each point w, from functions γ+w and γ
−
w we construct a function γw : L+ → Cw so that
for an arbitrary formula A ∈ L+:
 γw(A) = γ
+
w (p0) ◦w ... ◦w γ
+
w (pm−1) ◦w γ
−
w (q0) ◦w ... ◦w γ
−
w (qn−1)
where {p0, ..., pm−1} = At
+(A) and {q0, ..., qn−1} = At
−(A).
The two valuation functions V + and V − in the presentation of Fine’s semantics found in
Definition 2.4.1 were included in anticipation of the requirement in Definition 2.4.4 that truth




w , we make an
analogous revision in which positive negative concepts are treated independently. It is worth
noting that this distinction reflects Fine’s bilateral account of subject-matter discussed in
Section 3.1.2, in which a proposition enjoys distinct positive and negative subject-matters.
We give truth and falsity conditions, represented by + and −, respectively.
Definition 5.4.2. The positive forcing relation + is defined for all formulae so that:
 w + A if w ∈ V +(A) for A ∈ At
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 w + ¬̇A if w − A
 w + A ∧̇ B if w + A and w + B
 w + A ∨̇ B if w + A or w + B








w′ + A implies w′ + B and
γw′(B) ≤w′ γw′(A)
The negative relation is defined so that:
 w − A if w ∈ V −(A)
 w − ¬̇A if w + A
 w − A ∧̇ B if w − A and w − B
 w − A ∨̇ B if w − A and w − B








w′ + A and w′ − B or
γw′(B) 6≤w′ γw′(A)
We call the system determined by these semantics PAC:
Definition 5.4.3. The system PAC is defined so that Γ PAC A if for every point w in every
PAC model, whenever w + B for all B ∈ Γ, also w + A.
We are able to show that PAC extends AC in the desired fashion.
Observation 5.4.2. AC is the first-degree fragment of PAC
Proof. To show that A AC B entails that PAC A→ B, we prove the contrapositive. Suppose
for zeroth degree formulae A,B that 2PAC A → B. Then there exists a point w in a model
such that w 1+ A → B. Hence, there exists a w′ such that wRw′ at which either w′ + A
and w′ 1+ B or γw′(A) 6≤w′ γw′(B).
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In the former case, we can build an Efde valuation showing that A 2Efde B. Let u be a























〈t, t〉 if w′ ∈ V +(p) and w′ ∈ V −(p)
〈t, f〉 if w′ ∈ V +(p) and w′ /∈ V −(p)
〈f, t〉 if w′ /∈ V +(p) and w′ ∈ V −(p)
〈f, f〉 if w′ /∈ V +(p) and w′ /∈ V −(p)
That u[At] ⊆ V ⋆
Efde
entails that the above is a bilateral Efde valuation. A simple induction
on complexity of formulae shows that for zeroth degree formulae C, u(C) ∈ D⋆
Efde
if and only
if w′ + C. As A and B have no instances of the intensional implication connective, this
entails that A 2Efde B. But as AC is a subsystem of Efde, this entails that A 2AC B.
In the latter case, γw′(A) 6≤w′ γw′(B). This may occur only if there is an atom p such that
either p ∈ At+(B) and p /∈ At+(A) or p ∈ At−(B) and p /∈ At−(A). Suppose without loss
of generality that the former holds and construct an Efde valuation u defined as above with
the sole exception that pr0(u(p)) = u. The valuation u will thus map A to DAC; however, by
Lemma 5.2.2, the conjunction of the fact that p appears positively in B and the fact that
pr0(u(p)) = u implies that u(B) /∈ DAC, i.e., A 2AC B.
In both cases we conclude A 2AC B, hence, that 2PAC A→ B entails that A 2AC B.
To prove that PAC A→ B entails that A AC B for A,B ∈ Lzdf, suppose that A 2AC B
and let u be an AC valuation that witnesses this fact. We construct a PAC model witnessing
the failure of A→ B in PAC. For an atomic formula q, let pq represent the pair 〈pqq, 0〉 and
lt mq represent the pair 〈pqq, 1〉, so that pq and mq are pairs comprising the syntactic object
itself and with a natural number standing in for its polarity. Now, let W be a singleton {w}
and let Cw = ℘({pq | q ∈ At
+(A ∧̇ B)} ∪ {mq | q ∈ At
−(A ∧̇ B)}) with ◦w interpreted as
set theoretic union.
Construct valuations V + and V − so that for all q ∈ At,
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 w ∈ V +(A) iff pr0(u(q)) = t
 w ∈ V −(A) iff pr1(u(q)) = t
and construct functions γ+w and γ
−
w so that for all q ∈ At,








{pq} if q ∈ At
+(A ∧̇ B)
∅ otherwise








{mq} if q ∈ At
−(A ∧̇ B)
∅ otherwise
By the Gödel-Fine analysis of AC in Observation 5.4.1, that A 2AC B entails that one of
three conditions holds: Either A 2Efde B, At
+(B) 6⊂ At+(A), or At−(B) 6⊂ At−(A). We
prove the observation by arguing by cases.
In the first case, the valuation u serves as a bilateral Efde valuation witnessing the failure
of the inference from A to B. Now, because A and B have no instances of the implication
connective, that u(A) ∈ DAC and u(B) /∈ DAC entails that w + A and w 1+ B. As wRw,
this entails that w 1+ A→ B, whence we infer that 2PAC A→ B.
The latter two cases are symmetrical. Hence, we examine the first, in which At+(B) 6⊂
At+(A), without loss of generality. If this is the case, then there exists some q ∈ At+(B)
not appearing positively in A. But this means that pq ∈ γw(B) but pq /∈ γw(A). As ◦w
is interpreted in our example as set-theoretical union, this entails that γw(B) 6⋐w γw(A),
entailing that w 1+ A→ B.
From the assumption that A 2AC B we thus conclude that 2PAC A→ B. By contraposi-
tion, that A→ B is a PAC theorem entails that A AC B is a valid inference.
A simple restriction to the semantics yields the analogous extension for S⋆
fde
.
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Definition 5.4.4. The system PFDEϕ is defined so that Γ PFDEϕ A if for all PAC models
enjoying the property that
γ+w (p) = γ
−
w (p) for all p ∈ At
if w + B for all B ∈ Γ, also w + A.
We may also confirm that PFDEϕ extends S
⋆
fde
in the desired fashion.
Observation 5.4.3. S⋆
fde
is the first-degree fragment of PFDEϕ.
Proof. The proof is virtually identical to that of Observation 5.4.2.
We may observe that the definition of a PAC model gives a great deal of flexibility; there are
three degrees of freedom by which we may restrict models to yield stronger systems, i.e., by
adding restrictions to any of Γ, V , and R, we can generate corresponding extensions of PAC.
For example, considering validity in the restricted class of PAC in which for all p ∈ At and
w ∈ W , both γ+w (p) = γ
−
w (p) and V
+(p)∪V −(p) = W yields Harry Deutsch’s paraconsistent
containment logic S from (59). The various definitions from Section 4.1.1 entail that adding
the further restriction to this class models so that we consider only models in which R linearly
orders W will yield Deutsch’s S′ introduced in (61), while adding the additional restriction
that W is a singleton will correspond to a ‘demodalized’ extension S′′. Of course, adding the
restriction that for all p ∈ At, V +(p) ∩ V −(p) = ∅ to the restrictions that characterized S
will yield Fine’s original semantics for PAI in Definition 2.4.1. Finally, restricting the class of
PAI models to those in which W is a singleton yields Dunn’s demodalized containment logic
DAI, introduced in (65) and rediscovered by Richard Epstein with different (set-assignment)
semantics as ‘D’ in (69). Figure 5.1 portrays the relationship between various intensional
containment logics, arranged by which of γ, V , or R is restricted.
Moreover, it is also clear that one could also define ‘demodalized’ versions of PAC and
PFDEϕ. Examining this structure in more detail and providing an axiomatic account of these
relationships is an interesting task, although a task left for future study.









Figure 5.1: Systems Intermediate Between PAC and DAI
5.5 Conclusion
The present work goes some way towards providing S⋆
fde
and AC with a robust and use-
ful interpretation, as well as addressing some formal questions. We conclude with some
suggestions for future research.
It would be interesting to find ways to extend the present approach to some of the first-
degree logics near AC. For example, the only authentically semantical presentation of S1—
presented in (121), in which Kielkopf proves that S1 is characterized by the matrices Parry
uses in (143) to prove consistency of AI—is rather unintuitive. In addition to examining
Efde ∩ S1—which we saw to be S⋆fde—Angell’s (9) also gives an axiomatic account of the
system Efde ∪ S1. What semantics exist for this system and how could they be interpreted?
The intensional containment logics intermediate between PAC and DAI are left largely
unexamined and questions remain unanswered. What relationship exists between restricting
γ, v, and R? What are the axiomatizations of these systems? Is there a way to provide a
more elegant axiomatization of S and S′ than was offered by Deutsch? I suspect that the
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structure of these intermediate systems is a rich one, worthy of exploration.
A further topic worthy of investigating is examining faulty networks of Belnap computers.
In (175), Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing ask how to extend the Belnapian picture
to a network of such systems. In particular, Shramko and Wansing discover that the sixteen-
valued logic of such a network determines the same consequence relation as does the four-
valued semantics for Efde; furthermore, this result extends to networks of such networks, and
networks of networks of networks, ad infinitum. As a deductive system, Efde is thus stable
in a strong sense. Exploring suitable generalizations of the faulty Belnap computer to faulty
Shramko-Wansing networks and asking whether S⋆
fde
and AC are stable in the same sense as




In Section 4.2.4, we considered Melvin Fitting’s ‘cut-down’ connectives—propositional con-
nectives that ‘cut down’ available evidence—in the context of containment logics. We now
return to examine this relationship more closely. The work of Arnon Avron and Ofer Arieli
has shown a deep relationship between the theory of bilattices and the Belnap-Dunn logic
Efde. This correspondence has been interpreted as evidence that Efde is ‘the’ logic of bilat-
tices, a consideration reinforced by the work of Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing in
which Efde is shown to be similarly entrenched with respect to the theories of trilattices and,
more generally, multilattices. In this chapter, we export Fitting’s ‘cut-downs’ to the case of
multilattices and show that two related first-degree systems—the Deutsch-Oller system Sfde
and Richard Angell’s AC—emerge just as elegantly and are as intimately connected to the
theory of multilattices as the Belnap-Dunn logic.
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6.1 Introduction: Bilattices and Cut-Downs
Recall from Section 4.2.4 Fitting’s epistemic interpretation of the operations of Bochvar’s
‘internal’ logic Σ0 (equivalent to Kleene’s weak three-valued logic). In this section, we will
examine the generalization of cut-down operations and study how such cut-down operations
behave in the context of multilattices. Two types of cut-downs will be considered, and the
logic of such operations will be described.
Bilattices were introduced by Matthew Ginsberg in (96) and (97) as a formal tool in
which to model aspects of reasoning in artificial intelligence. The study of bilattices was
also taken up by Fitting (e.g., (89), (91)), in which a bilattice is treated as a generalized
truth-value space with applications to logic programming and the theory of truth.
Definition 6.1.1. A bilattice B is a structure 〈B,≤t,≤k,¬〉 where:
 B is a nonempty set
 ≤t and ≤k are partial orderings of B such that both 〈B,≤k〉 and 〈B,≤t〉 are complete
lattices
 ¬ : B → B is a inversion such that
– ¬¬a = a
– If a ≤t b then ¬b ≤t ¬a
– If a ≤k b then ¬a ≤k ¬b
N.b. that the original definition of a bilattice does not include the clause stipulating the
existence of an inversion ¬. Following the work of Fitting (e.g., (89), (90), (91)) and Arieli
and Avron (e.g., (12), (13), (14)), the stipulation that such a function exists has become
standard. In current parlance, structures defined like the above definition bilattice without
the stipulation that a negation operation exists are called ‘prebilattices.’
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The orderings ≤t and≤k are often referred to as the ‘truth’ and ‘information’ orderings,
respectively, representing an increase in the degree of truth and the amount of information.
Meet and join with respect to ≤t are denoted by ‘∧’ and ‘∨’ while meet and join with respect
to ≤k are denoted by ‘⊗’ and ‘⊕,’ respectively. Moreover, the definition assumes that for all
bilattices B and a, b ∈ B, meets and joins modulo both ≤k and ≤t exist and that there exist
distinct tops and bottoms modulo each relation.
Definition 6.1.2. With respect to two lattices A, B with orderings ≤A and ≤B, respectively,
the Ginsberg-Fitting product A⊙B is a bilattice 〈A×B,≤t,≤k,¬〉 where for 〈a0, b0〉, 〈a1, b1〉 ∈
A× B:
 〈a0, b0〉 ≤k 〈a1, b1〉 iff a0 ≤A a1 and b0 ≤B b1
 〈a0, b0〉 ≤t 〈a1, b1〉 iff a0 ≤A a1 and b1 ≤B b0
 ¬〈a0, b0〉 = 〈b0, a0〉
Definition 6.1.3. The set [a, b]k = {x ∈ B | a ≤k x ≤k b}.
Definition 6.1.4. A bilattice B is bilinear if B is isomorphic to a bilattice L ⊙ L, where
〈L,≤L〉 is a linear order.
In (90), Fitting studies a logic including a binary ‘guard connective,’ from which the weak
operations of Kleene are definable. However, Fitting’s (91) gives an equivalent formalization
of these weak operations in terms of ‘cut-down’ operations which can be defined in terms of
the standard bilattice operations. First-degree systems in which conjunction and disjunction
are interpreted as cut-down operations on bilattices are the targets of this chapter.
In (91), Fitting offers an epistemically-rich interpretation of the Kleene/Bochvar logic in
which groups of experts opining on propositions serve in place of truth-values. The truth
value assigned to a conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ, e.g., is interpreted as a pair comprising a group of
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experts who assent to both ϕ and ψ and a group of experts opposing either ϕ or ψ. But, as
Fitting notes, it is a truism that not all experts have opinions on all matters; hence, within
this interpretation it may be reasonable that
we want to ‘cut this down’ by only considering people who have actually expressed
an opinion on both propositions [ϕ] and [ψ].
The basic device by which Fitting accomplishes this is a unary cut-down operation:
Definition 6.1.5. For an element a ∈ B, the Fitting cut-down of a—symbolized by JaK—is
defined as a⊕ ¬a.
Definition 6.1.6. For elements a, b ∈ B, the Kleene-Fitting cut-down connectives △ and ▽
are defined so that:
 a △ b =df (a ∧ b)⊗ JaK⊗ JbK, and
 a ▽ b =df (a ∨ b)⊗ JaK⊗ JbK
Observation 6.1.1. For every bilattice B and all a ∈ B, ¬JaK = J¬aK.
Proof. It is easily confirmed that ¬ distributes over both ⊗ and ⊕. Hence, ¬JaK, i.e.,
¬(a⊕ ¬a) is equivalent to ¬a⊕ ¬¬a. But this is just J¬aK.
Observation 6.1.2. De Morgan’s laws hold for △ and ▽, i.e., for all a, b ∈ B, ¬(a △ b) =
¬a ▽ ¬b and ¬(a ▽ b) = ¬a △ ¬b.
Proof. In the first case, employ Observation 6.1.1 and the fact that De Morgan’s Laws hold
with respect to ∧ and ∨ to yield the following equivalences:
¬(a △ b) = ¬((a ∧ b)⊗ JaK⊗ JbK)
= ¬(a ∧ b)⊗ ¬JaK⊗ ¬JbK
= (¬a ∨ ¬b)⊗ J¬aK⊗ J¬bK
= ¬a ▽ ¬b
The second case follows from identical reasoning.
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6.2 Cut-Down Operations on Bilattices
In this section, we will review some of Arieli and Avron’s work on the logic of bilattices. The
techniques and constructions developed by Arieli and Avron are very general and elegant,
and can be readily adapted to account for logics including cut-down operations.
6.2.1 Logical Bilattices
In, e.g., (13) and (14), Arieli and Avron have shown that Efde plays a very robust role with
respect to the general theory of bilattices. The salient analogy is that just as classical, two-
valued logic acts as the logic of all Boolean algebras, Efde serves as the logic of all bilattices.
To review the relevant results, consider a few definitions. First, the notion of a filter on
a partially ordered set is generalized to that of a bifilter.
Definition 6.2.1. A bifilter on a bilattice B is a nonempty and proper subset F ⊂ B such
that for all a, b ∈ B,
 a ∧ b ∈ F iff a ∈ F and b ∈ F , and
 a⊗ b ∈ F iff a ∈ F and b ∈ F .
A bifilter F is prime if for all a, b ∈ B,
 if a ∨ b ∈ F then either a ∈ F or b ∈ F , and
 if a⊕ b ∈ F then either a ∈ F or b ∈ F .
In the sequel, bifilters will act as counterparts to familiar sets of truth values. Bifilters permit
the recasting of many logical notions in terms of bilattices, e.g., the closure of a bifilter under
arbitrary joins can be contrued as analogous to the principle of Addition, i.e., that whenever
ϕ is true, the truth of the disjunction ϕ ∨̇ ψ for an arbitrary ψ follows.
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A non-degenerate bilattice B (i.e., a bilattice extending FOUR2) equipped with a prime
bifilter on B is called by Arieli and Avron a logical bilattice:
Definition 6.2.2. A logical bilattice is a pair 〈B,F〉 where B is a non-degenerate bilattice
and F is a prime bifilter on B.
In order to define a consequence relation for a logical bilattice, maps from L to B must be
defined:
Definition 6.2.3. An Arieli-Avron valuation on a bilattice B is a function v : L → B such
that:
 v(¬̇ϕ) = ¬(v(ϕ))
 v(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) ∧ v(ψ)
 v(ϕ ∨̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) ∨ v(ψ)
Finally, validity for 〈B,F〉 is defined in terms of Arieli-Avron valuations as follows:
Definition 6.2.4. With respect to a logical bilattice 〈B,F〉, an inference from Γ to ϕ is
AA valid—written Γ 
〈B,F〉
AA
ϕ—if for all Arieli-Avron valuations v such that v[Γ] ⊆ F , also
v(ϕ) ∈ F .
In (13), Arieli and Avron prove the remarkable result that for Efde is sufficient for reasoning
about arbitrary bilattices in the following sense:




ϕ iff Γ Efde ϕ.
Arieli and Avron interpret this result as showing that the relationship between Efde and
bilattices is analogous to that between classical logic and Boolean algebras.
A similar correspondence can now be shown to hold between the logic of cut-down oper-
ations on bilattices and the logic Sfde that was described in Definition 2.3.4.
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6.2.2 Sfde on Bilattices
To begin, the notion of an Arieli-Avron valuation can be tailored to the case of cut-down
operations:
Definition 6.2.5. A Kleene-Fitting valuation on a bilattice B is a function v : L → B such
that:
 v(¬̇ϕ) = ¬(v(ϕ))
 v(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) △ v(ψ)
 v(ϕ ∨̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) ▽ v(ψ)
Validity modulo Kleene-Fitting valuations is identical to validity with respect to Arieli-Avron
valuations:




ϕ—if for all Kleene-Fitting valuations v such that v[Γ] ⊆ F , also
v(ϕ) ∈ F .
One of the most fundamental bilattices is FOUR2, pictured in Figure 6.1. The corre-
spondence between the logic of cut-down operations on FOUR2 and Sfde can be established
by the following observation.




ϕ iff Γ Sfde ϕ
Proof. Let h⋆ : FOUR2 → VSfde be a bijection defined so that:
h⋆(t) = t, h⋆(⊤) = b, h⋆(⊥) = u, and h⋆(f) = f






Figure 6.1: The Bilattice FOUR2
Then by examining the operations on FOUR2, one can make their behavior explicit in the
form of ‘truth tables’ for the elements of FOUR2:
¬ △ t ⊤ ⊥ f ▽ t ⊤ ⊥ f
t f t t ⊤ ⊥ f t t t ⊥ t
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊥ f ⊤ t ⊤ ⊥ ⊤
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
f t f f f ⊥ f f t ⊤ ⊥ f
By identifying the ‘truth tables’ for FOUR2 with those for Sfde, it is simple to confirm that:
 h⋆(¬a) = f ¬̇
Sfde
(h⋆(a))
 h⋆(a △ b) = f ∧̇
Sfde
(h⋆(a), h⋆(b))
 h⋆(a ▽ b) = f ∨̇
Sfde
(h⋆(a), h⋆(b))
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Hence, a simple induction on complexity of formulae entails that for every Kleene-Fitting
valuation v, there exists an Sfde valuation v
⋆ such that for all ϕ ∈ L, v⋆(ϕ) = h⋆(v(ϕ)).
It follows that whenever Γ 2〈FOUR2,{t,⊤}〉
KF
ϕ, one can take any Kleene-Fitting valuation v
witnessing the failure of the inference to yield an Sfde valuation v
⋆ witnessing that Γ 2Sfde ϕ.
As h⋆ is a bijection, one can employ the function (h⋆)−1 to construct a Kleene-Fitting
valuation witnessing the failure of Γ 
〈FOUR2,{t,⊤}〉
KF
ϕ whenever Γ 2Sfde ϕ.
Because Sfde is a fragment of some of the Kleene logics with guard connectives considered
by Fitting in (90), an implicit corollary of Fitting’s (90) is that Sfde is the logic of cut-down
operations on all bilinear bilattices as defined in Definition 6.1.4.









This result can be substantially improved, however, to hold not merely for bilinear bilattices
but for all non-degenerate logical bilattices. Thus, Sfde emerges as naturally and elegantly
from the theory of bilattices as Efde.
In order to show that Γ 
〈B,F〉
KF
ϕ holds iff Γ Sfde ϕ for any non-trivial logical bilattice
〈B,F〉 the steps followed by Arieli and Avron in (14) may be adapted without much difficulty.
Following this work, recall the below definition:
Definition 6.2.7. For a logical bilattice 〈B,F〉, define a partition of B by the following:
 T 〈B,F〉⊤ = {a ∈ B | a ∈ F and ¬a ∈ F}
 T 〈B,F〉
t
= {a ∈ B | a ∈ F and ¬a /∈ F}
 T 〈B,F〉
f
= {a ∈ B | a /∈ F and ¬a ∈ F}
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 T 〈B,F〉⊥ = {a ∈ B | a /∈ F and ¬a /∈ F}
Now, consider some observations concerning cut-down operations on logical bilattices. Let
〈B,F〉 be a logical bilattice where a, b ∈ B.
Observation 6.2.4. JaK ∈ F iff either a ∈ F or ¬a ∈ F .
Proof. As JaK is defined as a ⊕ ¬a, the primeness of F ensures that JaK ∈ F if and only if
either a ∈ F or ¬a ∈ F .
Observation 6.2.5. JaK ∈ T 〈B,F〉⊤ iff a /∈ T
〈B,F〉
⊥
Observation 6.2.6. a △ b ∈ F iff a ∈ F and b ∈ F
Proof. For left-to-right, suppose that a △ b ∈ F . Then, as F is closed upwards under ≤k
and a △ b = (a ∧ b) ⊗ JaK ⊗ JbK, also a ∧ b ∈ F . But as F is closed upwards under ≤t and
both a ∧ b ≤t a and a ∧ b ≤t b, it follows that a ∈ F and b ∈ F .
For right-to-left, suppose that a ∈ F and b ∈ F . This entails that a ∧ b ∈ F and that
both a, b /∈ T 〈B,F〉⊥ . By Observation 6.2.5, it follows that JaK ∈ F and JbK ∈ F . As F is
closed upwards under finite meets, these observations entail that (a∧ b)⊗ JaK⊗ JbK ∈ F , i.e.,
a △ b ∈ F .
Observation 6.2.7. a ▽ b ∈ F iff either a ∈ F or b ∈ F , and both JaK ∈ F and JbK ∈ F .
Proof. For left-to-right, if a ▽ b ∈ F , then (a ∨ b)⊗ JaK⊗ JbK ∈ F . By closure under ≤k, it
follows that a ∨ b ∈ F and that both JaK ∈ F and JbK ∈ F . By primeness of F , a ∨ b ∈ F
entails that either a ∈ F or b ∈ F . Hence, either a ∈ F or b ∈ F and both JaK ∈ F and
JbK ∈ F .
For right-to-left, if a ∈ F or b ∈ F and both JaK ∈ F and JbK ∈ F , then by closure under
finite applications of ⊗, (a ∨ b)⊗ JaK⊗ JbK ∈ F . But this is just to say that a ▽ b ∈ F .
Arieli and Avron’s definitions can be further exploited:
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Definition 6.2.8. Let 〈B0,F0〉 and 〈B1,F1〉 be logical bilattices and let a0 ∈ B0 and a1 ∈ B1
be elements of each. Then a0 and a1 are similar—written a0 ≃ a1—if
 a0 ∈ F0 iff a1 ∈ F1, and
 ¬a0 ∈ F0 iff ¬a1 ∈ F1
Definition 6.2.9. Two Kleene-Fitting valuations v0 and v1 for logical bilattices 〈B0,F0〉 and
〈B1,F1〉, respectively, are similar—written v0 ≃ v1—if for all atomic p ∈ L,
v0(p) ≃ v1(p)
Observation 6.2.8. Let v0 and v1 be Kleene-Fitting valuations for logical bilattices 〈B0,F0〉
and 〈B1,F1〉, respectively. If v0 ≃ v1, then for all formulae ϕ ∈ L,
v0(ϕ) ≃ v1(ϕ)
Proof. By induction on complexity of formulae. For atomic formulae p, this is secured by the
assumption that v0 ≃ v1. For induction hypothesis, assume that whenever ψ is a subformula
of ϕ, v0(ψ) ≃ v1(ψ).
Now, in the case of negation, this follows immediately from the involutivity of ¬. If
v0(ψ) ≃ v1(ψ), then
 v0(¬̇ψ) ∈ F0 iff ¬v0(ψ) ∈ F0 iff ¬v1(ψ) ∈ F1 iff v1(¬̇ψ) ∈ F1.
 v0(¬̇ ¬̇ψ) ∈ F0 iff v0(ψ) ∈ F0 iff v1(ψ) ∈ F1 iff v1(¬̇ ¬̇ψ) ∈ F1
But this is just to say that v0(¬̇ψ) ≃ v1(¬̇ψ).
In the case of a formula ψ ∧̇ ξ, by appeal to Observation 6.2.6, infer that v0(ψ ∧̇ ξ) ∈ F0
holds iff both v0(ψ) ∈ F0 and v0(ξ) ∈ F0. By induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to
suggesting that both v1(ψ) ∈ F1 and v1(ξ) ∈ F1, which by Observation 6.2.6, is equivalent
to v1(ψ ∧̇ ξ) ∈ F1.
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In the case of a negated conjunction, by appeal to Observation 6.1.2, v0(¬̇(ψ ∧̇ ξ)) =
v0(¬̇ψ ∨̇ ¬̇ ξ)—and mutatis mutandis for v1. Hence, v0(¬̇(ψ ∧̇ ξ)) ∈ F0 iff v0(¬̇ψ ∨̇ ¬̇ ξ) ∈ F0
iff ¬(v0(ψ)) ▽ ¬(v0(ξ)) ∈ F0. By Observations 6.2.4 and 6.2.7, this is equivalent to the
tripartite claim that:
 ¬(v0(ψ)) ∈ F0 or ¬(v0(ξ)) ∈ F0, and
 ¬(v0(ψ)) ∈ F0 or ¬¬(v0(ψ)) ∈ F0 (i.e., v0(ψ) ∈ F0), and
 ¬(v0(ξ)) ∈ F0 or ¬¬(v0(ξ)) ∈ F0 (i.e., v0(ξ) ∈ F0)
But by induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to:
 ¬(v1(ψ)) ∈ F1 or ¬(v1(ξ)) ∈ F1, and
 ¬(v1(ψ)) ∈ F1 or ¬¬(v1(ψ)) ∈ F1, and
 ¬(v1(ξ)) ∈ F1 or ¬¬(v1(ξ)) ∈ F1.
By further appeal to Observations 6.1.2 and 6.2.7, this is equivalent to suggesting that
v1(¬̇(ψ ∧̇ ξ)) ∈ F1. Hence, both v0(ψ ∧̇ ξ) ∈ F0 iff v1(ψ ∧̇ ξ) ∈ F1 and ¬v0(ψ ∧̇ ξ) ∈ F0 iff
¬v1(ψ ∧̇ ξ) ∈ F1. But this is just to say that v0(ψ ∧̇ ξ) ≃ v1(ψ ∧̇ ξ).
The case of disjunction follows analogously.
Let ιdenote the Russellian definite description operator. Then Arieli and Avron’s defi-
nitions can be further altered to yield the following:
Definition 6.2.10. Let g〈B,F〉 : B → FOUR2 be a function such that
g〈B,F〉(x) =
ιy.x ∈ T 〈B,F〉y
This immediately yields the principal lemma:
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Lemma 6.2.1. If v is a Kleene-Fitting valuation on 〈B,F〉, then g〈B,F〉 ◦ v is a valuation on
〈FOUR2, {⊤, t}〉 such that v ≃ g〈B,F〉 ◦ v.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of g〈B,F〉.
From Lemma 6.2.1, a further observation follows:








Proof. For right-to-left, suppose that Γ 
〈B,F〉
KF
ϕ. Then there exists a Kleene-Fitting val-
uation v on 〈B,F〉 such that v[Γ] ⊆ F and v(ϕ) /∈ F . Then by Lemma 6.2.1, g〈B,F〉 ◦ v
is a Kleene-Fitting valuation on 〈FOUR2, {⊤, t}〉 such that (g〈B,F〉 ◦ v)[Γ] ⊆ {⊤, t} and




For left-to-right, let v be a function witnessing that Γ 2〈FOUR2,{⊤,t}〉
KF
ϕ. As FOUR2 ⊆ B,
v is also a Kleene-Fitting valuation on 〈B,F〉. As ⊤, t ∈ F and ⊥, f /∈ F , it follows that v




From these observations, one can prove the correspondence of cut-down operations on all
bilattices and the logic Sfde.




ϕ iff Γ Sfde ϕ.
Proof. From Observations 6.2.2 and 6.2.9.
6.3 NINE2 and AC
Now, other unary operations on bilattices appear in the literature that a priori conform to
Fitting’s epistemic understanding of a cut-down. On the bilattice NINE2, shown in Figure












Figure 6.2: The Bilattice NINE2
6.2, a further reasonable cut-down corresponds to AC. In (53), Carlos Damásio and Lúıs
Pereira provided a deep study of the bilattice NINE2 in the context of logic programming.
Damásio and Pereira equip NINE2 with a ‘weak negation’ not—a unary negation-like
operation lacking involutivity—defined on NINE2 by the table:
x ⊥ df dt f t ⊤ of ot d⊥
¬x ⊥ dt df t f ⊤ ot of d⊥
not x ⊥ t f t f ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
not ¬x ⊥ f t f t ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
Now, the unary not operation defined by Damásio and Pereira provides the needed tool
to define a cut-down similar to the Fitting definition. In (53), the operation λx.not ¬x is
described with a similar epistemic character, as a function that ‘determines if... a proposition
is at least believed.’ We will interpret this function as a cut-down.
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Definition 6.3.1. For any a ∈ B, JaK—the Damásio-Pereira cut-down of a—is defined as
not ¬a.
Definition 6.3.2. The Damásio-Pereira weak operations N and H are defined so that:
 a N b =df (a ∧ b)⊗ JaK ⊗ JbK , and
 a H b =df (a ∨ b)⊗ JaK ⊗ JbK .
Clearly, interpreting disjunction and conjunction modulo the Damásio-Pereira cut-down is
similar in spirit to Fitting’s interpretation of a cut-down. For example, if one evaluates a H b
as true (or a member of F) only when both JaK and JbK are also members of F , one is cutting
down the body of evidence to only those propositions which one at least believes.
Definition 6.3.3. A Damásio-Pereira valuation of the language L on a bilattice B is a
function v : L → B such that:
 v(¬̇ϕ) = ¬(v(ϕ))
 v(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) N v(ψ)
 v(ϕ ∨̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) H v(ψ)
Definition 6.3.4. Γ 〈B,F〉
DP
ϕ if for every Damásio-Pereira valuation v such that v(ψ) ∈ F
for each ψ ∈ Γ, also v(ϕ) ∈ F .
Now it may be shown that AC captures the behavior of Damásio-Pereira cut-downs on
NINE2.
Observation 6.3.1. Γ 
〈NINE2,[t,⊤]k〉
DP
ϕ iff Γ AC ϕ.
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 π0t = {⊤, ot, t}
 π0f = {of ,d⊥,dt}
 π0u = {f ,df ,⊥}
 π1t = {⊤, of , f}
 π1f = {ot,d⊥,df}
 π1u = {t,dt,⊥}
Let v, v′, ... be arbitrary elements of VΣ0; one can employ a map h such that with respect to
each a ∈ NINE2,
h(a) = 〈 ιv.a ∈ π0v ,
ιv′.a ∈ π1v′〉
h is clearly a bijection between NINE2 and VAC. Moreover, it is also clear that h[π0t ] =
h[[t,⊤]k] = DAC.
What must then be shown is that:
 h(¬a) = f ¬̇
AC
(h(a))
 h(a N b) = f ∧̇
AC
(h(a), h(b))
 h(a H b) = f ∨̇
AC
(h(a), h(b))
To begin, note that negation behaves appropriately, that is, if h(a) = 〈v, v′〉 then h(¬a) =
〈v′, v〉, which immediately entails that for all a ∈ NINE2, h(¬a) = f ¬̇AC(h(a)).
In the case of conjunction, let a, b ∈ NINE2. One can mimic the behavior of Σ0. First
consider the element of Π0 within which a N b lies:
















t if a ∈ π0t and b ∈ π
0
t




And compare this to the truth function associated with conjunction in Σ0:


















t if v = t and v′ = t
u if v = u or v′ = u
f otherwise
It immediately follows that
ιv.a N b ∈ π0v = f
∧̇
Σ0
( ιv′.a ∈ π0v′ ,
ιv′′.b ∈ π0v′′)
Let pr0 and pr1 be the projection operators onto the first and second coordinates. From the
above reasoning conjoined with the relationship between Σ0 and AC, one can infer that:
ιv.a N b ∈ π0v = pr0(f
∧̇
AC
(〈 ιv′.a ∈ π0v′ ,w〉, 〈
ιv′′.b ∈ π0v′′ ,w
′〉))
where w and w′ are arbitrary elements of VΣ0 . A similar correspondence for the second
coordinate entails that
ιv.a N b ∈ π1v = pr1(f
∨̇
AC
(〈w, ιv′.a ∈ π1v′〉, 〈w
′, ιv′′.b ∈ π1v′′〉))
for arbitrary w,w′ ∈ VΣ0. Putting these observations together, one can infer that:
h(a N b) = f ∧̇
AC
(h(a), h(b))
That the analogous equivalence holds for disjunction follows from the duality of conjunction
and disjunction.
Hence, an induction on complexity of formulae entails that for any Damásio-Pereira
valuation v witnessing that Γ 2〈NINE2,[t,⊤]k〉
DP
ϕ, one can find a corresponding AC valuation
h ◦ v witnessing the failure of Γ AC ϕ. That h is a bijection entails that this holds from
right-to-left as well. Hence, Γ 
〈NINE2,[t,⊤]k〉
DP
ϕ holds iff Γ AC ϕ.
Now, recent work on related structures—trilattices—have suggested that the Belnap-
Dunn logic Efde is as firmly entrenched in the theory of multilattices in general. For example,
the logic induced many of the interpretations of connectives on the trilattice described in
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(174) ends up equivalent for all intents and purposes with Efde. Given the foregoing, it is
natural to ask whether Sfde and related systems emerge in the theory of multilattices as well.
We will proceed to show that the logic of cut-downs on trilattices is sensitive to how one
interprets logical negation and that the two most natural interpretations of negation lead to
Sfde and AC.
6.4 Cut-Down Operations on Trilattices
Trilattices are a natural generalization of bilattices introduced in (174), in which they were
offered as a generalization of bilattices in which orderings ≤t and ≤k were joined by an
ordering ≤c measuring the constructivity of a degree of truth. More recent discussions of
trilattices (e.g., (163), (174), (175)) forgo the use of a constructivity ordering in favor of a
falsity ordering ≤f distinct from ≤t. We will follow this convention, although it is important
to note that nothing essentially hinges on the interpretation of the ordering ≤f .
Definition 6.4.1. A trilattice T is a structure 〈T,≤t,≤f ,≤k〉 where:
 T is a nonempty set
 ≤t, ≤f , and ≤k are partial orderings of T such that 〈T,≤t,≤k〉, 〈T,≤t,≤f 〉, and 〈T,≤f
,≤k〉 are complete prebilattices
Each partial ordering induces binary meet and join operators. We will employ the convention
of treating ≤t and ≤f as alethic, and thus describe the corresponding meets and joins as ∧t,
∨t, ∧f , and ∨f . We treat ≤k as an information ordering and carry over the notation of ⊗k
and ⊕k to reinforce this interpretation.
In (174), Shramko, Dunn, and Takenaka explicitly part ways with the convention of
including a negation-like operation in the definition of a bilattice, and omit the requirement
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that such an inversion exists from the definition of a trilattice. However, we are interested
in such negation-like operators and we may define inversions as follows:
Definition 6.4.2. A t-inversion on a trilattice T is an involutive function ¬t : T → T such
that for all a, b ∈ T :
 If a ≤t b then ¬tb ≤t ¬ta
 If a ≤f b then ¬ta ≤f ¬tb
 If a ≤k b then ¬ta ≤k ¬tb
f -inversions ¬f and tf -inversions ¬tf are defined analogously, i.e., ¬f reverses the ordering
≤f but respects ≤t and ≤k, while ¬tf reverses both ≤t and ≤f but respects ≤k.
Much of the formal work in the sequel will appeal to Umberto Rivieccio’s representation
theorems found in (163) that show that many classes of trilattices are isomorphic to certain
products of bilattices. By appealing to these representation theorems, we will be able to
export some of the properties of cut-down operations on bilattices to the case of trilattices
without difficulty.
A product trilattice of two bilattices—the generalization of the Ginsberg-Fitting product
of two lattices—is defined as follows:
Definition 6.4.3. For bilattices A = 〈A,≤At ,≤
A
k ,¬




trilattice A⊙ B is the trilattice 〈A×B,≤t,≤f ,≤i〉 where for all 〈a, b〉, 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ A× B:
 〈a, b〉 ≤t 〈a′, b′〉 if a ≤At a
′ and b ≤Bt b
′
 〈a, b〉 ≤f 〈a




 〈a, b〉 ≤k 〈a′, b′〉 if a ≤Ak a
′ and b ≤Bk b
′
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From this definition, we can explicitly represent the meets and joins onA⊙B by the following:
〈a, b〉 ∧t 〈a
′, b′〉 = 〈a ∧A a′, b ∧B b′〉 〈a, b〉 ∨t 〈a
′, b′〉 = 〈a ∨A a′, b ∨B b′〉
〈a, b〉 ∧f 〈a′, b′〉 = 〈a⊕A a′, b⊗B b′〉 〈a, b〉 ∨f 〈a′, b′〉 = 〈a⊗A a′, b⊕B b′〉
〈a, b〉 ⊗k 〈a′, b′〉 = 〈a⊗A a′, b⊗B b′〉 〈a, b〉 ⊕k 〈a′, b′〉 = 〈a⊕A a′, b⊕B b′〉
Inversions behave nicely on product trilattices, so that ¬t and ¬f are unique:
Definition 6.4.4. On a product trilattice A ⊙ B, if A and B have negations ¬A and ¬B,
respectively, then the t-inversion ¬t is defined so that for all 〈a, b〉 ∈ A×B:
 ¬t〈a, b〉 =df 〈¬
Aa,¬Bb〉
If, moreover there is an isomorphism h : A ∼= B, then the f -inversion ¬f is defined so that:
 ¬f 〈a, b〉 = 〈h−1(b), h(a)〉
Product trilattices will be useful due to Umberto Rivieccio’s representation theorems for a
large class of trilattices presented in (163). Rivieccio shows that every interlaced trilattice
T is isomorphic to a product trilattice. The property of interlacing—which appears in many
contexts in the theory of bilattices as well—is a very natural property, being exhibited by
the most common bilattices and trilattices (e.g., FOUR2, NINE2, SIXT EEN 3 are all
interlaced).
Definition 6.4.5. A trilattice T is interlaced if the binary operations ∧t, ∨t, ∧f , ∨f , ⊗k,
and ⊕k are each monotone with respect to all three orderings.
For our purposes, the most important representation theorems of (163) are those involving
interlaced trilattices with inversions that naturally correspond to negation:
Theorem 6.4.1 (Rivieccio). T is an interlaced trilattice if and only if T is isomorphic to
a product trilattice A⊙ B where A and B are prebilattices.
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Theorem 6.4.2 (Rivieccio). T is an interlaced trilattice with t- and f -inversions if and
only if T is isomorphic to a product trilattice A⊙A where A is a prebilattice.
It follows from the observations of (163) that on an interlaced trilattice with inversions ¬t
and ¬f , ¬t and ¬f always commute.
By Theorem 6.4.2, there is essentially a single t-inversion on an interlaced trilattice, which
permits us to state the following corollary concerning tf -inversions:
Corollary 6.4.1. For an interlaced trilattice T with t- and f -inversions, there exists pre-
cisely one tf -inversion ¬tf , equivalent to the operation ¬t¬f .
Proof. A tf -inversion ¬tf is identical to the operation ¬tf¬f¬f and Definition 6.4.4 entails
that ¬tf¬f is just the unique t-inversion. Hence, for any a ∈ T , ¬tfa = ¬tf¬f¬fa =
¬t¬fa.
In the sequel, this entitles us to treat an inversion ¬tf as interchangable with the decomposed
¬t¬f (or, equivalently, ¬f¬t).
6.4.1 Generalizations of Cut-Down Operations
In the case of trilattices, the plenitude of distinct ways to define negation-like inversions
and conjunction and disjunction-like meets and joins entails that the Kleene-Fitting cut-
down does not pick out a unique generalization. For example, if a cut-down is defined as
the information join of an element and its negation, the natural question arises: By which
inversion should we interpret negation? If there are meets and joins modulo both the truth
and falsity orderings, in terms of which ordering should we define, say, weak conjunction?
When a trilattice has a k-inversion ¬k, the value x⊕ ¬kx will map all elements x to the
information-top, so defining a cut-down JxKk by the scheme JxKk = (x⊕¬kx) will be fruitless.
In the sequel, we will consider cut-down conjunctions and disjunctions to be interpreted
in virtue of the ordering ≤t. Generally speaking, inference as truth-preservation is a more
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familiar concept than other candidates, and on this interpretation, ∧t and ∨t are most
noticably recognizable as the standard conjunction and disjunction connectives. We’ll first
define our cut-down operations:
Definition 6.4.6. For an element a of a trilattice T with a t-inversion, the t-cut-down of
a—JaKt—is defined so that:
 JaKt =df a⊕k ¬ta
Definition 6.4.7. For a trilattice with a t-inversion, the t-weak conjunction △t and the
t-weak disjunction ▽t are defined:
 x △t y =df (x ∧t y)⊗k JxKt ⊗k JyKt
 x ▽t y =df (x ∨t y)⊗k JxKt ⊗k JyKt
For the interpretation of negation, we will consider the options of interpreting the t-inversion
¬t and the tf -inversion ¬tf (i.e., ¬t¬f). These—along with ¬f—are cited by Shramko and
Wansing as ‘the most obvious candidates for representing an object-language negation.’ (175,
p. 133) Both appear to be equally natural in this context; e.g., both inversions ¬t and ¬tf
interact with the cut-down JaKt in a similar fashion to what was observed in the case of
bilattices:
Observation 6.4.1. For a trilattice T with a inversion ¬t, for all a ∈ T ,
¬tJaKt = J¬taKt
Proof. ¬tJaKt = ¬t(a ⊕k ¬ta). Because ¬t distributes over the information join ⊕k, this is
equivalent to ¬ta⊕k ¬t¬ta, i.e., J¬taKt.
Observation 6.4.2. For a trilattice T with commuting inversions ¬t and ¬f , for all a ∈ T ,
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¬tf JaKt = J¬tfaKt
Proof. We appeal to the following equivalences: ¬tf JaKt is equivalent by definition to ¬tf (a⊕
¬ta) and hence, to ¬tfa⊕ ¬tf¬ta. Because ¬tf¬ta = ¬t¬f¬ta, by commutativity of ¬t and
¬f , we infer that this is equivalent to ¬tfa⊕ ¬t¬tfa, which is just J¬tfaKt.
Moreover, De Morgan’s laws can be seen to hold for both species of inversion.
Observation 6.4.3. For all elements a and b in a trilattice T with an inversion ¬t, ¬t(a △t
b) = ¬ta ▽t ¬tb and ¬t(a ▽t b) = ¬ta △t ¬tb
Proof. ¬t(a △t b) is just ¬t((a ∧t b)⊗k JaKt ⊗k JbK). ¬t distributes over ⊗k, whence we infer
equivalence with ¬t(a ∧t b)⊗k ¬tJaKt ⊗k ¬tJbK. By Observation 6.4.1 and De Morgan’s laws
for ∧t, we infer equivalence with (¬ta ∨t ¬tb)⊗k J¬taKt ⊗k J¬tbK, i.e., ¬ta ▽t ¬tb.
The second case follows from analogous reasoning.
Observation 6.4.4. For all elements a and b in a trilattice, ¬tf (a △t b) = ¬tfa ▽t ¬tfb and
¬tf (a ▽t b) = ¬tfa △t ¬tf b
Proof. ¬tf (a △t b) = ¬tf ((a∧t b)⊗k JaKt⊗k JbKt). Because both ¬t and ¬f distribute over ⊗k,
this is equal to ¬tf (a∧t b)⊗k ¬tf JaKt⊗k ¬tf JbKt. We can note that ¬tf (a∧t b) = ¬tfa∨t ¬tfb.
¬tf (a∧t b) is defined as ¬t¬f (a∧t b). The f -inversion distributes over the t-operations, so this
is equal to ¬t(¬fa∧t¬fb), which—by De Morgan’s laws—is equivalent to ¬t¬fa∨t¬t¬fb, i.e.,
¬tfa∨t ¬tf b. Furthermore, by Lemma 6.4.2, ¬tf JaKt⊗k ¬tf JbKt is equal to J¬tfaKt⊗k J¬tf bKt.
Putting these observations together, we infer that ¬tf (a ∧t b) ⊗k ¬tf JaKt ⊗k ¬tf JbKt is
equivalent to (¬tfa∨t ¬tfb)⊗k J¬tfaKt⊗k J¬tfbKt, i.e., ¬tfa ▽t ¬tfb. The second case follows
by dualizing the foregoing argument.
With natural generalizations of cut-down operations in hand, we now proceed to consider
how to consider logical consequence in this setting, again by generalization Arieli and Avron’s
approach.
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6.4.2 Some Properties of Trifilters
Now, because we wish to talk about validity with respect to certain operations on trilattices,
we proceed generalize Arieli and Avron’s notion of a bifilter to the case of a trilattice. We
will call the following natural generalization a trifilter, that is, a set of the elements of a
trilattice that is closed upwards under each of the three orderings.
Definition 6.4.8. A trifilter on a trilattice T is a nonempty and proper subset F ⊂ T closed
upwards under each ordering and closed under finite meets:
a ∧t b ∈ F iff a ∧f b ∈ F iff a⊗k b ∈ F iff a ∈ F and b ∈ F .
F is prime if for all a, b ∈ B,
a ∨t b ∈ F iff a ∨f b ∈ F iff a⊕k b ∈ F iff either a ∈ F or b ∈ F .
By this definition, a trifilter is a special case of the notion of a multifilter independently
defined by Yaroslav Shramko in (173).
It will behoove us to establish a few connections between trifilters on product trilattices
and bifilters on the bilattices from which they are constructed. Given the representation
theorems for interlaced trilattices, these results will enable us to apply many observations
about bifilters to the case of trifilters.
In the first case, we can show that given a product trilattice A⊙B, the product of A (i.e.,
the elements of bilattice A) and any prime filter on B will yield a trifilter on the product
trilattice.
Lemma 6.4.1. For a product trilattice A⊙B and a prime bifilter FB on B, the set F = A×FB
is a prime trifilter on A⊙ B.
Proof. Let A = 〈A,≤At ,≤
A




k 〉 be the prebilattices that yield A⊙B and
fix an element 〈a, b〉 ∈ F .
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Then if 〈a, b〉 ≤t 〈a′, b′〉, that a′ ∈ A follows by definition. By the primeness of FB, we
also know that b ≤Bt b
′ entails that b′ ∈ FB. If 〈a, b〉 ≤f 〈a′, b′〉 or 〈a, b〉 ≤k 〈a′, b′〉, then
a′ ∈ A by construction and because b ≤Bk b
′, also b′ ∈ FB. In all three cases, 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ F .
For primeness, suppose 〈a, b〉 ∨t 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ F . This element is 〈a ∨A a′, b ∨B b′〉, whence
b ∨B b′ ∈ FB. By primeness of FB, either b ∈ FB or b′ ∈ FB. Because both a and a′ are
elements of A, the first case entails that 〈a, b〉 ∈ F and the second entails that 〈a′, b′〉 ∈
F . The cases of primeness for the falsity and information orderings follow from a similar
argument.
Conversely, we can show that every trifilter on a product trilattice can be represented as
such a product.
Lemma 6.4.2. Every prime trifilter on a product trilattice A⊙ B is identical to a product
A× FB where FB is a prime bifilter on B.
Proof. Let F be a prime trifilter on A⊙ B.
We consider the first coordinate. Consider an arbitrary element a ∈ A and pick an
arbitrary 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ F . Then a′ ≤Ak (a⊕
A a′) and b′ ≤Bt b
′, so 〈a′, b′〉 ≤k 〈a⊕A a′, b′〉, whence
by closure under ≤k, 〈(a⊕A a′), b′〉 ∈ F . However, because a ≤A (a⊕A a′) and b′ ≤Ak b
′, also
〈(a ⊕A a′), b′〉 ≤f 〈a, b′〉. By closure under ≤f , this entails that 〈a, b′〉 ∈ F . It follows that
whenever 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ F , for all a ∈ A, also 〈a, b′〉 ∈ F . Hence, F is the product of A and the
set
FB = {b ∈ B | ∃a ∈ A such that 〈a, b〉 ∈ F}
We now must show that FB is a prime bifilter on B. For any b ∈ FB, there is an a ∈ A such
that 〈a, b〉 ∈ F . Hence, whenever b ≤Bt b
′ or b ≤Bk b
′′, 〈a, b〉 ≤t 〈a, b
′〉 and 〈a, b〉 ≤k 〈a, b
′〉,
respectively. In the first case, closure of the trifilter F entails that 〈a, b′〉 ∈ F , whence
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b′ ∈ FB; in the second case, closure entails that 〈a, b′′〉 ∈ F , ensuring that b′′ ∈ FR. Thus,
FR is a bifilter on B.
For primeness of FB, if b ∨B b′ ∈ FR, then for some a ∈ A, 〈a, b ∨B b′〉 ∈ F . But this
element is 〈(a ∨A a), (b ∨B b′)〉, i.e., 〈a, b〉 ∨t 〈a, b′〉, and by primeness of F , either 〈a, b〉 ∈ F
(entailing that b ∈ FB) or 〈a, b′〉 ∈ F (entailing that b′ ∈ FB). An identical argument yields
primeness of FB with respect to ⊕B as well.
6.5 Analytic Logic on Trilattices
With the foregoing definitions, the approach to bilattice logic championed by Arieli and
Avron—and the variations upon this approach described in Section 6.2.2—are readily adapted
to the case of interlaced trilattices.
Definition 6.5.1. A logical trilattice is a pair 〈T ,F〉 where T is a non-degenerate trilattice
and F is a prime trifilter on T .
Note the reappearance of the condition that T must be non-degenerate. This is essentially
the condition that the theory of the trilattice is sufficiently rich. The smallest non-degenerate
trilattice is SIXT EEN 3. This is a very reasonable constraint, e.g., it is required in the case
of logical bilattices described in Definition 6.2.2.
As stated before, we have two inversions that equally resemble negation. We will thus
define two types of valuations: one in which negation ¬̇ is interpreted as ¬t and another in
which negation is considered to be ¬tf . The upshot will be that the former logic of cut-downs
on trilattices is Sfde while the latter logic is equivalent to AC. The general structure of the
two arguments will be to first show a correspondence between any logical trilattice in which
the trilattice is a product and the logical trilattice 〈FOUR2 ⊙ FOUR2, FOUR2 × {⊤, t}〉,
then to show a correspondence between valuations of an appropriate type on 〈FOUR2 ⊙
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FOUR2, FOUR2×{⊤, t}〉 and consequence in Sfde or AC. Finally, we will appeal to Riviec-
cio’s representation theorems to prove that the correspondence extends to all logical bilattices
〈T ,F〉 such that T is interlaced.
6.5.1 Sfde on Trilattices
First, we will examine the logic of cut-down operations on trilattices in which negation is
interpreted as a t-inversion. The most natural generalization of Kleene-Fitting valuations
may be defined as follows:
Definition 6.5.2. A ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuation on a trilattice T is a function v : L → T
such that:
 v(¬̇ϕ) = ¬t(v(ϕ))
 v(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) △t v(ψ)
 v(ϕ ∨̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) ▽t v(ψ)




ϕ—if for all ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuations v, if v[Γ] ⊆ F then v(ϕ) ∈ F .
Given the representation theorems for interlaced trilattices, we will consider only product
trilattices for the moment.
Let us define a second notion of similarity, tailored to the case in which negation is
identified with the operation of t-inversion.
Definition 6.5.4. Consider two logical product trilattices 〈A0 ⊙ B0, A0 × F0〉 and 〈A1 ⊙
B1, A1×F1〉 where F0 and F1 are prime bifilters on B0 and B1, respectively.Then two elements
〈a, b〉 ∈ A0 × B0 and 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ A1 ×B1 are ¬t-similar—written 〈a, b〉 ≃t 〈a′, b′〉—if:
 〈a, b〉 ∈ A0 × F0 if and only if 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ A1 × F1, and
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 ¬t(〈a, b〉) ∈ A0 × F0 if and only if ¬t(〈a′, b′〉) ∈ A1 ×F1
As in the case of Section 6.2.2, the notion of ¬t-similarity between two points extends to
¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuations as well.
Definition 6.5.5. Two ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuations v0 and v1 on logical trilattices 〈A0 ⊙
B0, A0 × F0〉 and 〈A1 ⊙ B1, A1 ×F1〉 are ¬t-similar if for all atomic p ∈ L , v0(p) ≃t v1(p).
This definition allows us to prove two intermediate lemmas suggesting that many properties
of a logical trilattice 〈A ⊙ B, A× FB〉 can be recovered from the logical bilattice 〈B,FB〉.
Lemma 6.5.1. Consider a logical trilattice 〈A⊙B, A×FB〉, with FB a prime bifilter on B.
Then for every ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuation v:
v(ϕ) ∈ F if and only if pr1(v(ϕ)) ∈ FB
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 6.4.2.
Lemma 6.5.2. Let v be a ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuation on a logical trilattice 〈A⊙B, A×FB〉
with FB a prime bifilter on B. Then pr1 ◦ v is a Kleene-Fitting valuation on the logical
bilattice 〈B,FB〉.
Proof. We prove that pr0 ◦ v is in fact a Kleene-Fitting valuation on 〈B,FB〉 by induction
on complexity of formulae. As a basis step, we note that pr1 ◦ v maps atoms to elements of
B, as required.
In the case of a formula ¬̇ψ, let v(ψ) = 〈a, b〉. Then:
pr1(¬t〈a, b〉) = pr1(〈¬Aa,¬Bb〉) = ¬B(pr1(〈a, b〉))
In other words, (pr1 ◦ v)(¬̇ψ) = ¬B((pr1 ◦ v)(ψ)).
In the case of conjunction, let 〈a, b〉 and 〈a′, b′〉 be the values of v(ψ) and v(ξ), respectively.
Then v(ψ ∧̇ ξ) = 〈a, b〉 △t 〈a′, b′〉, whence:
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pr1(〈a, b〉 △t 〈a
′, b′〉) = pr1(〈a △
A a′, b △B b′〉) = pr1(〈a, b〉) △
B pr1(〈a
′, b′〉)
This entails that (pr1 ◦ v)(ψ ∧̇ ξ) = ((pr1 ◦ v)(ψ)) △
B ((pr1 ◦ v)(ξ)).
The case of disjunction can be inferred from the cases of negation and conjunction. Hence,
the valuation pr1 ◦ v maps formulae ϕ to appropriate values, i.e., pr1 ◦ v is a Kleene-Fitting
valuation.
These lemmas entail a fundamental property of ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuations.
Observation 6.5.1. If v0 and v1 are ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuations on logical trilattices 〈A0⊙
B0, A0×F0〉 and 〈A1⊙B1, A1×F1〉, then if v0 ≃t v1, for all formulae ϕ ∈ L , v0(ϕ) ≃t v1(ϕ).
Proof. By Lemma 6.5.1, vi(ψ) ∈ Ai ×Fi stands or falls with the claim that pr1(vi(ψ)) ∈ Fi
for each i ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, by Lemma 6.5.2, pr1 ◦ v0 and pr1 ◦ v1 are Kleene-Fitting
valuations on the logical bilattices 〈B0,F0〉 and 〈B1,F1〉, respectively. As a consequence, we
may infer that for any formula ϕ, v0(ϕ) ≃t v1(ϕ) if and only if (pr1 ◦ v0)(ϕ) ≃ (pr1 ◦ v1)(ϕ).
Because this holds a fortiori when ϕ is an atom p, the hypothesis that v0 ≃t v1 thus
entails that pr1 ◦ v0 ≃ pr1 ◦ v1. By applying Observation 6.2.8, we may infer that for an
arbitrary ϕ, (pr1 ◦ v0)(ϕ) ≃ (pr1 ◦ v1)(ϕ). But by our earlier observation, this entails that
v0(ϕ) ≃t v1(ϕ) and because ϕ was selected arbitrarily, this holds for all formulae ϕ.
Definition 6.5.6. Recall the definition of the partition T 〈B,F〉x from Definition 6.2.7 and let
〈A ⊙ B, A×FB〉 be a logical trilattice. Then the function g〈A⊙B,A×FB〉 : A×B → FOUR2 ×





Lemma 6.5.3. If v is a ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuation on 〈A⊙B, A×FB〉 with 〈B,FB〉 a logical
bilattice, then the valuation g〈A⊙B,A×FB〉◦v is a valuation on 〈SIXT EEN 3, FOUR2×{⊤, t}〉
such that v ≃t g〈A⊙B,A×FB〉 ◦ v.
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Proof. By construction of g〈A⊙B,A×FB〉, we can be assured that for all atoms p, v(p) ≃t
(g〈A⊙B,A×FB〉 ◦ v)(p). Hence, by Observation 6.5.1, v ≃t g〈A⊙B,A×FB〉 ◦ v.
Observation 6.5.2. Consider a logical trilattice 〈A⊙B,F〉 and a set of formulae Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆








Proof. If Γ 2〈A⊙B,A×FB〉
KF[¬t]
ϕ and v is a ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuation witnessing the failure of
this inference, then g〈A⊙B,A×FB〉 ◦ v is a valuation on 〈SIXT EEN 3, FOUR2 × {⊤, t}〉 such
that for all ϕ ∈ L, v(ϕ) ≃t (g〈A⊙B,A×FB〉 ◦ v)(ϕ). Hence, the ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuation




On the other hand, because SIXT EEN 3 is the smallest non-degenerate trilattice, the ele-
ments of FOUR2 can be identified with the top and bottom elements of bothA and B. Hence,
any valuation on 〈SIXT EEN 3, FOUR2×{⊤, t}〉 witnessing that Γ 2
〈SIXT EEN 3,FOUR2×{⊤,t}〉
KF[¬t]













Proof. For left-to-right, suppose that Γ 2〈SIXT EEN 3,FOUR2×{⊤,t}〉
KF[¬t]
ϕ and let v be a ¬t-Kleene-
Fitting valuation witnessing the failure of the inference. Then by Lemmas 6.5.1 and 6.5.2,
pr1 ◦ v is a Kleene-Fitting valuation on 〈FOUR2, {⊤, t}〉 such that (pr1 ◦ v)[Γ] ⊆ {⊤, t}




Conversely, if Γ 2〈FOUR2,{⊤,t}〉
KF
ϕ and v is a Kleene-Fitting valuation witnessing this fact,
then v⋆ : x 7→ 〈v(x), v(x)〉 is clearly a ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuation. By appealing to Lemma
6.5.1, from v[Γ] ⊆ {⊤, t} we can infer that v⋆[Γ] ⊆ FOUR2×{⊤, t} and from v(ϕ) /∈ {⊤, t},
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we infer that v⋆(ϕ) /∈ FOUR2 × {⊤, t}. But this is just to say that v⋆ witnesses that
Γ 2〈SIXT EEN 3,FOUR2×{⊤,t}〉
KF[¬t]
ϕ.
Observation 6.5.3. Let 〈T ,F〉 be a logical trilattice with a t-inversion where T is interlaced.




ϕ if and only if Γ Sfde ϕ
Proof. Suppose that Γ 2〈T ,F〉
KF[¬t]
ϕ and let v be a ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuation on 〈T ,F〉 wit-
nessing this fact. By Theorem 6.4.1, the trilattice T is isomorphic to a product trilattice
A⊙B and by Observation 6.5.1, F may be represented by the prime trifilter A×FB. Hence,
we infer equivalence with the proposition that Γ 2〈A⊙B,A×FB〉
KF[¬t]
ϕ where F = A × FB. By
Lemma 6.5.1, this holds if and only if there exists an analogous ¬t-Kleene-Fitting valuation




Lemma 6.5.4 shows the equivalence between this proposition and Γ 2〈FOUR2,{⊤,t}〉
KF
ϕ. Obser-
vation 6.2.10 ensures that this is equivalent to the claim that Γ 2Sfde ϕ.
We thus observe that—given the most direct and natural generalization of cut-down opera-
tions to the case of trilattices—the interpretation of Sfde as the logic of cut-down operations
on bilattices lifts to the case of interlaced trilattices whenever negation is interpreted as
t-inversion.
6.5.2 Interlude: Analytic Containment and Sfde
From a certain perspective, the relationship between the logics Sfde and AC might be expected
to mirror that between bilattices and trilattices.
On the one hand, we have observed that Rivieccio’s representation theorem for interlaced
trilattices of (163) proves that all interlaced trilattices are isomorphic to the product of two
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bilattices. For example, for a generalization of the Fitting-Ginsberg product ⊙, the trilattice
SIXT EEN 3 can be represented as the product trilattice FOUR2 ⊙ FOUR2.
On the other hand, whereas Chapter 5 described a Belnap-Dunn-like interpretation of
AC as two systems of positive Σ0 running in parallel (i.e., calculating independent truth and
falsity values), semantics for AC could just as easily have been provided by two systems of
Sfde. In this sense, the resulting sixteen-valued semantics for AC can be viewed as a product
of the matrix for Sfde with itself, with negation toggling between the two.
Lemma 6.5.5. The positive fragments of Σ0 and Sfde coincide.
Proof. Let ∼ be the equivalence relation on VSfde induced by the partition {{t, b}, {u}, {f}}.
Then if we use the notation f [x] to denote the image of x under f and the notation [x]∼
to denote the equivalence class of x under ∼, it is easy to confirm the following for all
v, v′ ∈ VSfde :
 f ∧̇
Sfde









entailing that ∼ is also a congruence relation. This also entails that we have the following




{t, b} {u} {f} f ∨̇
Sfde
{t, b} {u} {f}
{t, b} {t, b} {u} {f} {t, b} {t, b} {u} {t, b}
{u} {u} {u} {u} {u} {u} {u} {u}
{f} {f} {u} {f} {f} {t, b} {u} {f}
By appealing to the fact that both VΣ0 ⊆ VSfde and DΣ0 ⊆ DSfde and that there is a clear
analogy between the above truth tables and those for conjunction and disjunction in Defi-
nition 2.2.4, it is easy to confirm that the function h : v 7→ [v]∼ is an isomorphism between
the positive matrix of Σ0 and the quotient of the positive matrix of Sfde under ∼.
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Definition 6.5.7. The relation AC′ is the consequence relation induced by the matrix 〈VSfde×
VSfde ,DSfde × VSfde , f
¬̇
AC







′(〈v0, v1〉) = 〈v1, v0〉
 f ∧̇
AC




























AC′ valuations and AC′ validity are defined in the standard fashion.




are unable to distinguish between the values t and b in
positive Sfde, MAC′ provides a correct characterization of Angell’s AC as well.
Lemma 6.5.6. Γ AC′ ϕ iff Γ AC ϕ
Proof. Left-to-right is immediate. Suppose that Γ 2AC ϕ and that v is an AC valuation
witnessing this fact. Then because VAC ⊆ VAC′ , v is also an AC
′ valuation, whence Γ 2AC′ ϕ.
Right-to-left follows by invoking a trivial induction on complexity of formulae demon-
strating that any AC′ valuation has a corresponding AC valuation by mapping both t and
b to t. Any AC′ countermodel to an inference Γ AC′ ϕ entails the existence of an AC
countermodel to Γ AC ϕ.
This suggests that with respect to the generalization of cut-down operation on trilattices
in Definitions 6.4.6 and 6.4.7, whenever negation is identified with tf -inversion, the account
of Sfde on bilattices can be employed to provide a natural and robust correspondence between
AC and cut down operations on interlaced trilattices.
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6.5.3 AC on Trilattices
Now, granted the foregoing considerations on AC, we will show its equivalence to the logic
of cut-down operations on trilattices in which negation is interpreted as a tf -inversion.
Naturally, the modification of Kleene-Fitting valuations may be defined as follows:
Definition 6.5.8. A ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuation on a trilattice T with t- and f -inversions
is a function v : L → T such that:
 v(¬̇ϕ) = ¬tf (v(ϕ))
 v(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) △t v(ψ)
 v(ϕ ∨̇ ψ) = v(ϕ) ▽t v(ψ)




ϕ—if for all ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuations v, if v[Γ] ⊆ F then v(ϕ) ∈ F .
For an interlaced trilattice T with t- and f - inversions, the inversions ¬t and ¬f always
commute. With an eye to the representation theorems, that ¬t and ¬f commute ensures
that not only is every interlaced trilattice T isomorphic to a product trilattice A ⊙ B but
that A is isomorphic to B. Hence, we will consider product trilattices A⊙A in the follow-
ing pages before applying Rivieccio’s representation theorems (163) to extend the following
observations to all interlaced trilattices with inversions ¬t and ¬f .
Again, we proceed by showing a correspondence between logical trilattices of the form
〈A ⊙ A,F〉 and 〈FOUR2 ⊙ FOUR2, FOUR2 × {⊤, t}〉 before demonstrating a correspon-
dence between the latter logical trilattice and AC. An essential ingredient in this correspon-
dence is a final notion of similarity.
Definition 6.5.10. Consider two logical trilattices 〈A0⊙A0, A0×F0〉 and 〈A1⊙A1, A1×F1〉
where F0 and F1 are prime bifilters on A0 and A1, respectively. Then two elements 〈a, b〉 ∈
A0 ×A0 and 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ A1 × A1 are ¬tf -similar—written 〈a, b〉 ≃tf 〈a′, b′〉—if:
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 〈a, b〉 ≃t 〈a′, b′〉, and
 ¬tf 〈a, b〉 ≃t ¬tf 〈a′, b′〉
Observation 6.5.4. For two logical trilattices 〈A0 ⊙A0, A0 ×F0〉 and 〈A1 ⊙A1, A1 ×F1〉,
for all elements 〈a, b〉 ∈ A0 × A0 and 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ A1 ×A1,








b ≃ b′, and
a ≃ a′
where similarity simpliciter ( i.e., ≃) is considered with respect to logical bilattices 〈A0,F0〉
and 〈A1,F1〉.
Proof. An immediate consequence of Lemma 6.5.1 is that
〈a, b〉 ≃tf 〈a
′, b′〉 holds if and only if b ≃ b′.
Moreover, if we note that the claim that ¬tf 〈a, b〉 ≃t ¬tf 〈a′, b′〉 is equivalent to 〈¬b,¬a〉 ≃tf
〈¬b′,¬a′〉, Lemma 6.5.1 entails that this is equivalent to the statement that ¬a ≃ ¬a′, i.e.,
a ≃ a′.
As before, we again extend a notion of similarity to valuations on trilattices, although in
this case, we consider ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuations.
Definition 6.5.11. We say that two ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuations v0 and v1 are ¬tf -similar
if for all atoms p:
v0(p) ≃tf v1(p)
And we prove a fundamental principle concerning ¬tf -similar valuations.
Observation 6.5.5. Where v0 and v1 are ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuations on logical trilattices
〈A0 ⊙ A0, A0 × F0〉 and 〈A1 ⊙ A1, A1 × F1〉 such that v0 ≃tf v1, v0(ϕ) ≃tf v1(ϕ) for all
formulae ϕ ∈ L .
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Proof. Suppose that v0 and v1 are ¬tf -similar. Then we prove the observation by induction
on complexity of formulae.
As induction hypothesis for two formulae ϕ, ψ ∈ L, let v0(ϕ) = 〈a0, b0〉, v0(ψ) = 〈a1, b1〉,
v1(ϕ) = 〈a′0, b
′




1〉 and assume that v0(ϕ) ≃tf v1(ϕ) and v0(ψ) ≃tf v1(ψ).
More explicitly, by Observation 6.5.4, this entails that a0 ≃ a′0, a1 ≃ a
′
1, b0 ≃ b
′




In the case of negation, involutivity of ¬t ensures that the result holds. In particular,
that a0 ≃ a′0 and b0 ≃ b
′
0 entails that ¬a0 ≃ ¬a
′
0 and ¬b0 ≃ ¬b
′
0, entailing that 〈¬b0,¬a0〉 ≃tf
〈¬b′0,¬a
′
0〉, i.e., v0(¬̇ϕ) ≃tf v1(¬̇ϕ).
In the case of conjunction and disjunction, note that v0(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) = 〈a0 △ a1, b0 △ b1〉








1〉. By Observation 6.5.4, the matter of determining ¬tf -
similarity between v0(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) and v1(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) reduces to the matter of determining whether
a0 △ a1 ≃ a′0 △ a
′




1. Likewise, whether v0(ϕ ∨̇ ψ) ≃tf v1(ϕ ∨̇ ψ) stands
or falls alongside the matter of whether both a0 △ a1 ≃ a′0 △ a
′





The details of Observation 6.2.8 ensure that if a0 ≃ a′0 and a1 ≃ a
′
1 both hold, then
also a0 △ a1 ≃ a′0 △ a
′




1 (and mutatis mutandis when b0 ≃ b
′
0
and b1 ≃ b′1). Hence, the induction hypothesis entails that v0(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) ≃tf v1(ϕ ∧̇ ψ) and
v0(ϕ ∨̇ ψ) ≃tf v1(ϕ ∨̇ ψ).
Definition 6.5.12. Let g′〈A⊙A,A×F〉 : A× A→ FOUR2 × FOUR2 be defined so that:
g′〈A⊙A,A×F〉(a, b) = 〈¬(
ιx.a ∈ T 〈A,F〉x ),
ιy.b ∈ T 〈A,F〉y 〉.
Lemma 6.5.7. If v is a ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuation on 〈A ⊙ A, A × F〉 where 〈A,F〉
is a logical bilattice, then the function g′〈A⊙A,A×F〉 ◦ v is a ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuation on
〈SIXT EEN 3, FOUR2 × {⊤, t}〉 such that v ≃tf g′〈A⊙A,A×F〉 ◦v.
Proof. The construction of g′〈A⊙A,A×F〉 guarantees that (g
′
〈A⊙A,A×F〉 ◦ v)(p) ≃tf v(p) for each
atom p, entailing that g′〈A⊙A,A×F〉 ◦ v ≃tf v.
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The sum of these observations swiftly yields the corollary that SIXT EEN 3 retains its
fundamental role in the theory of trilattices when negation is interpreted by ¬tf .
The primary theorem will be proven by appealing to a sequence of equivalences described
in the following observations:
Observation 6.5.6. For a logical trilattice 〈A⊙A, A×F〉 and set of formulae Γ∪{ϕ}, we








Proof. For right-to-left, suppose that Γ 2〈A⊙A,A×F〉
KF[¬tf ]
ϕ and let v be a ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting
valuation such that v[Γ] ⊆ A × F although v(ϕ) /∈ A× F . Then by Lemma 6.5.7, we may
infer that (g′〈A⊙A,A×F〉 ◦ v)(ψ) ≃tf v(ψ) for each ψ ∈ Γ∪ {ϕ}, entailing that (g
′
〈A⊙A,A×F〉 ◦ v)
witnesses that Γ 2〈SIXT EEN 3,FOUR2×{⊤,t}〉
KF[¬tf ]
ϕ.
For left-to-right, we can without loss of generality assume that FOUR2 ⊆ A and that
{⊤, t} ⊆ F . Hence, a ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuation v on SIXT EEN 3 is a fortiori a valuation
onA⊙A. Thus, whenever v serves as a countermodel to an inference Γ 〈SIXT EEN 3,FOUR2×{⊤,t}〉
KF[¬tf ]








ϕ if and only if Γ AC ϕ.
Proof. Recall the bijection h⋆ between FOUR2 and VSfde from the proof of Observation 6.2.2
and define the map g⋆ : FOUR2 × FOUR2 → VSfde × VSfde so that:
g⋆(x, y) = 〈h⋆(y), f ¬̇
Sfde
(h⋆(x))〉.
To begin, there are several trivial observations that we can make. For one, it is clear that
g⋆ is bijective. It is also immediate to note that the image of FOUR2 × {⊤, t} under g⋆ is
precisely the set of designated values of AC′.
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What remains to be shown is that g⋆ preserves operations between the two structures.
In the case of negation, this is relatively simple, with the steps in the following justification
self-explanatory. Letting 〈a, b〉 ∈ FOUR2 × FOUR2, we have the following:
g⋆(¬tf 〈a, b〉) = g⋆(〈¬b,¬a〉)




















It follows that if v0 is a ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuation on SIXT EEN 3 and v1 is an AC
′
valuation such that g⋆(v0(ϕ)) = v1(ϕ), then:
g⋆(v0(¬̇ϕ)) = g⋆(¬tfv0(ϕ)) = f ¬̇AC′(v1(ϕ)) = v1(¬̇ϕ)
Likewise, in the case of weak conjunction,
g⋆(〈a, b〉 △t 〈a′, b′〉) = g⋆(〈a △ a′, b △ b′〉)



























′(g⋆(〈a, b〉), g⋆(〈a′, b′〉))
Now, consider ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting and AC
′ valuations v0 and v1, respectively, where g
⋆(v0(ϕ)) =
v1(ϕ) and g
⋆(v0(ψ)) = v1(ψ). Then:
g⋆(v0(ϕ ∧̇ ψ)) = g⋆(v0(ϕ) △ v0(ψ)) = f ∧̇AC′(v1(ϕ), v1(ψ)) = v1(ϕ ∧̇ ψ).
Hence, given a ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuation v on SIXT EEN 3 serving to demonstrate that
Γ 2〈SIXT EEN 3,FOUR2×{⊤,t}〉
KF[¬tf ]
ϕ, the function g⋆◦v is an AC′ valuation acting as a countermodel
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to the inference Γ AC′ ϕ. But Lemma 6.5.6 establishes that AC
′ consequence is identical to
AC consequence, whence Γ 2AC ϕ.
Likewise, if Γ 2AC ϕ then there exists an AC
′ valuation such that v[Γ] ⊆ DAC′ and
v(ϕ) /∈ DAC′. But as g
⋆ is an isomorphism, the function (g⋆)−1 ◦ v will be a ¬tf -Kleene-
Fitting valuation establishing that Γ 2〈SIXT EEN 3,FOUR2×{⊤,t}〉
KF[¬tf ]
ϕ.
Theorem 6.5.1. Let 〈T ,F〉 be a logical trilattice with inversions ¬t and ¬f where T is




ϕ if and only if Γ AC ϕ
Proof. By Rivieccio’s Theorem 6.4.2 and Lemma 6.4.2, 〈T ,F〉 is isomorphic to a logical
trilattice 〈A ⊙ A, A × F〉. We may then appeal to Observations 6.5.6 and 6.5.7 to prove
equivalence between consequence with respect to ¬tf -Kleene-Fitting valuations on 〈T ,F〉
and consequence in AC.
Hence, whenever negation is identified with the inversion ¬tf , the logic of cut down operations
on interlaced trilattices is captured by Angell’s AC.
6.6 Future Directions
There are two promising directions in which the foregoing work on cut-downs can be taken.
Obviously, the results of Section 6.5 are limited insofar as the correspondences described
therein hold only for interlaced trilattices. Although interlacing is a very natural property,
it is obviously desirable to improve these results to hold for all logical trilattices.
A further limitation lies in the fact that the results in Section 6.3 are limited insofar
as the observations apply only to the bilattice NINE2. Of course, there are numerous
possible generalizations of Damásio and Pereira’s operation of not to bilattices in general.
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The question of how to generalize not and how the generalized operations relate to AC in
general is worth pursuing.
In Chapter 5, we had considered Shramko and Wansing’s appeal to SIXT EEN 3 as a
representation of the logic of networks of Belnap computers in (175). If trilattices indeed
constitute a natural model for such Shramko-Wansing networks, Angell’s AC emerges nat-
urally in both the context of Belnap computers and networks of such computers. From
an interpretative standpoint, then, it is plausible there is a corresponding interpretation of
AC as the logic of faulty Shramko-Wansing networks, i.e., networks of Belnap computers in
which catastrophic errors may occur.
Finally, we have seen a host of other many-valued logics qualifying as ‘Parry.’ Whether
bilattice semantics can be given for these systems is worth investigating. For example, given
the interpretation of the Daniels-Priest logic S⋆
fde
as the logic of faulty Belnap computers
in Chapter 5, one might anticipate that it would have been this system—rather than the
Deutsch-Oller system Sfde—that arises in the context of cut down operations on multilattices.
It is worth investigating whether S⋆
fde
corresponds to any salient operations on multilattices.
At this point, we have considered a number of semantical frameworks within which
Angell’s AC can be defined. In the next chapter, we revisit the first semantics for AC,
described by Fabrice Correia in (49).
Chapter 7
Correia Semantics Revisited
Despite a renewed interest in Angell’s logic of analytic containment (AC), Correia’s semantics
for AC has remained largely unexamined. This chapter describes a reasonable approach to
Correia semantics by means of a correspondence with a nine-valued semantics for AC. The
present inquiry employs this correspondence to provide characterizations of a number of
propositional logics intermediate between AC and classical logic. In particular, we examine
Correia’s purported characterization of classical logic with respect to his semantics, showing
the condition Correia cites in fact characterizes the ‘logic of paradox’ LP and provide a
correct characterization. Finally, we consider some remarks on related matters, such as the
applicability of the present correspondence to the analysis of the system AC∗ and an intriguing
relationship between Correia’s models and articular models for first-degree entailment.
7.1 Introduction
In (9) and (11), Richard Angell introduced the systems AC and AC∗ corresponding to a
notion of analytic containment in which entailment is characterized as the containment of
one proposition within another. Although Correia provided the first semantical account of
217
CHAPTER 7. CORREIA SEMANTICS REVISITED 218
AC in (49), the semantics was not accompanied by any intuitive interpretation. Although
many of the more recent interpretations have come equipped with corresponding semantics
for AC, the object of study in this discussion is Correia’s semantics of (49).
Although Correia describes the semantics of (49) as ‘unusual,’ the framework still appears
to be authentically semantic in nature, that is, at first blush, the models are not merely a
clever trick to transform syntax into semantics. Importantly, Correia’s first semantics is
not specific merely to AC, but, as Correia shows, provides a framework within which other
deductive systems may be characterized. As an ill-understood semantical framework that
captures the behavior of multiple deductive systems, Correia’s semantics deserves deeper
investigation; such an investigation has so far been missing.
In the present study, the correspondence between the nine-valued, truth functional se-
mantics described in Chapter 5 and Correia’s models is examined anew. This correspondence
yields not only a simple avenue towards further characterizations of deductive systems in
terms of Correia’s models but insight into these properties and why they emerge in Correia
semantics.
7.2 Analytic Containment and Correia Semantics
In this section, we will first examine the proof-theoretical account of analytic containment
before proceeding to examine two semantical approaches: the account of Correia models
introduced in (49) and the many-valued account introduced in (74). Further semantics have
appeared in recent years but will not be reproduced here; the reader is referred to (50), (87),
or (115) for accounts of these alternative approaches to AC.
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7.2.1 Semantical Preliminaries
We have described Correia’s semantics for AC in Section 5.3.1 but are now interested not
only in how this semantics characterizes AC, but the conditions under which other deductive
systems may be captured. To this end, we will have to consider a more general notion of
validity in which only restricted classes of Correia models are considered.
Definition 7.2.1. We say that a formula A→ B is valid with respect to a class of Correia
models X if for all v ∈ X such that ∅ v A, ∅ v B.
Definition 7.2.2. A first-degree logic L is characterized by a set X of Correia models if
A→ B is a theorem of L iff A→ B is valid with respect to X.
Given the correspondence between the many-valued semantics for AC and vocabulary
closed Correia models, it will aid us to represent extensions of AC in a similar, bilateral
manner. Hence, we will will provide bilateral semantics for a host of systems as restrictions on
the matrix MAC. For example, we have considered two presentations of Efde: The unilateral
account in Definition 3.1.17 and the bilateral account in Definition 5.2.1. In the latter case,
the set of bilateral truth values V ∗
Efde
is a subset of VAC. Hence, the logical matrix of Definition
5.2.1 can be thought of as a restriction of the matrix MAC of Definition 5.2.3.
Formally, we define the restriction of a logical matrix as follows:
Definition 7.2.3. With respect to a logical matrix M = 〈V ,D , f ¬̇, f ∨̇, f ∧̇〉, suppose that
there exists a set U ⊆ V such that U is closed under f ¬̇, f ∨̇, and f ∧̇. Then the restriction
of M to the set U is the matrix
M ↾U = 〈U ,D ∩U , f ¬̇↾U , f
∨̇↾(U ×U ), f
∧̇↾(U ×U )〉.
Recall the Bochvar-Kleene logic Σ0 from Definition 2.2.4. Eventually, we will reexamine Σ0,
although its semantics will be formulated as a restriction of AC rather than the system from
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which AC is built. As we will have cause to return to Σ0 in the sequel, it is fitting to let this
second presentation of Σ0 illustrate the restriction of the matrix MAC.
Observation 7.2.1. Let V ⋆
Σ0




Proof. Let pr0 and pr1 be the projection operators projecting ordered pairs to their first









′〉) and mutatis mutandis for conjunction and
disjunction.
7.2.2 Correlating the Two Semantics
In Chapter 5, completeness of the nine-valued semantics was proven indirectly by means
of a construction showing that if A → B is a valid inference by the lights of the nine-
valued semantics, it is valid with respect to vocabulary closed Correia models as well. This
construction, however, provides a useful platform from which we may characterize other
notions of entailment in terms of Correia’s models. This section introduces the construction
and describes how it serves to interpret Correia’s models.
Before reviewing the construction of Chapter 5, it will be helpful to review and introduce
some properties of vocabulary closed Correia models. For example, we characterize the class
of vocabulary closed Correia models in a fashion alternative to that of Definition 5.3.7:
Theorem 7.2.1. A Correia model v is vocabulary closed iff





Proof. Immediate from Definition 5.3.7 and Lemma 5.3.6.
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Hence, that v is vocabulary closed is to say v is determined precisely by its set of generators
and its positive and negative vocabularies. This entails that when v is vocabulary closed, all
the information in v can be recovered from G(v) and 〈Γ⋆v,∆
⋆
v〉.
The set G(v) is essential in the correspondence between Correia models and the nine-
valued semantics. In this section, we will describe elements of the correspondence necessary
to the present study. Now, Definition 5.3.14 provided us a truth-preserving method of
translating Correia models into AC valuations that preserves truth. If we want to study
further correspondences, however, it will be necessary to have a technique to translate AC
valuations into Correia models whose theories are identical. This Correia model will be called
a Correia counterpart :
Definition 7.2.4. Let v be an AC valuation. Then the Correia counterpart of v is the unique




c(v)〉 = 〈{p | pr1(v(p)) 6= u}, {p | pr0(v(p)) 6= u}〉
 〈∅, {p}〉 ∈ c(v) iff v(p) ∈ DAC
 〈{p},∅〉 ∈ c(v) iff v(¬̇ p) ∈ DAC
Theorem 7.2.2. ∅ c(v) A iff v(A) ∈ DAC.
Proof. It can be confirmed that F(c(v)) is a singleton. Then ∅ c(v) A holds iff ∅ F(c(v)) A
holds. But by Lemma 5.3.13, this is equivalent to saying that v(A) ∈ DAC.
7.2.3 A General Characterization Lemma
While characterizing different deductive systems by classes of Correia models, we employ a
similar scheme of proof for each case. Rather than rehearse a virtually identical proof several
times over, we will prove a lemma to which we may appeal when necessary.
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Lemma 7.2.1 (Characterization Lemma). Let L be a first-degree logic characterized by a
matrix ML such that ML a restriction of MAC and let Φ be a property of some vocabulary
closed Correia models. Moreover, let the following two conditions hold:
 whenever v has property Φ then each vC ∈ F(v) is an ML valuation
 whenever v is an ML valuation then c(v) has property Φ
Then L is characterized by the class of vocabulary closed models with property Φ.
Proof. Suppose that L is such a restriction of AC and that the two conditions hold. Then to
prove that L is characterized by the class of vocabulary closed models satisfying property Φ
is to prove that A→ B is a theorem of L iff for all vocabulary closed Correia models v with
property Φ, whenever ∅ v A, also ∅ v B.
For left-to-right, we prove the contrapositive. Suppose that there exists a vocabulary
closed Correia model satisfying Φ such that ∅ v A but ∅ 2v B. Then by Lemma 5.3.13,
there exists a vC ∈ F(v) such that vC(A) ∈ DAC but vC(B) /∈ DAC. By hypothesis, however,
vC is an L valuation and—as a restriction of AC—this entails that vC(A) ∈ DL but vC(B) /∈
DL. Hence, vC is an L valuation witnessing the failure of A→ B in L.
For right-to-left, we again prove the contrapositive. Let A → B fail to be a theorem of
L and let v be an L valuation witnessing this fact. Then as L is by hypothesis a restriction
of AC, v is trivially an AC valuation. Now consider c(v). By Theorem 7.2.2, ∅ c(v) A
although ∅ 2c(v) B. But c(v) by hypothesis has property Φ, whence we infer the existence
of a vocabulary closed model with property Φ at which A is true but B is not true.
7.3 Correia Models and Other Propositional Logics
AC admits many equivalent presentations, one in which we are concerned with the validity
of formulae A → B from Lfdf (e.g., the presentation in (49) or (87)) and the other in
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which we are concerned with validity of an inference Γ AC B for Γ ⊆ Lzdf and B ∈ Lzdf.
Similarly, many propositional logics described in terms of a consequence relation also admit
a formulation as a first-degree deductive system.
The contributions of Correia’s (49) go beyond a characterization of AC in terms of his
models; he also purports to characterize both the Belnap-Dunn logic Efde and the classical
logic CL itself in terms of classes of his models.
In this section, we employ the interpretation of Correia models as sets of truth functions
in order to characterize a number of deductive systems intermediate between AC and CL.
Initially, we will examine Correia’s characterization of the Belnap-Dunn logic of first-degree
entailment Efde to make clear the utility and methodology of interpreting Correia models as
collections of truth functions. Then, we will proceed to characterize some other first-degree
logics in terms of Correia models. Finally, we will examine Correia’s characterization of
classical logic, showing it to be incorrect and providing a correct characterization of classical
logic in the framework of (49).
7.3.1 First-Degree Entailment
Within the many-valued framework, the bilateral semantics for the logic Efde of Definition
5.2.1 can be viewed as a restriction of the nine-valued AC semantics in which the set of truth
values are restricted to those corresponding to truth, falsity, both true and false, and neither
true nor false.






Note that V ⋆
Efde
is closed under the truth functions of AC; this will be the case for every
restriction of AC considered in the sequel.
From a proof-theoretic perspective, as verified in (49), Efde can be obtained from AC by
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adding the axiom A→ A ∨̇ B. In (49), Correia also provides a characterization of Efde with
respect to Correia models satisfying the following condition:
Definition 7.3.1 (Condition TE). For all finite sets of atoms Γ, Γ′, ∆, and ∆′ if 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v
then 〈Γ ∪ Γ′,∆ ∪∆′〉 ∈ v
To analyze Correia’s result and provide similar characterizations to other deductive systems,
we introduce a property equivalent to Condition TE.
Definition 7.3.2. The language closure of a Correia model v—symbolized JvK—is the small-
est Correia model v′ extending v such that
 for all Correia pairs 〈Γ,∆〉, if there exists a 〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ v such that 〈Γ′,∆′〉 4 〈Γ,∆〉,
then 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ v′
I.e., the set {〈Γ,∆〉 | ∃〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ v s.t. 〈Γ′,∆′〉 4 〈Γ,∆〉 4 〈At,At〉}. We say that a
Correia model v is language closed if v = JvK .
It is clear that these are equivalent conditions.
Observation 7.3.2. v is language closed iff v enjoys Condition TE.
In order to demonstrate the utility Lemma 7.2.1, we will prove Correia’s result by means of
the following lemmas.
Lemma 7.3.1. If v is language closed then for all vC ∈ F(v), vC is an Efde valuation.
Proof. Suppose that v is a language closed Correia model. Then for all p ∈ At, p ∈ ∆⋆
v
and p ∈ Γ⋆
v
. Hence, for any C ∈
∏
(G(v)τ ), we observe that both pr0(vC(p)) 6= u, and
pr1(vC(p)) 6= u. Hence, the range of vC is necessarily a subset of {〈t, f〉, 〈f, t〉, 〈t, t〉, 〈f, f〉},
i.e., the range of vC is a subset of V
⋆
Efde
. But this is just to say that vC is a bilateral Efde
valuation.
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Lemma 7.3.2. If v is a bilateral Efde valuation, then c(v) is language closed.
Proof. Let v be a bilateral Efde valuation; for no atomic formula p is either pr0(v(p)) = u or





As c(v) is by construction vocabulary closed so that all atomic formulae appear in both its
positive and negative vocabularies, it follows that c(v) is language closed.
With the assistance of Lemma 7.2.1, Lemmas 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 yield the theorem immediately.
Theorem 7.3.1. Efde is characterized by the class of language closed Correia models.
By following this general strategy, we are able to provide natural characterizations of nu-
merous deductive systems in terms of Correia semantics.
First, we will examine ‘analytic’ extensions of AC—those sharing a strong relevance prop-
erty to be described in the sequel—before characterizing a few non-‘analytic’ extensions.
Finally, we will turn our attention to the proper characterization of classical logic.
7.3.2 ‘Analytic’ Extensions
We have noted that AC is ‘analytic’ in the sense employed by Parry, i.e., that AC enjoys
the Proscriptive Principle. We have already encountered other first-degree logics that are
‘analytic’ in this sense which may be characterized in a bilateral fashion as restrictions
of MAC. Two such systems that admit an analysis in terms of Correia models are S
⋆
fde
described in (55) and Sfde described in (58)—the first-degree fragments of Charles Daniels’
‘story semantics’ of (54) and Harry Deutsch’s logic S of (59).
We will thus provide bilateral semantics for these two systems as restrictions of MAC:












= {〈t, t〉, 〈t, f〉, 〈f, t〉, 〈f, f〉, 〈u, u〉}
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Definition 7.3.4. A bilateral semantics is given for the first-degree formulation of Sfde by





= {〈t, t〉, 〈t, f〉, 〈f, t〉, 〈u, u〉}
Note that we are employing the decoration of ⋆ to indicate that the set of truth values
considered is bilateral.
The distinction between these systems and AC may be illustrated by examining the
theorems that hold in the stronger logics. For example, the formula A → A ∨̇ ¬̇A fails in
AC, as the fact that v(A) ∈ DAC is not sufficient to guarantee that pr1(v(A)) 6= u; on the
‘nonsense’ reading of the truth value u (as in (31)), this is to say that the positive content of a
proposition may be meaningful while its negative content is not. However, simple calculation
confirms that this formula is in fact a theorem of S⋆
fde
, as the meaningfulness of a proposition
and its negation stand or fall together.




possibility of a proposition’s being neither true nor false by fiat. Hence, the mere mention of
a proposition B entails that tertium non datur holds of B; this is captured by a restricted
excluded middle, witnessed by the validity of the formula A ∨̇ B → B ∨̇ ¬̇B in Sfde.
Let us proceed to characterize these systems with respect to Correia semantics. First we
will examine properties corresponding to S⋆
fde
.
Definition 7.3.5. A Correia model v is unsigned if Γ⋆v = ∆
⋆
v.
Lemma 7.3.3. If v is an unsigned and vocabulary closed Correia model then for all vC ∈




Proof. Let v be an unsigned and vocabulary closed valuation. Then for each vC ∈ F(v), vC
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pr0(vC(p)) = u iff p /∈ Γ
⋆
v
iff p /∈ ∆⋆
v
iff pr1(vC(p)) = u.
Hence, the first coordinate of a truth value vC(A) is u iff its second coordinate is u. This
strikes 〈t, u〉, 〈f, u〉, 〈u, t〉, and 〈u, f〉 as possible values, effectively restricting the set of truth
values to V ⋆
S⋆
fde
. As this set is closed under the truth functions of AC, this entails that each




Lemma 7.3.4. If v is an S⋆
fde
valuation then c(v) is an unsigned, vocabulary closed Correia
model.
Proof. If v is an S⋆
fde
valuation then v is a fortiori an AC valuation and c(v) is by construction




c(v). But this entails that c(v) is unsigned.
Again, Lemma 7.2.1 entails that we may infer the following theorem from Lemmas 7.3.3 and
7.3.4:
Theorem 7.3.2. The Daniels-Priest logic S⋆
fde
is characterized by the class of unsigned and
vocabulary closed Correia models.
Now, let us examine the stronger property corresponding to Sfde.





〈{p}, {p}〉 ∈ v.
We can make the following observations about relatively complete Correia models.
Lemma 7.3.5. If v is relatively complete, then v is unsigned.




iff 〈{p}, {p}〉 ∈ v iff p ∈ ∆⋆
v
.
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Lemma 7.3.6. If v is a relatively complete and vocabulary closed Correia model then for all
vC ∈ F(v), vC is a bilateral Sfde valuation.
Proof. Assume v to be relatively complete and vocabulary closed. By Lemma 7.3.5, v is
also unsigned, whence for any vC ∈ F(v), the range of vC is a subset of V ⋆S⋆
fde
. However, the
value 〈f, f〉 is likewise not admissible. As 〈{p}, {p}〉 ∈ v, every vC ∈ F(v) is such that either




v. Hence, the set of truth values to
which any atom may be mapped is V ⋆
S⋆
fde
r {〈f, f〉}. But this is just V ⋆
Sfde
.
Lemma 7.3.7. If v is a bilateral Sfde valuation then c(v) is a relatively complete and vocab-
ulary closed Correia model.








As v is an Sfde valuation such that neither coordinate of v(p) is u, either v(p) ∈ D⋆Sfde or
v(¬̇ p) ∈ D⋆
Sfde




option entails that 〈{p}, {p}〉 ∈ c(v), whence we infer that c(v) is relatively complete.
From Lemmas 7.2.1, 7.3.6, and 7.3.7, we infer the following:
Theorem 7.3.3. The Deutsch-Oller logic Sfde is characterized by the class of relatively
complete and vocabulary closed Correia models.
7.3.3 Non-‘Analytic’ Extensions
There are a number of popular and much-studied deductive systems intermediate between
AC and classical logic that fail to enjoy the Proscriptive Principle. In this section, we will
characterize three such systems with respect to Correia’s semantics.
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Inasmuch as the truth functional semantics for AC is intimately related to those for Σ0,
it is a natural question to ask whether Σ0 itself can be given Correia semantics. We thus
turn to providing properties that in fact correspond to Σ0.
Definition 7.3.7. A Correia model v is consistent if for all 〈Γ,∆〉, 〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ G(v),
∆ ∩ Γ′ = ∅.
Definition 7.3.8. A vocabulary closed Correia model v is relatively determinate if v is
consistent and relatively complete.





, precisely one of the following holds:
a 〈{p},∅〉 ∈ v
b 〈∅, {p}〉 ∈ v.
Proof. Let v be vocabulary closed and relatively determinate and consider an arbitrary
p ∈ Γ⋆v ∪ ∆
⋆
v. Then by relative completeness, 〈{p}, {p}〉 ∈ v. However, consistency of
v entails that 〈{p}, {p}〉 /∈ G(v). Hence, there must be some 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ G(v) such that
〈Γ,∆〉 4 〈{p}, {p}〉, and the only Correia pairs that can witness this are 〈{p},∅〉 and
〈∅, {p}〉. Consistency again prevents both these pairs from simultaneously appearing in
G(v), whence we conclude that precisely one of these pairs is found in v.
Lemma 7.3.9. If v is vocabulary closed, unsigned, and relatively determinate, then the range
of each vC ∈ F(v) is a subset of {〈t, f〉, 〈f, t〉, 〈u, u〉}.
Proof. Let v be vocabulary closed, unsigned, and relatively determinate. By definition, v is
also relatively complete, and by Lemma 7.3.6, this entails that each vC ∈ F(v) is a bilateral
Sfde valuation, i.e., maps each atom p to a value of V
⋆
Sfde
. However, that v is relatively
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determinate entails that every such vC cannot map formulae to the value 〈t, t〉, as for any
C ∈
∏
(G(v)τ ), consistency entails that for no 〈Γ,∆〉, 〈Γ′,∆′〉 ∈ G(v) will C(〈Γ,∆〉τ ) =
C(〈Γ′,∆′〉τ ). Hence, the set of values to which vC can map an atom p is V ⋆Sfde r {〈t, t〉}.
Lemma 7.3.10. Let v be an MAC↾V ⋆
Σ0
valuation. Then c(v) is an unsigned and relatively
determinate vocabulary closed Correia model.
Proof. As v is trivially an Sfde valuation, we already may infer that c(v) is unsigned, rela-
tively complete, and vocabulary closed. What remains, then, is to demonstrate that c(v) is
consistent. As c(v) is unsigned and relatively complete, for every 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ G(c(v)), 〈Γ,∆〉τ
is a singleton. Hence, the only way that c(v) could violate consistency would be if both
〈{p},∅〉 ∈ c(v) and 〈∅, {p}〉 ∈ c(v). But by Theorem 7.2.2, this would entail that both
v(p) ∈ D⋆
Σ0
and v(¬̇ p) ∈ D⋆
Σ0
, i.e., that v(p) = 〈t, t〉. But 〈t, t〉 /∈ V ⋆
Σ0
, whence a violation
of consistency is seen to be impossible. Hence, c(v) is unsigned, relatively determinate, and
vocabulary closed.
As before, Lemmas 7.2.1, 7.3.9, and 7.3.10 yield the following:
Theorem 7.3.4. The logic Σ0 is characterized by the class of vocabulary closed Correia
models that are unsigned and relatively determinate.
Proof. Lemmas 7.2.1, 7.3.9, and 7.3.10 jointly entail that the logic characterized by the
matrix MAC↾V ⋆
Σ0
corresponds to unsigned and relatively determinate Correia models. By
Observation 7.2.1, the Bochvar logic Σ0 is characterized by both MΣ0 and MAC↾V ⋆
Σ0
. Hence,
we may conclude that unsigned and relatively determinate Correia models characterize Σ0.
We’ve discussed the strong Kleene logic in Section 3.3.1, in which unilateral many-valued
semantics were given by Definition 3.3.5.
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The first-degree formulation of K3 also permits analysis in terms of Correia semantics.
To provide this characterization, we first consider an alternative bilateral semantics for K3
as a restriction of MAC.









= {〈t, f〉, 〈f, t〉, 〈f, f〉}.
The natural interpretation of the truth values of K3 is that the system permits propositions
to be true, false, or neither true nor false.
Lemma 7.3.11. If v is a consistent and language closed Correia model then for all vC ∈ F(v),
vC is a K3 valuation.




= At, whence for
each p and vC ∈ F(v), we can conclude that
 by language closure, both pr0(vC(p)) 6= u and pr1(vC(p)) 6= u, and
 by consistency, either pr0(vC(p)) 6= t or pr1(vC(p)) 6= t.
Hence, the set of truth values to which an atom may be mapped by v is {〈t, f〉, 〈f, t〉, 〈f, f〉},
i.e., V ⋆
K3
. As V ⋆
K3
is closed under each of the AC truth functions, this entails that for arbitrary
formulae A, vC(A) ∈ V ⋆K3 ; in other words, vC is a K3 valuation.
Lemma 7.3.12. If v is a K3 valuation, then c(v) is consistent and language closed.
Proof. Let v be a K3 valuation. As K3 is an extension of Efde, we already understand c(v) to
be language closed. Hence, Γ⋆
c(v) = ∆
⋆
c(v). Consistency of c(v) may be established by noting
that 〈t, t〉 /∈ V ⋆
K3
and following the steps in Theorem 7.3.4.
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Lemmas 7.2.1, 7.3.11, and 7.3.12 entitle us to infer the following:
Theorem 7.3.5. The strong Kleene logic K3 is characterized by the class of consistent and
language closed Correia models.
We have already appealed to the dual relationship between K3 and Priest’s logic of paradox
LP, presented in Definition 2.3.5, as documented in, e.g., (22). This duality allows us to
interpret LP in a bilateral fashion as a restriction of MAC. It is thus natural to expect
Correia semantics for LP as well.
We begin by defining LP in terms of MAC.








= {〈t, f〉, 〈f, t〉, 〈t, t〉}.
In other words, LP can be interpreted as the restriction of AC induced by demanding that
every proposition be either true or false (and perhaps both).
Lemma 7.3.13. If v is a relatively complete and language closed Correia model then for all
vC ∈ F(v), v is a bilateral LP valuation.
Proof. As before, from language closure of v and completeness relative to At, we may infer
that
 by language closure, both pr0(vC(p)) 6= u and pr1(vC(p)) 6= u, and
 by completeness relative to At, either pr0(vC(p)) = t or pr1(vC(p)) = t
for all vC ∈ F(v) and p ∈ At. We are thereby able to infer that vC must map each atom to
{〈t, f〉, 〈f, t〉, 〈t, t〉}. But this is V ⋆
LP
and we may conclude that each vC ∈ F(v) is a bilateral
LP valuation.
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Lemma 7.3.14. If v is a bilateral LP valuation, then c(v) is a relatively complete and
language closed Correia model.
Proof. Let v be an LP valuation. By construction, Γ⋆
c(v) = ∆
⋆
c(v) = At, whence we conclude
that c(v) is language closed. As for all atoms p, either v(p) ∈ D⋆
LP
or v(¬̇ p) ∈ D⋆
LP
, either
〈{p},∅〉 ∈ c(v) or 〈∅, {p}〉 ∈ c(v). But each entails that 〈{p}, {p}〉 ∈ c(v). As p was selected
arbitrarily, this holds for all atoms, whence c(v) is complete relative to At.
Lemmas 7.2.1, 7.3.13, and 7.3.14 secure for us the characterization of LP:
Theorem 7.3.6. The logic of paradox LP corresponds to the class of relatively complete and
language closed Correia models.
This permits an immediate corollary characterizing the first-degree fragment of the logic
RM, i.e., R with the Mingle axiom. We have observed in Definition 3.3.9 that RMfde may
be characterized by the union of unilateral LP valuations and K3 valuations. This obviously
remains true when the LP and K3 valuations are treated as restrictions of AC valuations.
Corollary 7.3.1. The logic RMfde is characterized by the class of language closed Correia
models that are either consistent or relatively complete.
Proof. Immediate from Definition 3.3.9 and Theorems 7.3.5 and 7.3.6.
At this stage, we have characterized a number of deductive systems in terms of Correia
models. Anticipating the correct characterization of classical logic CL in the next section,
we thus arrive at the picture in Figure 7.1.
7.3.4 Correia’s Characterization of Classical Logic
We now turn to the question of the characterization of classical logic CL with respect to
Correia models. In (49), to yield classical consequence, Correia offers the condition:











Figure 7.1: First-Degree Systems Intermediate Between AC and CL
Definition 7.3.11 (Condition PC). For all finite sets of atoms Γ, 〈Γ,Γ〉 ∈ v.
With this definition, Correia asserts the following:
Assertion 7.3.1 (Correia). Classical propositional logic is characterized by Correia models
enjoying both Conditions TE and PC.
We will proceed to show that Correia’s position, however, is incorrect. While classical logic
is complete with respect to such models, it is not sound.
Observation 7.3.3. The conjunction of Conditions TE and PC does not correspond to CL
inference.
Proof. We provide a countermodel. Let w denote the set
{〈{p0},∅〉, 〈∅, {p0}〉} ∪ {〈{q}, {q}〉 | q ∈ At}.
Now consider the Correia model JwK, the vocabulary closure of w.
By construction, JwK satisfies Conditions TE and PC. However, although ∅ JwK p0 ∧̇
¬̇ p0, for no q 6= p0 does ∅ JwK q. Hence, JwK witnesses that p0 ∧̇ ¬̇ p0 → q fails, although
this inference is classically valid.
In (49), Correia shows that the addition of axiom A→ A ∨̇ B to AC provides an axiomatiza-
tion of Efde and that this system is characterized by models satisfying Condition TE. Correia
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next demonstrates that the addition of the axiom A → B ∨̇ ¬̇B to this axiomatization of
Efde is sufficient to provide an account of classical logic CL. The fact that the inclusion of
A → B ∨̇ ¬̇B to his axiomatization of Efde yields classical logic and the fact that Efde is
sound with respect to models satisfying Condition TE jointly suggest a very natural strat-
egy to approach to the soundness of CL. To show CL to be sound with respect to models
satisfying Conditions TE and PC, merely prove that A → B ∨̇ ¬̇B holds in each model of
this class.
The problem with this strategy is subtle. While all theorems of Efde are valid with respect
to models satisfying Conditions TE and PC, the rule of inference AC7—explicitly appearing
in the axiomatization of Efde—fails to hold with respect to this class. As an example, consider
a case in which for distinct p0, q ∈ At, both p0 ∨̇ ¬̇ p0 → q ∨̇ ¬̇ q and q ∨̇ ¬̇ q → p0 ∨̇ ¬̇ p0 are
valid, while JwK (from Observation 7.3.3) witnesses the failure of ¬̇(p0 ∨̇ ¬̇ p0)→ ¬̇(q ∨̇ ¬̇ q).
Hence, it is in the presence of AC7 that the addition of A → B ∨̇ ¬̇B to Efde generates
classical logic. Without the validity of AC7, Conditions TE and PC will correspond to a
proper subsystem of CL.
Now, consider the question of which deductive system is in fact characterized by the
conjunction of Properties TE and PC.
Lemma 7.3.15. A language closed Correia model v enjoys Condition PC iff v is relatively
complete.
Proof. Let v be language closed. Then the positive and negative vocabularies of v are each
equal to At itself. Hence, that v is relatively complete is equivalent to 〈{p}, {p}〉 ∈ v for
all p ∈ At. As {p} is a finite set of atoms, Condition PC immediately entails relative
completeness.
On the other hand, suppose v to be relatively complete and consider a finite set of atoms
Γ such that q ∈ Γ. Then by relative completeness, 〈{q}, {q}〉 ∈ v and by language closure,
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〈Γ,Γ〉 ∈ v. As Γ was selected arbitrarily, v satisfies Condition PC.
Corollary 7.3.2. The conjunction of Conditions TE and PC characterizes the logic LP.
This still leaves the question of how to properly characterize classical logic in terms of Correia
models.
First, let us examine the counterexample from Observation 7.3.3. Clearly, from a seman-
tical perspective, the responsible element of the counterexample is that in the corresponding
set of truth functions F(JwK), each assigns both p0 and ¬̇ p0 a designated value (as both
〈∅, {p0}〉 ∈ JwK and 〈{p0},∅〉 ∈ JwK) without, e.g., necessitating that q take a designated
value.
In order to correctly characterize classical logic, it is essential that we preclude this from
obtaining, i.e., we must permit that one and only one of 〈∅, {p0}〉 and 〈{p0},∅〉 appear in
v. Recall from Definition 7.3.8 the notion of a Correia model’s being relatively determinate.
We observe that it is relatively determinate language closed models that correctly char-
acterize classical logic.
Theorem 7.3.7. Classical logic CL is characterized by the class of language closed models
that are relatively determinate, i.e., are determinate relative to At.
Proof. If v is both language closed and relatively determinate then the set of generators G(v)
contains precisely one of 〈{p},∅〉 or 〈∅, {p}〉 for each p ∈ At. Hence, the set F(v) contains








〈t, f〉 if 〈∅, {p}〉 ∈ v
〈f, t〉 if 〈{p},∅〉 ∈ v
As the bilateral truth values 〈t, f〉 and 〈f, t〉 can be identified with the unilateral values t and
f, respectively, it can be readily seen that v is essentially a classical valuation on At.
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Hence, there is an isomorphism between the class of relatively determinate, language
closed Correia models on the one hand and classical truth functions on the other. By means
of Lemma 7.2.1, then, we may confirm the theorem.
7.4 Conclusions and Future Research
In (49), Correia suggests two directions in which the study of AC should be taken: the study
of extensions of AC in languages with formulae of arbitrary degree (i.e., those in which one
permits nested arrows) and the study of the interpretation of his models. The first has been
tackled in Chapter 5, in which the similarity between AC and the first-degree fragment of
Parry’s PAI was exploited to describe a semantics for a higher degree system of analytic
containment in the style of Fine’s semantics of (81). It is hoped that in characterizing a host
of systems in terms of Correia’s models, the present inquiry goes some way to addressing
the second of Correia’s suggestions.
There are some very obvious questions that remain, e.g., we have in this study focused
only on systems that have previously appeared in the literature. However—as Figure 7.1
makes clear—there remain intermediate systems that correspond to classes of Correia models
that have not been described here. For example, considering only those vocabulary closed
Correia models that are consistent—without demanding that these models be unsigned—
would make the axiom A ∧̇ ¬̇A→ B valid while permitting counterexamples to the scheme
A→ A ∨̇ ¬̇A. To more fully catalog these systems is left for future research.
Of course, the analysis of one problem in formal logic commonly poses as many new
questions as those it answers, and the present inquiry is little different. To close, let us
consider two further and more difficult directions in which analysis of Correia semantics may
be taken.
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7.4.1 Extensions of AC∗
The foregoing analysis yields more than just a further semantical account of some many-
valued logics. By applying the above characterizations to Correia’s analysis of AC∗, these
characterizations also suggest a way to enrich classical propositional logic CL with operators
corresponding to, e.g., LP entailment.
In (9), Angell describes a system that Correia calls AC∗, considered by both Correia in
(49) and (50) and Fine in (87). To define AC∗, we will need to appeal to a richer language.
This language L ∗ will be defined as follows:
Definition 7.4.1. L ∗ is the language defined in Backus-Naur form where p ∈ At and
B ∈ L ⊃
fdf
:
A ::= p|B| ¬̇A|A ∧̇ A|A ∨̇ A|A ⊃ A
Correia uses A ↔ B as a shorthand for (A → B) ∧̇ (B → A). AC∗ may be described
syntactically by the following definition:
Definition 7.4.2. The axioms for AC∗ are:
AC∗1 A↔ ¬̇ ¬̇A
AC∗2 A→ A ∧̇ A
AC∗3 A ∧̇ B → A
AC∗4 A ∨̇ B → B ∨̇ A
AC∗5 A ∨̇ (B ∨̇ C)↔ (A ∨̇ B) ∨̇ C
AC∗6 A ∨̇ (B ∧̇ C)↔ (A ∨̇ B) ∧̇ (A ∨̇ C)
AC∗7 (A↔ B) ⊃ (¬̇A→ ¬̇B)
AC∗8 (A→ B) ⊃ (A ∨̇ C → B ∨̇ C)
AC∗9 (A→ B) ⊃ ((B → C) ⊃ (A→ C))
AC∗10 (A→ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
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AC∗ has detachment of the material conditional as its sole rule of inference:
AC∗11 From A and A ⊃ B, infer B
Defining Correia’s semantics for AC∗ requires a few intermediate definitions.
Definition 7.4.3. Let v be a classical valuation. Then ṽ is the Correia model defined by the
following;
{〈Γ,∆∪ {p}〉 | v(p) = 〈t, f〉 and Γ,∆ ⋐ Lit} ∪ {〈Γ ∪ {p},∆〉 | v(p) = 〈f, t〉 and Γ,∆ ⋐ Lit}.
It can be established that ṽ is just the Correia counterpart c(v) as defined in Definition 7.2.4.
Observation 7.4.1. When v is a classical valuation, ṽ = c(v).
Proof. Immediate from the definitions.
Now, rather than relying on the foregoing account of AC validity, when analyzing AC∗,
Correia insists on revising the notion of semantic consequence. Hence, we must introduce a
new operator v ⊆ L ⊃zdf ×L ⊃zdf.




 if Γ v A then Γ v B, and
 A v Γ iff A,B v Γ.
Definition 7.4.5. An AC∗ model is a pair 〈v,V〉 where v is a classical valuation and V is a
set of vocabulary closed Correia models such that c(v) ∈ V.
Then truth in a model is given by the definition:
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Definition 7.4.6. If 〈v,V〉 is an AC∗ model, then truth in the model is defined recursively:
 〈v,V〉 p if v(p) ∈ DCL for p ∈ At
 〈v,V〉 ¬̇A if 2〈v,V〉 A
 〈v,V〉 A ∨̇ B if 〈v,V〉 A or 〈v,V〉 B
 〈v,V〉 A→ B if for all v ∈ V, A v B
Clauses for conjunction and material implication can be inferred from the above in the usual
fashion.
Inasmuch as AC∗ permits us to talk about a species of nonclassical entailment within
classical logic, the foregoing inquiry into characterizing such entailment relations with respect
to Correia semantics suggests that studying extensions of AC∗ could prove useful.
For example, we could proof-theoretically extend Correia’s analysis of AC∗ to systems
such as an analogous LP∗:
Definition 7.4.7. LP∗ is the deductive system generated by AC∗ by removing the axiom AC∗7
and adding the axiom
LP∗1 A→ B ∨̇ ¬̇B
Now, as validity of A→ B in an AC∗ model is a function of the properties of the Correia mod-
els in V, it is natural to expect that one could immediately export the earlier correspondences
to likewise characterize, e.g., LP∗.
Curiously, as we will see, this is not the case.
Observation 7.4.2. LP∗ does not correspond to AC∗ models 〈v,V〉 in which each v ∈ V is
relatively complete and language closed.
Proof. We provide a counterexample. Let x be the set
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{〈{p0},∅〉} ∪ {〈{q},∅〉, 〈∅, {q}〉 | q 6= p0}
Then consider JxK—the language closure of x. As p ∈ ∆⋆JJxKK, because language closure entails
that JxK is unsigned, we may infer that p ∈ Γ⋆JJxKK as well. By construction, then, JxK is
relatively complete.
Now, we construct the necessary AC∗ model. Let v be a classical valuation; as c(v)
is language closed and relatively determinate, it is also relatively complete. Hence, the
AC∗ model 〈v, {c(v), JxK}〉 is such that each member of {c(v), JxK} is language closed and
relatively complete.
Now we are able to provide an instance of the axiom LP∗1, namely, p0 → p1 ∨̇ ¬̇ p1, that
fails in 〈v, {c(v), JxK}〉. By language closure, we infer that 〈{p1}, {p0, p1}〉 ∈ JxK . Hence, we
have the following sequence of inferences:
 p1 JJxKK p0, p1
 ∅ JJxKK p0, p1, ¬̇ p1
 ∅ JJxKK p0, p1 ∨̇ ¬̇ p1
 ¬̇ p0 JJxKK p1 ∨̇ ¬̇ p1
 ¬̇ p0, ¬̇(p1 ∨̇ ¬̇ p1) JJxKK ∅
However, we are unable to say that ¬̇ p0 JJxKK ∅. This would only be derivable from ∅ JJxKK p0,
which would be obtainable only if 〈∅, {p0}〉 ∈ JxK . But this Correia pair was omitted by
definition.
Thus, p0 JJxKK p1 ∨̇ ¬̇ p1 fails and we conclude that 2〈v,{c(v),JJxKK}〉 p0 → (p1 ∨̇ ¬̇ p1), i.e.,
LP∗1 is not valid in such models.
As a means of adding a variety of nonclassical entailment operators to classical logic, it will
be a worthwhile endeavor to more fully develop extensions of AC∗. Clearly the solution will
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require some further work. It is hoped that the further analysis of such systems can be fully
addressed in a future inquiry.
7.4.2 Clauses and Clutters
With respect to a vocabulary closed Correia model v, it has been an indispensable feature
that all information can be recovered from the set of its generators and its positive and
negative vocabularies. Moreover, in extensions of Efde, the set G(v) itself suffices. It is worth
making a few remarks concerning the structure of G(v).
First, clearly the literal projection τ defined in Definition 5.3.12 is a bijection and we may
consider G(v)τ without loss of generality. It is worthwhile to note that objects such as G(v)τ
are in fact quite common in the study of formal logic. A common treatment of formulae in
disjunctive normal form is to take sets of sets of literals—i.e., subsets of ℘(℘(Lit))—as a
faithful representation of a proposition and by construction for any v, G(v)τ ⊂ ℘(℘(Lit)).
Hence, structures such as G(v)τ have appeared frequently in the literature, most notably, in
the field of automated theorem proving.
Often, this representation of a proposition or formula is taken as a primitive notion. A
disjunction of literals is represented as a clause—a set of literals—and a conjunction of such
disjunctions is construed as a set of clauses. For example, putting quantifiers aside, the most
basic objects—the ‘natural syntactical units’—studied in, e.g., John Alan Robinson’s (164)
are sentences considered as finite collection of finite sets of literals.
What seems to underscore the potential interpretative fruits of such a correlation is
that containment logics like Angell’s AC have been independently discovered as arising from
precisely such structures. The articular models of Ray E. Jennings and Yue Chen were
described in (115) as a framework for analyzing entailment faithful to Gottfried Leibniz’s
vision of the structure of a proposition. Following remarks of Leibniz, they remark that
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[w]e are naturally inclined to interpret the literals as truth-sets, i.e., as members
of ℘(U) where U is the universe in a full propositional model. Accordingly
the articular representation of a sentence as a set of sets of literals under this
interpretation yields a collection of collections of subsets of U , i.e., a hypergraph
on ℘(U).(115, p. 105)
We will not review the details of the framework of Jennings and Chen but will rest by
suggesting a close relationship between the set of generators of a Correia model and the
notion of a hypergraph.
Definition 7.4.8. A hypergraph on a set X is a set of subsets of X, i.e., a set H ⊆ ℘(℘(X)).
A simple hypergraph—called a ‘clutter’ in (114)—is a particular type of hypergraph.
Definition 7.4.9. A simple hypergraph is a hypergraph H such that for all distinct E,E ′ ∈
H, E * E ′.
The relationship of Correia semantics and simple hypergraphs is clear:
Observation 7.4.3. For any Correia model v, 〈G(v),4〉 is isomorphic to a simple hyper-
graph.
Proof. Every element of the set G(v) is clearly incomparable to every other with respect to
4. For example, when 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ G(v), if 〈Γ,∆〉 4 〈Γ′,∆′〉, then 〈Γ′,∆′〉 /∈ G(v). Hence, each
element of G(v)τ is incomparable to every other with respect to the subset relation. But this
is to say that G(v)τ is a simple hypergraph on Lit.
AC independently appears (as ‘FDAE’ for ‘first-degree analytic entailment’ in (115)) as a
consequence relation arising from valuations that map literals to simple hypergraphs. This
reinforces the speculation that light may be shed on the interpretation of Correia models by
considering work on analyzing propositions as sets of clauses or simple hypergraphs.
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Beyond the matter of interpretation, though, examining the connection between Correia’s
semantics and these areas of research may also assist in obtaining further formal results. Ar-
ticular models are capable of capturing deductive behavior weaker than AC. Correia’s models,
for all their apparent idiosyncrasies, do in fact expose a limitation of presentation of AC in
Definition 5.2.3, that is, that the truth functional semantics does not immediately suggest a
means of modeling systems weaker than AC. There exist systems weaker than AC—such as
the first-degree fragment of Sören Halldén’s S0—that lack sufficient semantic analyses1 and,
as Correia demonstrates, Correia models without the requirement of vocabulary closure also
correspond to a proper subsystem of AC. Hence, to investigate the proximity of Correia’s
models to such semantical frameworks may yield accounts of first-degree deductive systems
that resist a natural analysis in the many-valued framework.
1While S0 (and hence S0fde) has a semantic analysis due to Sylvan and Meyer in (167), the semantics is
exceedingly artificial, as the authors freely concede.
Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
What have we accomplished by surveying a variety of occasions—linguistic, metaphysical,
computational—in which Parry’s Proscriptive Principle can be given an intuitive reading?
If anything has been accomplished, I hope that what has been shown is that systems
whose behavior more or less respects Parry’s criterion are not limited by their failure to
perfectly capture the notion of Kantian analyticity. Rather, we are afforded a much broader
range of interpretations than Parry’s critics—or his sympathizers, for that matter—had
previously allowed. We have surveyed numerous contexts in which this type of behavior
arises: We have observed that many approaches to the linguistic notion of meaninglessness
or nonsense lead to behavior very similar to the Proscriptive Principle, for example. In meta-
physics, we discussed how the Parry systems of Angell’s AC and Correia’s Cor arise in Fine’s
state space semantics and how this analysis can be applied to resolve some puzzling features
of Restall’s truthmaker semantics. That we have examined such systems in the settings of
bilattices, dynamic logic, and constructive logic suggests that researchers in artificial intelli-
gence or the philosophy of mathematics may themselves benefit from the utility of Parry’s
intuitions. And by considering catastrophic errors in computation—when a program hangs
or is unable to retrieve a value—we provided semantics for several of these systems in terms
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of programs.
Most of the foregoing chapters have included suggestions for future research, in which we
have identified a number of investigations regrettably set aside, e.g., looking into Halldén’s
S0, developing a theory of Parry systems on logical multilattices in general, providing ax-
iomatizations of the intensional containment logics included in Deutsch’s S. As we close,
however, I would like consider future directions with a broader brush, by describing several
of the limitations of this dissertation and the directions in which this work may be taken.
8.1 Refining the Notion of Content
Much of the criticism leveled against Parry’s PAI is tacitly related to the fact that the notion
of content it assumes is relatively coarse-grained. In the context of Parry-type systems, we
have refined this notion to some degree by the introduction of positive and negative content,
but further refinements can be made. (81) contains a number of suggestions concerning how
the notion of content or subject-matter can be given a more fine-grained analysis.
8.1.1 The Content of Entailments
For one, the syncategoramatic terms—i.e., the connectives—have played no role in determin-
ing the content of a complex formula in this dissertation. Providing a more subtle reading to
the connectives that takes into account the contribution of such syncategoramatic elements
to a proposition’s overall content is a project that has been suggested by Fine in (81) but
has not yet received an adequate investigation.
With respect to the extensional connectives, it is unclear that one should place too heavy
an emphasis on their contribution. Undoubtedly, between an atom p and the conjunction
p ∧̇ p, the latter ‘contains’ the concept of conjunction in a way that the former lacks.
Despite this, when we go so far as to suggest that the propositions p ∨̇ p and p ∧̇ p express
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incommensurate propositions—the incommensurability between which is understood as an
undesirable feature of Suszko and Bloom’s SCI of (29) and (30)—it seems that the notion
of content becomes so fine-grained as to be indistinguishable from syntax. (And indeed,
Suszko and Bloom’s basic SCI treats even p ∨̇ q and q ∨̇ p as corresponding to wholly
distinct propositions.) To allow this much weight to syncategoramatic terms is to lurch too
far in this direction.
Despite this, the contribution that the notion of entailment makes to the content of a
proposition in which it appears seems distinct from the contribution of the truth-functional
connectives. On its face, it seems far fetched to suggest that the content of extensional claims
about the world—conjunctions and disjunctions of simple atomic statements—includes the
concept of intensional entailment. This intuition bears some resemblance to the classical
is/ought problem: The assertion that some entailment or other is valid is, in a strong sense,
as normative a claim as any of Hume’s ‘oughts,’ and the assertion that A → B just as
clearly ‘expresses some new relation or affirmation’ (108, p. 469) not discoverable in mere
extensional facts.
This intuition is reflected in the Ackermann property—and its converse—common to
many relevant logics. This property—first shown to hold of Wilhelm Ackerman’s Π in (3)
and (4)—is the criterion that every valid entailment of the form A→ (B → C) is such that
the symbol ‘→’ appears in A (or a falsum constant ⊥). When taken up by Anderson and
Belnap, the Ackermann property and its converse become something of a motto:
Entailments are sui generis in the following sense: only entailments entail entail-
ments... Moreover, it is never the case that the denial of an entailment entails
an entailment.[p. 718](5)
Parry actually identifies this criterion as a ‘proscriptive principle,’ although he is skeptical
of its validity:
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This... anticipates the later doubt about [the axiom f(p)→ (p→ p)] stimulated
by the (proscriptive) principle of Ackermann and Anderson-Belnap, that only
entailments entail entailments. But it still seems to me that in any case a non-
entailment may entail an entailment.(148, p. 105)
Parry’s skepticism notwithstanding, the interpretation of the Ackermann property and its
converse as a thesis about analytic implication enjoys quite a bit of plausibility. The devel-
opment of modifications to PAI in which this Humean-style criterion is taken into account it
worthy of exploration.
A further wrinkle in considering the content of formulae including entailments appears
when we make the move to positive and negative subject-matter or content. For example,
when considering the conditional as a primitive, the syntax of a conditional A→ B strongly
suggests that the formulae A and B are employed in a ‘positive’ sense in the formula. This
is especially clear in the Hempel case—i.e., the sentence ‘all ravens are black’—in which the
default position seems to be that one is talking—positively—about ravens and blackness,
rather than non-ravens and non-blackness. This default position was reflected in Definition
5.4.1, in which models for the Parry-like PAC described the positive content of a conditional
A→ B as the union of the positive content of A and the positive content of B.
In Definition 5.4.1 we described the negative content of A→ B in an analogous fashion—
as the union of the negative contents of both A and B. But this, I suspect, parts ways with
the polarities of one’s assertions when one denies a conditional. To deny A → B on many
readings—such as Nelson’s in (135)—is to suggest a counterexample in which A is true and
B is false. The Nelsonian identification of ¬̇(A → B) and A ∧̇ ¬̇B—i.e., that the two
have identical meanings—entails that the two have identical content, suggesting that the
valence of A remains positive in the negative content of A → B. To revise Definition 5.4.1
to incorporate this assertion in the content functions γ+ and γ− might appear as follows:
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 γ+(A→ B) = γ+(A) ∪ γ+(B)
 γ−(A→ B) = γ+(A) ∪ γ−(B)
Such a definition appears to be entirely natural. Axiomatizing not only PAC but also its
cousin determined by this alternative, Nelsonian account of the positive and negative content
of an entailment is a compelling next step to take.
8.1.2 Quantification
One of the upshots of the present interpretations of first-degree, propositional Parry sys-
tems is that they provide new frameworks within which to examine the various notions in
conceptivist systems. One such notion that has been thus far ill-understood in conceptivist
systems is quantification and predicate extensions. In general, quantificational extensions
of Parry systems have been guided by inchoate notions of ‘concepts’ and ‘content.’ Being
guided by concepts from the realms of computation and linguistics has the benefit of casting
such concepts in a different light.
Many of the motivating themes that we have invoked are implicitly about a first-order
framework. For example, many of the motivations for the development of logics of nonsense
explicitly invoked the application of predicates to objects, e.g., the notion of a ‘category mis-
take’ presupposes such a framework. While the propositional languages we have considered
are capable of modeling theses concerning, e.g., meaningless statements or retrieving values
for sentences, they are insufficiently expressive to represent the problematic cases themselves.
There have been a number of attempts to develop a quantification theory for conceptivist
systems. For example, in (81), Fine briefly considers the matter of how to carry over Parry’s
intuitions from the propositional case to the first order case and, as mentioned, Daniels’
story semantics of (54) and Loptson’s discussion in (129) and (130) provide quantification
theories that are by and large harmonious with Parry’s intuitions.
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Especially salient is the question of whether the content of a universal sentence ∀xA
contains the content of each of its substitution instances A(x := a). From the perspective
of (54), it seems clear that a universal formula should not be thought of as containing
all ‘names’; the appearance of the line ‘Everyone was an accomplice’ (and, therefore, the
tacit endorsement of its truth) in a Sherlock Holmes tale should not entail that ‘Flash
Gordon was an accomplice,’ as this runs afoul of the prohibition against introducing ‘new
and unwanted names.’1 Fine himself provides a similar argument from our apparent ability
to grasp universal sentences, observing that ‘in order to understand ∀xA(x) I need not know
(or, at least possess names for) the objects in the domain of the quantifier.’ (81, p. 178)
Fine gestures towards some ways of looking at the content of a first order sentence in terms
of his semilattices of concepts, but he arrives at nothing definitive.
Furthermore, the interpretation of such systems in terms of computation might also yield
a natural way of extending the picture to quantified formulae. Seating the discussion in
terms of computation allows us to look at the question in a different light.
Rather than being forced into the question of whether the content of a universal sentence
contains all names, it may be fruitful to instead think of a formula ∀xA as being evaluated
by a routine for each name in the environment in parallel. Hence, if the algorithm does not
halt on evaluating ∀xA—and assigns it a value of 1—then for any name a recognized by the
environment, the algorithm evaluating A(x := a) can be run. Whether to accept or to reject
the inference ∀xA  A(x := a) if a function of whether one allows names not recognized by
the environment.
Likewise, considering the inference A(a)  ∃x(x := a) becomes rather straightforward, if
only we interpret ∃xA as being evaluated by a routine that runs on all names a and asks
1This description of the prohibition does not necessarily presuppose cases in which, e.g., all elements of
some domain are assigned names (or constants). Even if the name ‘Flash Gordon’ is not, e.g., expressible
within the bounds of a Sherlock Holmes story, Daniels’ position equally suggests that the proposition that
Flash Gordon was an accomplice is not part of the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Everyone was an
accomplice.’
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whether A(x := a) is true. If we take names to be governed by the environment, then the
fact that A(x := a) can be successfully evaluated says nothing concerning whether a routine
evaluating A(x := b) will terminate.
In each case, the present approach may allow us to export the duties performed by
the machinery of Fine’s semilattices of concepts to valuation functions themselves. The
first-degree conceptivist systems described in Section 4.3.3 secure the Proscriptive Principle
without such a semantical apparatus; whether this can be extended to first order or higher
degree systems remains to be seen. Thoroughly applying the interpretations covered in this
dissertation to higher degree and first order systems is a matter for another day. Yet it seems
apparent that such approaches would recast the analysis of these formal matters and might
allow for a more intuitive way to extend conceptivist intuitions to these cases.
8.2 Related Deductive Calculi
Over the course of the foregoing material, we have succeeded in drawing together a number
of a priori disparate approaches to deduction. Much work still remains, however. There are
two families of deductive systems that we have largely ignored that deserve to be identified
as natural targets for further study: For one, there exist systems that are dual to Parry logics
in that their respective accounts of entailment require that content be introduced to—rather
than the decomposed from—that of the antecedent. Secondly, the constellation of extensions
to and subsystems of Parry’s PAI is far from mapped out.
8.2.1 Dual Systems
If it is tempting to read Parry’s Proscriptive Principle as the requirement that entailments be
analytic—so that the concepts of the consequent already appear in those of the antecedent—
then it seems just as natural to consider whether an analogous principle might correspond
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to something resembling Kantian ampliativity.
Now, such a property dual to Parry’s Proscriptive Principle has appeared as the ‘converse
Parry property’ by Kosta Dos̆en in (63) or as a property of ‘dual dependence’ by Epstein
in (71), according to which for any valid entailment A → B all atoms appearing in A also
appear in B.
Of course, if the legitimacy of Parry’s logic as a correct exegesis of Kantian analytic
reasoning is strained, then the suitability of this dual property as capturing ampliative rea-
soning seems even more problematic. But we aren’t beholden to a Kantian reading of this
dual property, either; one of the upshots of the foregoing chapters has been the availability
of many alternative readings of Parry’s criterion.
Such readings are available to converse Parry systems as well. In (70), Richard Epstein
remarks that his system DualD—effectively the dual system to the Dunn-Epstein system
DAI—was interpreted by Douglas Walton as a ‘logic of actions’ in (191). On Walton’s
interpretation, the validity of an entailment corresponds to the successful application of
an action in bringing about new information. One obvious problem is to provide analyses
that similarly act as dual, ‘ampliative’ counterparts to the systems in the neighborhood of
PAI. While Fine’s semantics can be adjusted without difficulty to allow only ampliative
entailments, much work remains, e.g., examining axiomatizations of these dual systems and
describing their properties.
Moreover, it seems that the techniques in this dissertation can be directly applied to
provide interpretations for systems like DualD. For example, Chapters 2 and 5 relied heavily
on the status of the Bochvar-Kleene nonsense logic Σ0 as ‘almost Parry.’ Not surprisingly,
Halldén’s C0, too, can be understood in similar terms and given an analogous characterization
in terms of classical validity and the containment of atoms. The feature that is cognate
with the failure of Addition in Σ0, for example, is the failure of Conjunctive Simplification,
i.e., the inference from A ∧̇ B to A. Most prominently, Roberto Ciuni in (44) and Ciuni
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and Massimiliano Carrara in (45) have considered interpretations and characterizations of
C0 (referred to as ‘PWK’ for ‘paraconsistent weak Kleene’) that are harmonious with the
foregoing interpretation of Σ0.
That such an analysis can induce converse Parry systems in the first-degree case has been
confirmed by Damian Szmuc. In (187), Szmuc dualizes the techniques found in Chapter 6 to
provide bilattice semantics for ‘track-down’ operations that give rise to the deductive calculi
FDEPWK and dAC, which are dual to Sfde (called ‘FDEWK’ by Szmuc) and AC, respectively.
In this setting, Fitting’s epistemic interpretation of cut-down operations on bilattices from
(91) immediately yields epistemic interpretations of ‘track-down’ operations and, in turn,
intensional interpretations of these converse Parry calculi.
8.2.2 Other Parry Systems
The literature contains a wider family of Parry logics than has been acknowledged in this
dissertation. Some of these systems were introduced with Parry’s PAI in mind and others
have been described wholly independently of Parry’s enterprise. While we have acknowledged
a number of these systems in the foregoing pages, many have been relegated to footnotes
and many systems have not been rigorously considered qua Parry logics. A full picture of
containment logic, of course, would require that these systems—outlined in Figure 8.1—be
given an analogous treatment and, because a full picture is ultimately desirable, we might
consider some of the regrettable omissions in outline.
First to be mentioned is the lack of sufficient analyses for the three subsystems of PAI
appearing in Figure 8.1.
Most conspicuous of the omitted subsystems is the lack of a semantical analysis of Parry’s
original system AI of (143). Recall that Fine’s (81) analyzes a proper extension by including
the axiom (A ∧̇ ¬̇B) → ¬̇(A → B). Because Parry claimed that he had endorsed this
axiom as far back as 1957 and ultimately endorsed Fine’s semantics as harmonious with












Figure 8.1: Deductive Systems in the Neighborhood of PAI
his intuitions, the discovery of a semantics for AI would presumably have little worth as a
guide to Parry’s philosophy. As a formal matter, however, the lack of a semantics for AI is
a regrettable deficiency of this dissertation and it is worth investigating whether AI can be
given a Fine-style analysis by making subtle changes to Fine’s analysis.
A further deficiency is the lack of a Fine-style analysis of Daniels’ logic S⋆. The first-degree
fragment of the system has made many appearances over the course of this dissertation and
the intensional system—as Daniels notes—enjoys the Proscriptive Principle. Indeed, by a
brief inspection of the axiomatization found in (54), it can be confirmed that each theorem of
the system is a theorem of PAI. Now, the ‘story semantics’ Daniels provides in (54) bears little
resemblance to the Fine-style analysis of PAI, but it seems plausible that a correspondence
between the two frameworks can be provided. Due to the similarity between Daniels’ remarks
on implication and content and the foregoing Observation 5.4.3, my own suspicion is that
S⋆ is the system PFDEϕ defined semantically in Definition 5.4.4. The task of generating a
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correspondence governing the relationship between S⋆ and PFDEϕ—or at least an analysis
thereof—is unfortunately still outstanding but is well worth picking up in the future.
The final subsystem that has been set aside is Halldén’s system S0 described in (103). S0
is historically notable as—arguably—the first paraconsistent system introduced, appearing
in the same year as Jaśkowski’s (112). But in introducing S0, Halldén was not trying to codify
any freestanding intuitions concerning entailment, but rather he intended to make a formal
observation concerning Lewis’ logic of strict implication S1. In S1, the strict implication
connective is not primitive, but is defined in terms of ✸, so that
ϕ→ ψ =df ¬✸(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
appears in its axiomatization. S0 is defined as the deductive system determined by omitting
this definition from the rules and axioms of S1. What Halldén shows is that by taking the
implication connective as primitive and eliminating this definition, even if all the axioms of
S1 governing the behavior of the connective are retained, the resulting logic is quite different
than S1.
S0 seems to have been nearly forgotten until being resurrected by Parry in (145)—which
appears in full as (146)—in which Parry observes that the system S0 is properly contained
in AI. Hence, S0 is a →-Parry system and it would be desirable to analyze the system qua
containment logic.
While Sylvan and Meyer provided a semantical analysis of S0 in (167), the framework they
provide is intended to provide a semantics for every axiomatic deductive calculus. Hence,
Sylvan and Meyer’s semantics for S0 is not motivated by any set of features particular to S0.
Whether Halldén’s system can be given an analysis in line with Fine’s (81) is an interesting
question and one worth pursuing. It seems likely, for example, by adapting the content
semilattices to the case of Cresswell’s neighborhood semantics for S1 in (52) might provide
an appropriate account of S0.
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The dissertation has also stopped short of analyzing two extensions of PAI in which the
language is enriched by the addition of a unary necessity operator. Both systems—Loptson’s
AI-Q from (130) and Urquhart’s AIN from (188)—are interesting in their own rights from
both philosophical and formal perspectives and deserve to be reexamined in the future.
Loptson’s AI-Q, introduced in (130), enriches PAI by adding a modal operator whose
behavior is modeled after Arthur Prior’s modal logic Q. AI-Q is interesting as its introduction
is accompanied by a very detailed and reasonable philosophical argument for its legitimacy,
some of which was mentioned in Chapter 3. Although the question of whether an analysis
can be given along the lines of Fine’s analysis of PAI is a compelling one—and should, I think,
be taken up—Loptson’s (130) provides an axiom system for AI-Q and describes a semantics
with respect to which the axiom system is sound. Completeness with respect to Loptson’s
semantics is not demonstrated, however, so there remain open questions about the system
independent of this dissertation.
Urquhart was one of the three philosophers to contemporarily take up Parry’s system
anew in the 1970s and 1980s, joining Dunn’s (65) and Fine’s (81) with his own system AIN in
(188). While AI-Q adds to PAI a modality like that of Q, Urquhart enriches the demodalized
DAI with a modality corresponding to S4.
Especially interesting is a conjecture that Urquhart makes in the concluding remarks of
(188). Motivated by the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski-style embeddings of intuitionistic logic into
S4 found in (100) and (133), Urquhart conjectures that a similar translation (✷) allows the
embedding of PAI into AI. More informally, the conjecture states that A is provable in PAI
if and only if A✷ is provable in AIN. To the best of my knowledge, this conjecture has been
neither proven nor refuted, and investigating Urquhart’s conjecture further appears to be a
worthwhile pursuit.
In contrast to AI-Q and AIN, which enrich the language of PAI, we have also neglected to
discuss a family of implicational systems in the language L→. In (138), Marek Nowak studies
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the implicational fragments PAI→ and DAI→—calling them ‘Mα’ and ‘M1,’ respectively—and
two extensions to these systems. The extensions themselves—M′α and M2—are not terribly
interesting as sets of theorems. The theorems of the respective systems correspond to the set
of S4 and S5 validities that meet Parry’s criterion (what would be called ‘S4PP’ and ‘S5PP’
in the language of Chapter 2) and therefore are subject to Sylvan’s criticism of a ‘double-
barrelled analysis’ in the worst way. Nevertheless, Nowak’s axiomatizations are intriguing—it
is admittedly not obvious how one could provide a Hilbert-style account of M′α and M2—and
studying Nowak’s axiom systems in more detail may well prove instructive.
8.3 Conclusion
Clearly, the work initiated by Parry in (143) is still far from finished. We leave unexplored
myriad avenues—avenues of both philosophical and formal interest—that lead from Parry’s
own work to frontiers not imagined by Parry.
It is painfully obvious, when the limitations of this dissertation are surveyed, that the
foregoing material makes little more than a dent in exploring the themes of Parry’s work.
But I think that, at the very least, I have succeeded in demonstrating that those who have
decried Parry’s work as nothing more than syntactical gimmickry were premature in their
assessment. We have surveyed a very wide range of occasions in which Parry’s intuitions
are relevant and the breadth of these applications reinforces a suspicion that the study of
Parry’s work proves to be a rewarding exercise.
It is my hope that the thoughts contained in this dissertation—however meandering they
may have been—succeed in kindling a new interest in Parry and his techniques, and that
the work left unfinished in the foregoing pages will be pursued.
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6(4):335–359.
[169] Russell, B. (1918). The philosophy of logical atomism. The Monist, 4(1):495–527.
[170] Russell, B. (1920). Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin,
London, second edition.
[171] Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson’s University Library, London.
[172] Segerberg, K. (1965). A contribution to nonsense-logics. Theoria, 31(3):199–217.
[173] Shramko, Y. (2016). Truth, falsehood, information, and beyond: The American plan
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